The Secret World of Robert Gates
By Robert Parry
Consortium News
Thursday 09 November 2006
Robert Gates, George W. Bush's choice to
replace Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, is
a trusted figure within the Bush Family's inner
circle, but there are lingering questions about
whether Gates is a trustworthy public official.
The 63-year-old Gates has long faced
accusations of collaborating with Islamic
extremists in Iran, arming Saddam Hussein's
dictatorship in Iraq, and politicizing U.S.
intelligence to conform with the desires of
policymakers - three key areas that relate to his
future job.
Gates skated past some of these
controversies during his 1991 confirmation
hearings to be CIA director - and the current
Bush administration is seeking to slip Gates
through the congressional approval process again,
this time by pressing for a quick confirmation by
the end of the year, before the new
Democratic-controlled Senate is seated.
If Bush's timetable is met, there will be
no time for a serious investigation into Gates's
past.
Fifteen years ago, Gates got a similar
pass when leading Democrats agreed to put
"bipartisanship" ahead of careful oversight when
Gates was nominated for the CIA job by President
George H.W. Bush.
In 1991, despite doubts about Gates's
honesty over Iran-Contra and other scandals, the
career intelligence officer brushed aside
accusations that he played secret roles in arming
both sides of the Iran-Iraq War. Since then,
however, documents have surfaced that raise new
questions about Gates's sweeping denials.
For instance, the Russian government sent
an intelligence report to a House investigative
task force in early 1993 stating that Gates
participated in secret contacts with Iranian
officials in 1980 to delay release of 52 U.S.
hostages then held in Iran, a move to benefit the
presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan and George
H.W. Bush.
"R[obert] Gates, at that time a staffer
of the National Security Council in the
administration of Jimmy Carter, and former CIA
Director George Bush also took part" in a meeting
in Paris in October 1980, according to the
Russian report, which meshed with information
from witnesses who have alleged Gates's
involvement in the Iranian gambit.
Once in office, the Reagan administration
did permit weapons to flow to Iran via Israel.
One of the planes carrying an arms shipment was
shot down over the Soviet Union on July 18, 1981,
after straying off course, but the incident drew
little attention at the time.
The arms flow continued, on and off,
until 1986 when the Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages
scandal broke. [For details, see Robert Parry's
Secrecy & Privilege. For text of the Russian
report, click here. To view the actual U.S.
embassy cable that includes the Russian report,
click here.]
Iraqgate Scandal
Gates also was implicated in a secret
operation to funnel military assistance to Iraq
in the 1980s, as the Reagan administration played
off the two countries battling each other in the
eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War.
Middle Eastern witnesses alleged that
Gates worked on the secret Iraqi initiative,
which included Saddam Hussein's procurement of
cluster bombs and chemicals used to produce
chemical weapons for the war against Iran.
Gates denied those Iran-Iraq accusations
in 1991 and the Senate Intelligence Committee -
then headed by Gates's personal friend, Sen.
David Boren, D-Oklahoma - failed to fully check
out the claims before recommending Gates for
confirmation.
However, four years later - in early
January 1995 - Howard Teicher, one of Reagan's
National Security Council officials, added more
details about Gates's alleged role in the Iraq
shipments.
In a sworn affidavit submitted in a
Florida criminal case, Teicher stated that the
covert arming of Iraq dated back to spring 1982
when Iran had gained the upper hand in the war,
leading President Reagan to authorize a U.S. tilt
toward Saddam Hussein.
The effort to arm the Iraqis was
"spearheaded" by CIA Director William Casey and
involved his deputy, Robert Gates, according to
Teicher's affidavit. "The CIA, including both CIA
Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew
of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of
non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and
vehicles to Iraq," Teicher wrote.
Ironically, that same pro-Iraq initiative
involved Donald Rumsfeld, then Reagan's special
emissary to the Middle East. An infamous
photograph from 1983 shows a smiling Rumsfeld
shaking hands with Saddam Hussein.
Teicher described Gates's role as far
more substantive than Rumsfeld's. "Under CIA
Director [William] Casey and Deputy Director
Gates, the CIA authorized, approved and assisted
[Chilean arms dealer Carlos] Cardoen in the
manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other
munitions to Iraq," Teicher wrote.
Like the Russian report, the Teicher
affidavit has never been never seriously
examined. After Teicher submitted it to a federal
court in Miami, the affidavit was classified and
then attacked by Clinton administration
prosecutors. They saw Teicher's account as
disruptive to their prosecution of a private
company, Teledyne Industries, and one of its
salesmen, Ed Johnson.
But the questions about Gates's
participation in dubious schemes involving
hotspots such as Iran and Iraq are relevant again
today because they reflect on Gates's judgment,
his honesty and his relationship with two
countries at the top of U.S. military concerns.
About 140,000 U.S. troops are now bogged
down in Iraq, 3 years after President George W.
Bush ordered an invasion to remove Saddam Hussein
from power and eliminate his supposed WMD
stockpiles. One reason the United States knew
that Hussein once had those stockpiles was
because the Reagan administration helped him
procure the material needed for the WMD
production in the 1980s.
The United States also is facing down
Iran's Islamic government over its nuclear
ambitions. Though Bush has so far emphasized
diplomatic pressure on Iran, he has pointedly
left open the possibility of a military option.
