> New Yorker Magazine, April 17, 2006 issue >THE IRAN PLANS > >by SEYMOUR M. HERSH > >Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb? > > >The Bush Administration, while publicly advocating diplomacy in >order to stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, has increased >clandestine activities inside Iran and intensified planning for a >possible major air attack. Current and former American military and >intelligence officials said that Air Force planning groups are >drawing up lists of targets, and teams of American combat troops >have been ordered into Iran, under cover, to collect targeting data >and to establish contact with anti-government ethnic-minority >groups. The officials say that President Bush is determined to deny >the Iranian regime the opportunity to begin a pilot program, planned >for this spring, to enrich uranium. > >American and European intelligence agencies, and the International >Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), agree that Iran is intent on >developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons. But there are >widely differing estimates of how long that will take, and whether >diplomacy, sanctions, or military action is the best way to prevent >it. Iran insists that its research is for peaceful use only, in >keeping with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that it will >not be delayed or deterred. > >There is a growing conviction among members of the United States >military, and in the international community, that President Bush's >ultimate goal in the nuclear confrontation with Iran is regime >change. Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has challenged the >reality of the Holocaust and said that Israel must be "wiped off the >map." Bush and others in the White House view him as a potential >Adolf Hitler, a former senior intelligence official said. "That's >the name they're using. They say, 'Will Iran get a strategic weapon >and threaten another world war?' " > >A government consultant with close ties to the civilian leadership >in the Pentagon said that Bush was "absolutely convinced that Iran >is going to get the bomb" if it is not stopped. He said that the >President believes that he must do "what no Democrat or Republican, >if elected in the future, would have the courage to do," and "that >saving Iran is going to be his legacy." > >One former defense official, who still deals with sensitive issues >for the Bush Administration, told me that the military planning was >premised on a belief that "a sustained bombing campaign in Iran will >humiliate the religious leadership and lead the public to rise up >and overthrow the government." He added, "I was shocked when I heard >it, and asked myself, 'What are they smoking?' " > >The rationale for regime change was articulated in early March by >Patrick Clawson, an Iran expert who is the deputy director for >research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and who >has been a supporter of President Bush. "So long as Iran has an >Islamic republic, it will have a nuclear-weapons program, at least >clandestinely," Clawson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee >on March 2nd. "The key issue, therefore, is: How long will the >present Iranian regime last?" > >When I spoke to Clawson, he emphasized that "this Administration is >putting a lot of effort into diplomacy." However, he added, Iran had >no choice other than to accede to America's demands or face a >military attack. Clawson said that he fears that Ahmadinejad "sees >the West as wimps and thinks we will eventually cave in. We have to >be ready to deal with Iran if the crisis escalates." Clawson said >that he would prefer to rely on sabotage and other clandestine >activities, such as "industrial accidents." But, he said, it would >be prudent to prepare for a wider war, "given the way the Iranians >are acting. This is not like planning to invade Quebec." > >One military planner told me that White House criticisms of Iran and >the high tempo of planning and clandestine activities amount to a >campaign of "coercion" aimed at Iran. "You have to be ready to go, >and we'll see how they respond," the officer said. "You have to >really show a threat in order to get Ahmadinejad to back down." He >added, "People think Bush has been focussed on Saddam Hussein since >9/11," but, "in my view, if you had to name one nation that was his >focus all the way along, it was Iran." (In response to detailed >requests for comment, the White House said that it would not comment >on military planning but added, "As the President has indicated, we >are pursuing a diplomatic solution"; the Defense Department also >said that Iran was being dealt with through "diplomatic channels" >but wouldn't elaborate on that; the C.I.A. said that there were >"inaccuracies" in this account but would not specify them.) > >"This is much more than a nuclear issue," one high-ranking diplomat >told me in Vienna. "That's just a rallying point, and there is still >time to fix it. But the Administration believes it cannot be fixed >unless they control the hearts and minds of Iran. The real issue is >who is going to control the Middle East and its oil in the next ten >years." > >A senior Pentagon adviser on the war on terror expressed a similar >view. "This White House believes that the only way to solve the >problem is to change the power structure in Iran, and that means >war," he said. The danger, he said, was that "it also reinforces the >belief inside Iran that the only way to defend the country is to >have a nuclear capability." A military conflict that destabilized >the region could also increase the risk of terror: "Hezbollah comes >into play," the adviser said, referring to the terror group that is >considered one of the world's most successful, and which is now a >Lebanese political party with strong ties to Iran. "And here comes >Al Qaeda." > >In recent weeks, the President has quietly initiated a series of >talks on plans for Iran with a few key senators and members of >Congress, including at least one Democrat. A senior member of the >House Appropriations Committee, who did not take part in the >meetings but has discussed their content with his colleagues, told >me that there had been "no formal briefings," because "they're >reluctant to brief the minority. They're doing the Senate, somewhat >selectively." > >The House member said that no one in the meetings "is really >objecting" to the talk of war. "The people they're briefing are the >same ones who led the charge on Iraq. At most, questions are raised: >How are you going to hit all the sites at once? How are you going to >get deep enough?" (Iran is building facilities underground.) >"There's no pressure from Congress" not to take military action, the >House member added. "The only political pressure is from the guys >who want to do it." Speaking of President Bush, the House member >said, "The most worrisome thing is that this guy has a messianic >vision." > >Some operations, apparently aimed in part at intimidating Iran, are >already under way. American Naval tactical aircraft, operating from >carriers in the Arabian Sea, have been flying simulated >nuclear-weapons delivery missions-rapid ascending maneuvers known as >"over the shoulder" bombing-since last summer, the former official >said, within range of Iranian coastal radars. > >Last month, in a paper given at a conference on Middle East security >in Berlin, Colonel Sam Gardiner, a military analyst who taught at >the National War College before retiring from the Air Force, in >1987, provided an estimate of what would be needed to destroy Iran's >nuclear program. Working from satellite photographs of the known >facilities, Gardiner estimated that at least four hundred targets >would have to be hit. He added: > >I don't think a U.S. military planner would want to stop there. Iran >probably has two chemical-production plants. We would hit those. We >would want to hit the medium-range ballistic missiles that have just >recently been moved closer to Iraq. There are fourteen airfields >with sheltered aircraft. . . . We'd want to get rid of that threat. >We would want to hit the assets that could be used to threaten Gulf >shipping. That means targeting the cruise-missile sites and the >Iranian diesel submarines. . . . Some of the facilities may be too >difficult to target even with penetrating weapons. The U.S. will >have to use Special Operations units. > >One of the military's initial option plans, as presented to the >White House by the Pentagon this winter, calls for the use of a >bunker-buster tactical nuclear weapon, such as the B61-11, against >underground nuclear sites. One target is Iran's main centrifuge >plant, at Natanz, nearly two hundred miles south of Tehran. Natanz, >which is no longer under I.A.E.A. safeguards, reportedly has >underground floor space to hold fifty thousand centrifuges, and >laboratories and workspaces buried approximately seventy-five feet >beneath the surface. That number of centrifuges could provide enough >enriched uranium for about twenty nuclear warheads a year. (Iran has >acknowledged that it initially kept the existence of its enrichment >program hidden from I.A.E.A. inspectors, but claims that none of its >current activity is barred by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.) The >elimination of Natanz would be a major setback for Iran's nuclear >ambitions, but the conventional weapons in the American arsenal >could not insure the destruction of facilities under seventy-five >feet of earth and rock, especially if they are reinforced with >concrete. > >There is a Cold War precedent for targeting deep underground bunkers >with nuclear weapons. In the early nineteen-eighties, the American >intelligence community watched as the Soviet government began >digging a huge underground complex outside