> >Beware Empires in Decline > >Michael T. Klare | October 13, 2006 > >Editor: John Feffer, IRC > ><http://fpif.org/pdf/gac/0610beware.pdf> ><javascript:openTafWindow('?action=etfform&url=http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3596','TellAFriend','scrolling=yes,resizable,width=600,height=400')> ><http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3596#comment> >Foreign Policy In Focus ><http://www.fpif.org>www.fpif.org > > The common wisdom circulating in Washington >these days is that the United States is too >bogged down in Iraq to consider risky military >action against Iran or-God forbid-North Korea. >Policy analysts describe the U.S. military as >"over-burdened" or "stretched to the limit." The >presumption is that the Pentagon is telling >President Bush that it can't really undertake >another major military contingency. > >Added to these pessimistic assessments of U.S. >military capacity is the widespread claim that a >"new realism" has taken over in the >administration's upper reaches, that cautious >"realists" like Condoleezza Rice have gained the >upper hand over fire-breathing neoconservatives. >Ergo: No military strike against Iran or North >Korea. > >But I'm not buying any of this. > >Just as an empire on the rise, like the United >States on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, is >often inclined to take rash and ill-considered >actions, so an empire on the decline, like the >British and French empires after World War II, >will engage in senseless, self-destructive acts. >And I fear the same can happen to the United >States today, as we, too, slip into decline. > >The decline of an empire can be a hard and >painful thing for the affected imperial elites. >Those who are used to commanding subservience >and respect from their subjects and from lesser >powers are often ill-prepared to deal with their >indifference and contempt. Even harder is >overcoming the long-inbred assumption that one's >vassals are inferior-mentally, morally, and >otherwise. The first malady makes the declining >elites extraordinarily sensitive to perceived >slights or insults from their former subjects; >the second often leads elites to overestimate >their own capabilities and to underestimate >those of their former subjects-an often fatal >error. The two misjudgments often combine to >produce an extreme readiness to strike back when >a perceived insult coincides with a (possibly >deceptive) military superiority. > >The Suez Blunder > >One of the most spectacular examples of such >miscalculation in modern times-and an especially >illuminating one-was the Suez Canal crisis of >1956. The crisis began in July 1956 when >Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, angry at >the West's failure to support construction of >the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, nationalized the >Suez Canal, then owned principally by a >British-French company and long regarded as a >pre-eminent symbol of the British Empire. > >A reasonable Anglo-French response to Nasser's >move might have been to negotiate a dignified >turnover of the canal (as President Carter did >in 1977 with the Panama Canal, thereby removing >a major irritant in U.S.-Latin America >relations). But no: it was beneath their dignity >to negotiate with rabble like Nasser. Instead, >with images of imperial grandeur still fresh in >their minds, the British and French embarked on >October 29, 1956 upon an invasion of Egypt >(wisely bringing in the Israelis for a little >backup). > >Then the second malady kicked in. From what can >be reconstructed today, it never occurred to >British and French leaders that their former >subjects would even consider putting up any >resistance to modern European armies, and so >victory would occur swiftly. Instead, it was >pure debacle. The British and French were far >too few on the ground to win any military >victories, and the Egyptians didn't cry "uncle" >at the first sight of the Union Jack. > >Desperately, the British and French-who had >first dismissed any need for American >help-pleaded with then-President Eisenhower for >American assistance. But Ike wasn't in a mood to >help. Having seen which way the wind was blowing >in the Middle East, he decided it was better to >abandon his NATO allies than support the old >imperialists in a battle with pan-Arab >nationalism (which might then choose to align >with Moscow). And so the British and French were >forced to withdraw in utter humiliation. > >Much in this extraordinary episode bears on the >situation in Washington today. Once again, a >former subject state-in this case, Iran-is >thumbing its nose at its former imperial >overlords-Britain and the United States (which >together put the megalomaniacal Shah in power >there in 1953). Once again, extreme discomfort >and distress has been the result. Yes, I >recognize that Iran's pursuit of nuclear >technology poses a different sort of danger than >Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal (though to >hear the British tell it, that was no less of a >strategic peril). > >But there nevertheless remains a symbolic aspect >to this whole crisis that cannot be entirely >ignored. A once subservient Third World nation >confronts the Greatest Power the World Has Ever >Known on something approaching equal terms. It >is precisely these sorts of circumstances that >are likely to trigger rash, ill-considered >action on the part of the declining power. > >"How dare they stand up to us in that way?" >British and French officials must have been >muttering to themselves back in 1956. And: >"We'll teach them a thing or two!