On Tue, 2009-09-08 at 14:41 +0800, Avi Kivity wrote:
> On 09/07/2009 11:48 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote:
> >
> >> #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP
> >>
> >> int kvm_set_irq_level(kvm_context_t kvm, int irq, int level, int
> >> *status)
> >> @@ -1515,6 +1546,38 @@ static void sig_ipi_handler(int n)
> >> {
> >> }
> >>
> >> +static void sigbus_handler(int n, struct signalfd_siginfo *siginfo,
> >> void *ctx)
> >> +{
> >> + if (siginfo->ssi_code == BUS_MCEERR_AO) {
> >> + uint64_t status;
> >> + unsigned long paddr;
> >> + CPUState *cenv;
> >> +
> >> + /* Hope we are lucky for AO MCE */
> >
> > Even if the error was limited to guest memory, it could have been
> > generated by either the kernel or userspace reading guest memory, no?
> >
> > Does this potentially open a security hole for us? Consider the
> > following:
> >
> > 1) We happen to read guest memory and that causes an MCE. For
> > instance, say we're in virtio.c and we read the virtio ring.
> > 2) That should trigger the kernel to generate a sigbus.
> > 3) We catch sigbus, and queue an MCE for delivery.
> > 4) After sigbus handler completes, we're back in virtio.c, what was
> > the value of the memory operation we just completed?
> >
> > If the instruction gets skipped, we may be leaking host memory because
> > the access never happened.
> >
>
> I think it's a lot safer to only report guest mode accesses to the
> guest, and let user mode accesses terminate qemu. The guest wouldn't
> expect 100% recovery; for example if an uncorrectable error hit a vital
> kernel data structure.
Yes, this is the current behavior. If MCE is caused by user mode
accessing, the KVM will be killed by force_sig_info, only MCE caused by
guest mode accessing will be captured by SIGBUS signal handler.
Best Regards,
Huang Ying
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