Moscow. Analysts >concluded that the underground facility was designed for "continuity >of government"-for the political and military leadership to survive >a nuclear war. (There are similar facilities, in Virginia and >Pennsylvania, for the American leadership.) The Soviet facility >still exists, and much of what the U.S. knows about it remains >classified. "The 'tell' "-the giveaway-"was the ventilator shafts, >some of which were disguised," the former senior intelligence >official told me. At the time, he said, it was determined that "only >nukes" could destroy the bunker. He added that some American >intelligence analysts believe that the Russians helped the Iranians >design their underground facility. "We see a similarity of design," >specifically in the ventilator shafts, he said. > >A former high-level Defense Department official told me that, in his >view, even limited bombing would allow the U.S. to "go in there and >do enough damage to slow down the nuclear infrastructure-it's >feasible." The former defense official said, "The Iranians don't >have friends, and we can tell them that, if necessary, we'll keep >knocking back their infrastructure. The United States should act >like we're ready to go." He added, "We don't have to knock down all >of their air defenses. Our stealth bombers and standoff missiles >really work, and we can blow fixed things up. We can do things on >the ground, too, but it's difficult and very dangerous-put bad stuff >in ventilator shafts and put them to sleep." > >But those who are familiar with the Soviet bunker, according to the >former senior intelligence official, "say 'No way.' You've got to >know what's underneath-to know which ventilator feeds people, or >diesel generators, or which are false. And there's a lot that we >don't know." The lack of reliable intelligence leaves military >planners, given the goal of totally destroying the sites, little >choice but to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons. "Every >other option, in the view of the nuclear weaponeers, would leave a >gap," the former senior intelligence official said. " 'Decisive' is >the key word of the Air Force's planning. It's a tough decision. But >we made it in Japan." > >He went on, "Nuclear planners go through extensive training and >learn the technical details of damage and fallout-we're talking >about mushroom clouds, radiation, mass casualties, and contamination >over years. This is not an underground nuclear test, where all you >see is the earth raised a little bit. These politicians don't have a >clue, and whenever anybody tries to get it out"-remove the nuclear >option-"they're shouted down." > >The attention given to the nuclear option has created serious >misgivings inside the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he >added, and some officers have talked about resigning. Late this >winter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to remove the nuclear >option from the evolving war plans for Iran-without success, the >former intelligence official said. "The White House said, 'Why are >you challenging this? The option came from you.' " > >The Pentagon adviser on the war on terror confirmed that some in the >Administration were looking seriously at this option, which he >linked to a resurgence of interest in tactical nuclear weapons among >Pentagon civilians and in policy circles. He called it "a juggernaut >that has to be stopped." He also confirmed that some senior officers >and officials were considering resigning over the issue. "There are >very strong sentiments within the military against brandishing >nuclear weapons against other countries," the adviser told me. "This >goes to high levels." The matter may soon reach a decisive point, he >said, because the Joint Chiefs had agreed to give President Bush a >formal recommendation stating that they are strongly opposed to >considering the nuclear option for Iran. "The internal debate on >this has hardened in recent weeks," the adviser said. "And, if >senior Pentagon officers express their opposition to the use of >offensive nuclear weapons, then it will never happen." > >The adviser added, however, that the idea of using tactical nuclear >weapons in such situations has gained support from the Defense >Science Board, an advisory panel whose members are selected by >Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. "They're telling the Pentagon >that we can build the B61 with more blast and less radiation," he >said. > >The chairman of the Defense Science Board is William Schneider, Jr., >an Under-Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration. In >January, 2001, as President Bush prepared to take office, Schneider >served on an ad-hoc panel on nuclear forces sponsored by the >National Institute for Public Policy, a conservative think tank. The >panel's report recommended treating tactical nuclear weapons as an >essential part of the U.S. arsenal and noted