-Just you >watch!" > >"How dare they stand up to us in that way?" >White House officials must be saying to one >another in private today. And: "We'll teach them >a thing or two!-Just you watch!" > >Overcoming Objections to War > >But what about the problem of the over-stretched >U.S. military and all those American soldiers >now bogged down in Iraq? This is where the >second post-imperial malady comes in. Yes, >American ground troops are bogged down in Iraq, >but American air and sea power, currently >under-utilized in the Iraq conflict, can be used >to cripple Iranian military capabilities with >minimum demand on U.S. ground forces. Despite >the Israeli inability to emasculate Hezbollah >with airpower during the Lebanon fighting last >summer, American air and naval officers, I >suspect, believe that they can inflict punishing >damage on the Iranians with airpower alone, and >do so without suffering significant casualties >in return. I also suspect that well-connected >neoconservatives and, no doubt, Vice President >Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld are >whispering this message into the ear of >President Bush. > >And what about all the forms of retaliation we >might expect from the Iranians, like an upsurge >in Shiite disorder in Iraq and chaos in the oil >markets? These and other likely Iranian >responses are also said to be deterring a U.S. >military strike. But the Iranians will be >incapable of such coordinated action after the >U.S. Air Force subjects them to Shock and Awe, >and anyway there are contingency plans in place >to deal with the fallout. Or so say the neocons, >I would imagine. > >So I believe that the common wisdom in >Washington regarding military action against >Iran is wrong. Just because American forces are >bogged down in Iraq, and Condoleezza Rice >appears to enjoy a bit more authority these >days, does not mean that "realism" will prevail >at the White House. I suspect that the response >of declining British and French imperial elites >when faced with provocative acts by a former >subject power in 1956 is a far more accurate >gauge of what to expect from the Bush >administration today. > >The impulse to strike back must be formidable. >Soon, I fear, it will prove irresistible. > >Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and >world-security studies at Hampshire College, a >Foreign Policy In Focus columnist, and the >author of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and >Consequences of America's Growing Dependence on >Imported Petroleum (Metropolitan Books, 2004). > > >World Beat > >Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a >joint project of the International Relations >Center (IRC, online at ><http://www.irc-online.org/>www.irc-online.org) >and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, >online at ><http://www.ips-dc.org/>www.ips-dc.org). >©Creative Commons - some rights reserved. > >Recommended citation: >Michael T. Klare, "Beware Empires in Decline" >(Silver City, NM and Washington, DC: Foreign >Policy In Focus, October 13, 2006). > >Web location: ><http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3596>http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3596 > >Production Information: >Author(s): Michael T. Klare >Editor(s): John Feffer, IRC >Production: Chellee Chase-Saiz, IRC > >Latest Comments & Conversation Area >Editor's Note: FPIF.org editors read and approve >each comment. Comments are checked for content >only; spelling and grammar errors are not >corrected and comments that include vulgar >language or libelous content are rejected. >Name: Jamal Uddin Date: Oct 16, 2006 Power and >civilization are like gypsy traveling from Rome >to Babylon. All great powers eventually become >part of the history. USA is no exception. There >are some obvious signs of this occuring >including arrogance of power. >Name: jean perois Date: Oct 17, 2006 I think >that the vision of the Suez Canal needs some >revision. Military objectives were all reached >before schedule and the Americans prevented >Nasser from a humiliating debacle. This analysis >is the first of this kind I read and I guess it >is the american version of history. A lot of >very good things in this article. War in >Indochina by the French would have set a more >appropriate example. Regards. > You may add a new comment here. It will not >appear on this page until it has been approved >by the moderator. >Your Name: Comment: >--- >This is the GRUNDER list >To unsubscribe email bradyf62ATnetscape.net, with Subject line UNSUB.
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