If we have pointer authentication support, a guest may wish to use it.
This patch adds the infrastructure to allow it to do so.

This is sufficient for basic testing, but not for real-world usage. A
guest will still see pointer authentication support advertised in the ID
registers, and we will need to trap accesses to these to provide
santized values.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]> 
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 15 +++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h    | 12 ++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c       | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h 
b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
index f5ea0ba..0c3cb43 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/cpucaps.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/virt.h>
 
@@ -49,6 +51,19 @@ static inline void vcpu_reset_hcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
                vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= HCR_E2H;
        if (test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_EL1_32BIT, vcpu->arch.features))
                vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~HCR_RW;
+
+       /*
+        * Address auth and generic auth share the same enable bits, so we have
+        * to ensure both are uniform before we can enable support in a guest.
+        * Until we have the infrastructure to detect uniform absence of a
+        * feature, only permit the case when both are supported.
+        *
+        * Note that a guest will still see the feature in ID_AA64_ISAR1 until
+        * we introduce code to emulate the ID registers.
+        */
+       if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH) &&
+           cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH))
+               vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long vcpu_get_hcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h 
b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index e7705e7..b25f710 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -133,6 +133,18 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
        PMSWINC_EL0,    /* Software Increment Register */
        PMUSERENR_EL0,  /* User Enable Register */
 
+       /* Pointer Authentication Registers */
+       APIAKEYLO_EL1,
+       APIAKEYHI_EL1,
+       APIBKEYLO_EL1,
+       APIBKEYHI_EL1,
+       APDAKEYLO_EL1,
+       APDAKEYHI_EL1,
+       APDBKEYLO_EL1,
+       APDBKEYHI_EL1,
+       APGAKEYLO_EL1,
+       APGAKEYHI_EL1,
+
        /* 32bit specific registers. Keep them at the end of the range */
        DACR32_EL2,     /* Domain Access Control Register */
        IFSR32_EL2,     /* Instruction Fault Status Register */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c
index 9341376..3440b42 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 
+#include <asm/cpucaps.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
 
@@ -31,6 +33,24 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_do_nothing(struct 
kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) { }
  * pstate, and guest must save everything.
  */
 
+#define __save_ap_key(regs, key) \
+       regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1); \
+       regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1)
+
+static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_ap_keys(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
+{
+       if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH)) {
+               __save_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
+               __save_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
+               __save_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
+               __save_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
+       }
+
+       if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH)) {
+               __save_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
+       }
+}
+
 static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_common_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
 {
        ctxt->sys_regs[ACTLR_EL1]       = read_sysreg(actlr_el1);
@@ -41,6 +61,8 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_common_state(struct 
kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
        ctxt->gp_regs.regs.sp           = read_sysreg(sp_el0);
        ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pc           = read_sysreg_el2(elr);
        ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pstate       = read_sysreg_el2(spsr);
+
+       __sysreg_save_ap_keys(ctxt);
 }
 
 static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
@@ -84,6 +106,25 @@ void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_guest_state(struct 
kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
        __sysreg_save_common_state(ctxt);
 }
 
+#define __restore_ap_key(regs, key) \
+       write_sysreg_s(regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1], SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1); \
+       write_sysreg_s(regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1], SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1)
+
+static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_ap_keys(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
+{
+       if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH)) {
+               __restore_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
+               __restore_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
+               __restore_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
+               __restore_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
+       }
+
+       if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH)) {
+               __restore_ap_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
+       }
+}
+
+
 static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_common_state(struct kvm_cpu_context 
*ctxt)
 {
        write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[ACTLR_EL1],   actlr_el1);
@@ -94,6 +135,8 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_common_state(struct 
kvm_cpu_context *ctx
        write_sysreg(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.sp,       sp_el0);
        write_sysreg_el2(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pc,   elr);
        write_sysreg_el2(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pstate, spsr);
+
+       __sysreg_restore_ap_keys(ctxt);
 }
 
 static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
-- 
1.9.1

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