their suitability "for >those occasions when the certain and prompt destruction of high >priority targets is essential and beyond the promise of conventional >weapons." Several signers of the report are now prominent members of >the Bush Administration, including Stephen Hadley, the >national-security adviser; Stephen Cambone, the Under-Secretary of >Defense for Intelligence; and Robert Joseph, the Under-Secretary of >State for Arms Control and International Security. > >The Pentagon adviser questioned the value of air strikes. "The >Iranians have distributed their nuclear activity very well, and we >have no clue where some of the key stuff is. It could even be out of >the country," he said. He warned, as did many others, that bombing >Iran could provoke "a chain reaction" of attacks on American >facilities and citizens throughout the world: "What will 1.2 billion >Muslims think the day we attack Iran?" > >With or without the nuclear option, the list of targets may >inevitably expand. One recently retired high-level Bush >Administration official, who is also an expert on war planning, told >me that he would have vigorously argued against an air attack on >Iran, because "Iran is a much tougher target" than Iraq. But, he >added, "If you're going to do any bombing to stop the nukes, you >might as well improve your lie across the board. Maybe hit some >training camps, and clear up a lot of other problems." > >The Pentagon adviser said that, in the event of an attack, the Air >Force intended to strike many hundreds of targets in Iran but that >"ninety-nine per cent of them have nothing to do with proliferation. >There are people who believe it's the way to operate"-that the >Administration can achieve its policy goals in Iran with a bombing >campaign, an idea that has been supported by neoconservatives. > >If the order were to be given for an attack, the American combat >troops now operating in Iran would be in position to mark the >critical targets with laser beams, to insure bombing accuracy and to >minimize civilian casualties. As of early winter, I was told by the >government consultant with close ties to civilians in the Pentagon, >the units were also working with minority groups in Iran, including >the Azeris, in the north, the Baluchis, in the southeast, and the >Kurds, in the northeast. The troops "are studying the terrain, and >giving away walking-around money to ethnic tribes, and recruiting >scouts from local tribes and shepherds," the consultant said. One >goal is to get "eyes on the ground"-quoting a line from "Othello," >he said, "Give me the ocular proof." The broader aim, the consultant >said, is to "encourage ethnic tensions" and undermine the regime. > >The new mission for the combat troops is a product of Defense >Secretary Rumsfeld's long-standing interest in expanding the role of >the military in covert operations, which was made official policy in >the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, published in February. >Such activities, if conducted by C.I.A. operatives, would need a >Presidential Finding and would have to be reported to key members of >Congress. > >" 'Force protection' is the new buzzword," the former senior >intelligence official told me. He was referring to the Pentagon's >position that clandestine activities that can be broadly classified >as preparing the battlefield or protecting troops are military, not >intelligence, operations, and are therefore not subject to >congressional oversight. "The guys in the Joint Chiefs of Staff say >there are a lot of uncertainties in Iran," he said. "We need to have >more than what we had in Iraq. Now we have the green light to do >everything we want." > >The President's deep distrust of Ahmadinejad has strengthened his >determination to confront Iran. This view has been reinforced by >allegations that Ahmadinejad, who joined a special-forces brigade of >the Revolutionary Guards in 1986, may have been involved in >terrorist activities in the late eighties. (There are gaps in >Ahmadinejad's official biography in this period.) Ahmadinejad has >reportedly been connected to Imad Mughniyeh, a terrorist who has >been implicated in the deadly bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the >U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, in 1983. Mughniyeh was then the >security chief of Hezbollah; he remains on the F.B.I.'s list of >most-wanted terrorists. > >Robert Baer, who was a C.I.A. officer in the Middle East and >elsewhere for two decades, told me that Ahmadinejad and his >Revolutionary Guard colleagues in the Iranian government "are >capable of making a bomb, hiding it, and launching it at Israel. >They're apocalyptic Shiites. If you're sitting in Tel Aviv and you >believe they've got nukes and missiles-you've got to take them out. >These guys are nuts, and there's no reason to back off." > >Under Ahmadinejad, the Revolutionary Guards have expanded their >power base throughout