https://bugs.koha-community.org/bugzilla3/show_bug.cgi?id=7550
--- Comment #26 from Marc Véron <[email protected]> --- (In reply to Marcel de Rooy from comment #24) > (In reply to Marc Véron from comment #14) > > Hmm, my patch worked with a hash generated with the image file (as > > recommended in comment #7), and it did not leave a security hole with > > SelfCheckoutByLogin="barcode" > > Looks to me that this option is a security hole on itself? > If I guess barcodes, I can still see all images? If I come on sco-main, I > will automatically get the image from the img tag as well? Or do I > misunderstand the discussion here? We have two situations: Situation # 1 - SCO is up and running. A user logs in with what ever credentioals necessary, depending on SelfCheckoutByLogin - User copies the image link into the address bar of a new browser window. It is something like: .../cgi-bin/koha/sco/sco-patron-image.pl?borrowernumber=XXXX - User changes the borrowernumber - Image of an other user is displayed (should not be possible) That's what this bug is about. Problem is solved by adding an unguessable token to the link. Problem #2 - SCO is up and running. SelfCheckOut is set to barcode (i.e. card number) - Someboy comes along the SCO station and tries to log in by guessing card numbers. If the numbering pattern is simple, there is a good chance that they can break in. That's what this bug is not about. IMO problem #2 should be discussed and addressed in a new bug. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are watching all bug changes. _______________________________________________ Koha-bugs mailing list [email protected] http://lists.koha-community.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/koha-bugs website : http://www.koha-community.org/ git : http://git.koha-community.org/ bugs : http://bugs.koha-community.org/
