On Sat, 2005-11-05 at 04:33 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Hi, > > > Your comment that the administrator controls the boot loader is true > > today. It will probably continue to be true that the administrator can > > *replace* the OS. Given coming changes in PC architecture, it will > > probably *not* continue to be true that this can be done without > > detection, and it will not necessarily be true that changing the OS > > will allow successful inspection of data written by the previous OS. > > And who will do this detection, other then the admin? Or do you mean > Treacherous Computing, introducing another "trusted" entity even more > out of your control?
What you call "treacherous computing" is in fact a value-neutral technology. Freedom advocates have been so busy deriding DRM that they have utterly failed to consider other, socially positive uses of this technology. > My point is that no matter how hard you try, you can't change the fact > that ultimately the users need to trust the one controlling the machine. > Nothing in your system design can really change this. Yes, I have understood your point for several rounds of email now. The problem is that your assertion is contrary to fact. You *have*, however, convinced me that you do not understand secure boot and its implications for system architectures that robustly defend their users from espionage, including administrator espionage. shap _______________________________________________ L4-hurd mailing list L4-hurd@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/l4-hurd