the Iranian bureaucracy; by the end of >January, they had replaced thousands of civil servants with their >own members. One former senior United Nations official, who has >extensive experience with Iran, depicted the turnover as "a white >coup," with ominous implications for the West. "Professionals in the >Foreign Ministry are out; others are waiting to be kicked out," he >said. "We may be too late. These guys now believe that they are >stronger than ever since the revolution." He said that, particularly >in consideration of China's emergence as a superpower, Iran's >attitude was "To hell with the West. You can do as much as you like." > >Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is considered >by many experts to be in a stronger position than Ahmadinejad. >"Ahmadinejad is not in control," one European diplomat told me. >"Power is diffuse in Iran. The Revolutionary Guards are among the >key backers of the nuclear program, but, ultimately, I don't think >they are in charge of it. The Supreme Leader has the casting vote on >the nuclear program, and the Guards will not take action without his >approval." > >The Pentagon adviser on the war on terror said that "allowing Iran >to have the bomb is not on the table. We cannot have nukes being >sent downstream to a terror network. It's just too dangerous." He >added, "The whole internal debate is on which way to go"-in terms of >stopping the Iranian program. It is possible, the adviser said, that >Iran will unilaterally renounce its nuclear plans-and forestall the >American action. "God may smile on us, but I don't think so. The >bottom line is that Iran cannot become a nuclear-weapons state. The >problem is that the Iranians realize that only by becoming a nuclear >state can they defend themselves against the U.S. Something bad is >going to happen." > >While almost no one disputes Iran's nuclear ambitions, there is >intense debate over how soon it could get the bomb, and what to do >about that. Robert Gallucci, a former government expert on >nonproliferation who is now the dean of the School of Foreign >Service at Georgetown, told me, "Based on what I know, Iran could be >eight to ten years away" from developing a deliverable nuclear >weapon. Gallucci added, "If they had a covert nuclear program and we >could prove it, and we could not stop it by negotiation, diplomacy, >or the threat of sanctions, I'd be in favor of taking it out. But if >you do it"-bomb Iran-"without being able to show there's a secret >program, you're in trouble." > >Meir Dagan, the head of Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, told >the Knesset last December that "Iran is one to two years away, at >the latest, from having enriched uranium. From that point, the >completion of their nuclear weapon is simply a technical matter." In >a conversation with me, a senior Israeli intelligence official >talked about what he said was Iran's duplicity: "There are two >parallel nuclear programs" inside Iran-the program declared to the >I.A.E.A. and a separate operation, run by the military and the >Revolutionary Guards. Israeli officials have repeatedly made this >argument, but Israel has not produced public evidence to support it. >Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State in Bush's first >term, told me, "I think Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program-I >believe it, but I don't know it." > >In recent months, the Pakistani government has given the U.S. new >access to A. Q. Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistani atomic >bomb. Khan, who is now living under house arrest in Islamabad, is >accused of setting up a black market in nuclear materials; he made >at least one clandestine visit to Tehran in the late >nineteen-eighties. In the most recent interrogations, Khan has >provided information on Iran's weapons design and its time line for >building a bomb. "The picture is of 'unquestionable danger,' " the >former senior intelligence official said. (The Pentagon adviser also >confirmed that Khan has been "singing like a canary.") The concern, >the former senior official said, is that "Khan has credibility >problems. He is suggestible, and he's telling the neoconservatives >what they want to hear"-or what might be useful to Pakistan's >President, Pervez Musharraf, who is under pressure to assist >Washington in the war on terror. > >"I think Khan's leading us on," the former intelligence official >said. "I don't know anybody who says, 'Here's the smoking gun.' But >lights are beginning to blink. He's feeding us information on the >time line, and targeting information is coming in from our own >sources- sensors and the covert teams. The C.I.A., which was so >burned by Iraqi W.M.D., is going to the Pentagon and the >Vice-President's office saying, 'It's all new stuff.' People in the >Administration are saying, 'We've got enough.' " > >The Administration's case against Iran is compromised by its