Scribit Michal Suchanek dies 05/05/2006 hora 15:26: > > But this control is a very very hypothetical one, and I'm not even > > sure it is theoretically possible. There you do not take active > > defense, but merely paranoid abusive defense, IMHO. > I do not think that this is very hypothetical. The manufacturer of the > TPM chips is in a position where their components cannot be verified > (because their function requires that) yet the chips are the central > part that guarantees the security and reliability of a DRM system (or > any system using the TPM chip).
It is not central in security nor in reliability! It provides only a certification mechanism, and has nothing to do with securing the system from outside. And it has absolutely nothing with the reliability of the system... So the chip, for what I know, is totally unable to give anyone control over the system. If there is the slightest chance of it, just advocate very strongly for the TC chip to be removable and replaceable. > And while a certificate can be revoked, revoking TPM chips may be much > harder. Which is a very strong flaw in it's design. It should be possible to change it, I think. And if you're not happy with it, maybe you could burn it. Quickly, Nowhere man -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] OpenPGP 0xD9D50D8A
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
_______________________________________________ L4-hurd mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/l4-hurd