history >of promoting false intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass >destruction. In a recent essay on the Foreign Policy Web site, >entitled "Fool Me Twice," Joseph Cirincione, the director for >nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, >wrote, "The unfolding administration strategy appears to be an >effort to repeat its successful campaign for the Iraq war." He noted >several parallels: > >The vice president of the United States gives a major speech focused >on the threat from an oil-rich nation in the Middle East. The U.S. >Secretary of State tells Congress that the same nation is our most >serious global challenge. The Secretary of Defense calls that nation >the leading supporter of global terrorism. > >Cirincione called some of the Administration's claims about Iran >"questionable" or lacking in evidence. When I spoke to him, he >asked, "What do we know? What is the threat? The question is: How >urgent is all this?" The answer, he said, "is in the intelligence >community and the I.A.E.A." (In August, the Washington Post reported >that the most recent comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate >predicted that Iran was a decade away from being a nuclear power.) > >Last year, the Bush Administration briefed I.A.E.A. officials on >what it said was new and alarming information about Iran's weapons >program which had been retrieved from an Iranian's laptop. The new >data included more than a thousand pages of technical drawings of >weapons systems. The Washington Post reported that there were also >designs for a small facility that could be used in the >uranium-enrichment process. Leaks about the laptop became the focal >point of stories in the Times and elsewhere. The stories were >generally careful to note that the materials could have been >fabricated, but also quoted senior American officials as saying that >they appeared to be legitimate. The headline in the Times' account >read, "RELYING ON COMPUTER, U.S. SEEKS TO PROVE IRAN'S NUCLEAR AIMS." > >I was told in interviews with American and European intelligence >officials, however, that the laptop was more suspect and less >revelatory than it had been depicted. The Iranian who owned the >laptop had initially been recruited by German and American >intelligence operatives, working together. The Americans eventually >lost interest in him. The Germans kept on, but the Iranian was >seized by the Iranian counter-intelligence force. It is not known >where he is today. Some family members managed to leave Iran with >his laptop and handed it over at a U.S. embassy, apparently in >Europe. It was a classic "walk-in." > >A European intelligence official said, "There was some hesitation on >our side" about what the materials really proved, "and we are still >not convinced." The drawings were not meticulous, as newspaper >accounts suggested, "but had the character of sketches," the >European official said. "It was not a slam-dunk smoking gun." > >The threat of American military action has created dismay at the >headquarters of the I.A.E.A., in Vienna. The agency's officials >believe that Iran wants to be able to make a nuclear weapon, but >"nobody has presented an inch of evidence of a parallel >nuclear-weapons program in Iran," the high-ranking diplomat told me. >The I.A.E.A.'s best estimate is that the Iranians are five years >away from building a nuclear bomb. "But, if the United States does >anything militarily, they will make the development of a bomb a >matter of Iranian national pride," the diplomat said. "The whole >issue is America's risk assessment of Iran's future intentions, and >they don't trust the regime. Iran is a menace to American policy." > >In Vienna, I was told of an exceedingly testy meeting earlier this >year between Mohamed ElBaradei, the I.A.E.A.'s director-general, who >won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, and Robert Joseph, the >Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control. Joseph's message was >blunt, one diplomat recalled: "We cannot have a single centrifuge >spinning in Iran. Iran is a direct threat to the national security >of the United States and our allies, and we will not tolerate it. We >want you to give us an understanding that you will not say anything >publicly that will undermine us. " > >Joseph's heavy-handedness was unnecessary, the diplomat said, since >the I.A.E.A. already had been inclined to take a hard stand against >Iran. "All of the inspectors are angry at being misled by the >Iranians, and some think the Iranian leadership are nutcases-one >hundred per cent totally certified nuts," the diplomat said. He >added that ElBaradei's overriding concern is that the Iranian >leaders "want confrontation, just like the neocons on the other >side"-in Washington. "At the end of the day, it will work only if >the United States agrees to talk to the Iranians." > >The central question-whether Iran will be able to proceed with its >plans to enrich uranium-is now before the United Nations, with the >Russians and the Chinese reluctant to impose sanctions on Tehran. A >discouraged former I.A.E.A. official told me in late March that, at >this point, "there's nothing the Iranians could do that would result >in a positive outcome. American diplomacy does not allow for it. >Even if they announce a stoppage of enrichment, nobody will believe >them. It's a dead end." > >Another diplomat in Vienna asked me, "Why would the West take the >risk of going to war against that kind of target without giving it >to the I.A.E.A. to verify? We're low-cost, and we can create a >program that will force Iran to put its cards on the table." A >Western Ambassador in Vienna expressed similar distress at the White >House's dismissal of the I.A.E.A. He said, "If you don't believe >that the I.A.E.A. can establish an inspection system-if you don't >trust them-you can only bomb." > >There is little sympathy for the I.A.E.A. in the Bush Administration >or among its European allies. "We're quite frustrated with the >director-general," the European diplomat told me. "His basic >approach has been to describe this as a dispute between two sides >with equal weight. It's not. We're the good guys! ElBaradei has been >pushing the idea of letting Iran have a small nuclear-enrichment >program, which is ludicrous. It's not his job to push ideas that >pose a serious proliferation risk." > >The Europeans are rattled, however, by their growing perception that >President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney believe a bombing >campaign will be needed, and that their real goal is regime change. >"Everyone is on the same page about the Iranian bomb, but the United >States wants regime change," a European diplomatic adviser told me. >He added, "The Europeans have a role to play as long as they don't >have to choose between going along with the Russians and the Chinese >or going along with Washington on something they don't want. Their >policy is to keep the Americans engaged in something the Europeans >can live with. It may be untenable." > >"The Brits think this is a very bad idea," Flynt Leverett, a former >National Security Council staff member who is now a senior fellow at >the Brookings Institution's Saban Center, told me, "but they're >really worried we're going to do it." The European diplomatic >adviser acknowledged that the British Foreign Office was aware of >war planning in Washington but that, "short of a smoking gun, it's >going to be very difficult to line up the Europeans on Iran." He >said that the British "are jumpy about the Americans going full bore >on the Iranians, with no compromise." > >The European diplomat said that he was skeptical that Iran, given >its record, had admitted to everything it was doing, but "to the >best of our knowledge the Iranian capability is not at the point >where they could successfully run centrifuges" to enrich uranium in >quantity. One reason for pursuing diplomacy was, he said, Iran's >essential pragmatism. "The regime acts in its best interests," he >said. Iran's leaders "take a hard-line approach on the nuclear issue >and they want to call the American bluff," believing that "the >tougher they are the more likely the West will fold." But, he said, >"From what we've seen with Iran, they will appear superconfident >until the moment they back off." > >The diplomat went on, "You never reward bad behavior, and this is >not the time to offer concessions. We need to find ways to impose >sufficient costs to bring the regime to its senses. It's going to be >a close call, but I think if there is unity in opposition and the >price imposed"-in sanctions-"is sufficient, they may back down. It's >too early to give up on the U.N. route." He added, "If the >diplomatic process doesn't work, there is no military 'solution.' >There may be a military option, but the impact could be >catastrophic." > >Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, was George Bush's most >dependable ally in the year leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. >But he and his party have been racked by a series of financial >scandals, and his popularity is at a low point. Jack Straw, the >Foreign Secretary, said last year that military action against Iran >was "inconceivable." Blair has been more circumspect, saying >publicly that one should never take options off the table. > >Other European officials expressed similar skepticism about the >value of an American bombing campaign. "The Iranian economy is in >bad shape, and Ahmadinejad is in bad shape politically," the >European intelligence official told me. "He will benefit politically >from American bombing. You can do it, but the results will be >worse." An American attack, he said, would alienate ordinary >Iranians, including those who might be sympathetic to the U.S. "Iran >is no longer living in the Stone Age, and the young people there >have access to U.S. movies and books, and they love it," he said. >"If there was a charm offensive with Iran, the mullahs would be in >trouble in the long run." > >Another European official told me that he was aware that many in >Washington wanted action. "It's always the same guys," he said, with >a resigned shrug. "There is a belief that diplomacy is doomed to >fail. The timetable is short." > >A key ally with an important voice in the debate is Israel, whose >leadership has warned for years that it viewed any attempt by Iran >to begin enriching uranium as a point of no return. I was told by >several officials that the White House's interest in preventing an >Israeli attack on a Muslim country, which would provoke a backlash >across the region, was a factor in its decision to begin the current >operational planning. In a speech in Cleveland on March 20th, >President Bush depicted Ahmadinejad's hostility toward Israel as a >"serious threat. It's a threat to world peace." He added, "I made it >clear, I'll make it clear again, that we will use military might to >protect our ally Israel." > >Any American bombing attack, Richard Armitage told me, would have to >consider the following questions: "What will happen in the other >Islamic countries? What ability does Iran have to reach us and touch >us globally-that is, terrorism? Will Syria and Lebanon up the >pressure on Israel? What does the attack do to our already >diminished international standing? And what does this mean for >Russia, China, and the U.N. Security Council?" > >Iran, which now produces nearly four million barrels of oil a day, >would not have to cut off production to disrupt the world's oil >markets. It could blockade or mine the Strait of Hormuz, the >thirty-four-mile-wide passage through which Middle Eastern oil >reaches the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, the recently retired defense >official dismissed the strategic consequences of such actions. He >told me that the U.S. Navy could keep shipping open by conducting >salvage missions and putting mine- sweepers to work. "It's >impossible to block passage," he said. The government consultant >with ties to the Pentagon also said he believed that the oil problem >could be managed, pointing out that the U.S. has enough in its >strategic reserves to keep America running for sixty days. However, >those in the oil business I spoke to were less optimistic; one >industry expert estimated that the price per barrel would >immediately spike, to anywhere from ninety to a hundred dollars per >barrel, and could go higher, depending on the duration and scope of >the conflict. > >Michel Samaha, a veteran Lebanese Christian politician and former >cabinet minister in Beirut, told me that the Iranian retaliation >might be focussed on exposed oil and gas fields in Saudi Arabia, >Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. "They would be at >risk," he said, "and this could begin the real jihad of Iran versus >the West. You will have a messy world." > >Iran could also initiate a wave of terror attacks in Iraq and >elsewhere, with the help of Hezbollah. On April 2nd, the Washington >Post reported that the planning to counter such attacks "is >consuming a lot of time" at U.S. intelligence agencies. "The best >terror network in the world has remained neutral in the terror war >for the past several years," the Pentagon adviser on the war on >terror said of Hezbollah. "This will mobilize them and put us up >against the group that drove Israel out of southern Lebanon. If we >move against Iran, Hezbollah will not sit on the sidelines. Unless >the Israelis take them out, they will mobilize against us." (When I >asked the government consultant about that possibility, he said >that, if Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel, "Israel and >the new Lebanese government will finish them off.") > >The adviser went on, "If we go, the southern half of Iraq will light >up like a candle." The American, British, and other coalition forces >in Iraq would be at greater risk of attack from Iranian troops or >from Shiite militias operating on instructions from Iran. (Iran, >which is predominantly Shiite, has close ties to the leading Shiite >parties in Iraq.) A retired four-star general told me that, despite >the eight thousand British troops in the region, "the Iranians could >take Basra with ten mullahs and one sound truck." > >"If you attack," the high-ranking diplomat told me in Vienna, >"Ahmadinejad will be the new Saddam Hussein of the Arab world, but >with more credibility and more power. You must bite the bullet and >sit down with the Iranians." > >The diplomat went on, "There are people in Washington who would be >unhappy if we found a solution. They are still banking on isolation >and regime change. This is wishful thinking." He added, "The window >of opportunity is now." > > > > > >
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