Political Intelligence
Beyond the secret schemes to aid Iran and
Iraq in the 1980s, Gates also stands accused of
playing a central role in politicizing the CIA
intelligence product, tailoring it to fit the
interests of his political superiors, a legacy
that some Gates critics say contributed to the
botched CIA's analysis of Iraqi WMD in 2002.
Before Gates's rapid rise through the
CIA's ranks in the 1980s, the CIA's tradition was
to zealously protect the objectivity and
scholarship of the intelligence. However, during
the Reagan administration, that ethos collapsed.
At Gates's confirmation hearings in 1991,
former CIA analysts, including renowned
Kremlinologist Mel Goodman, took the
extraordinary step of coming out of the shadows
to accuse Gates of politicizing the intelligence
while he was chief of the analytical division and
then deputy director.
The former intelligence officers said the
ambitious Gates pressured the CIA's analytical
division to exaggerate the Soviet menace to fit
the ideological perspective of the Reagan
administration. Analysts who took a more nuanced
view of Soviet power and Moscow's behavior in the
world faced pressure and career reprisals.
In 1981, Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl of the
CIA's Soviet office was the unfortunate analyst
who was handed the assignment to prepare an
analysis on the Soviet Union's alleged support
and direction of international terrorism.
Contrary to the desired White House take
on Soviet-backed terrorism, Ekedahl said the
consensus of the intelligence community was that
the Soviets discouraged acts of terrorism by
groups getting support from Moscow for practical,
not moral, reasons.
"We agreed that the Soviets consistently
stated, publicly and privately, that they
considered international terrorist activities
counterproductive and advised groups they
supported not to use such tactics," Ekedahl said.
"We had hard evidence to support this conclusion."
But Gates took the analysts to task,
accusing them of trying to "stick our finger in
the policy maker's eye," Ekedahl testified
Ekedahl said Gates, dissatisfied with the
terrorism assessment, joined in rewriting the
draft "to suggest greater Soviet support for
terrorism and the text was altered by pulling up
from the annex reports that overstated Soviet
involvement."
In his memoirs, From the Shadows, Gates
denied politicizing the CIA's intelligence
product, though acknowledging that he was aware
of Casey's hostile reaction to the analysts'
disagreement with right-wing theories about
Soviet-directed terrorism.
Soon, the hammer fell on the analysts who
had prepared the Soviet-terrorism report. Ekedahl
said many analysts were "replaced by people new
to the subject who insisted on language
emphasizing Soviet control of international
terrorist activities."
A donnybrook ensued inside the U.S.
intelligence community. Some senior officials
responsible for analysis pushed back against
Casey's dictates, warning that acts of
politicization would undermine the integrity of
the process and risk policy disasters in the
future.
Working with Gates, Casey also undertook
a series of institutional changes that gave him
fuller control of the analytical process. Casey
required that drafts needed clearance from his
office before they could go out to other
intelligence agencies.
Casey appointed Gates to be director of
the Directorate of Intelligence [DI] and
consolidated Gates's control over analysis by
also making him chairman of the National
Intelligence Council, another key analytical body.
"Casey and Gates used various management
tactics to get the line of intelligence they
desired and to suppress unwanted intelligence,"
Ekedahl said.
Career Reprisals
With Gates using top-down management
techniques, CIA analysts sensitive to their
career paths intuitively grasped that they could
rarely go wrong by backing the "company line" and
presenting the worst-case scenario about Soviet
capabilities and intentions, Ekedahl and other
CIA analysts said.
Largely outside public view, the CIA's
proud Soviet analytical office underwent a purge
of its most senior people. "Nearly every senior
analyst on Soviet foreign policy eventually left
the Office of Soviet Analysis," Goodman said.
Gates made clear he intended to shake up
the DI's culture, demanding greater
responsiveness to the needs of the White House
and other policymakers.
In a speech to the DI's analysts and
managers on Jan. 7, 1982, Gates berated the
division for producing shoddy analysis that
administration officials didn't find helpful.
Gates unveiled an 11-point management
plan to whip the DI into shape. His plan included
rotating division chiefs through one-year stints
in policy agencies and requiring CIA analysts to
"refresh their substantive knowledge and broaden
their perspective" by taking courses at
Washington-area think tanks and universities.
Gates declared that a new Production
Evaluation Staff would aggressively review their
analytical products and serve as his "junkyard
dog."
Gates's message was that the DI, which
had long operated as an "ivory tower" for
academically oriented analysts committed to an
ethos of objectivity, would take on more of a
corporate culture with a product designed to fit
the needs of those up the ladder both inside and
outside the CIA.
"It was a kind of chilling speech,"
recalled Peter Dickson, an analyst who
concentrated on proliferation issues. "One of the
things he wanted to do, he was going to shake up
the DI. He was going to read every paper that
came out. What that did was that everybody
between the analyst and him had to get involved
in the paper to a greater extent because their
careers were going to be at stake."
A chief Casey-Gates tactic for exerting
tighter control over the analysis was to express
concern about "the editorial process," Dickson
said.
"You can jerk people around in the
editorial process and hide behind your editorial
mandate to intimidate people," Dickson said.
Gates soon was salting the analytical
division with his allies, a group of managers who
became known as the "Gates clones." Some of those
who rose with Gates were David Cohen, David
Carey, George Kolt, Jim Lynch, Winston Wiley,
John Gannon and John McLaughlin.
Though Dickson's area of expertise -
nuclear proliferation - was on the fringes of the
Reagan-Bush primary concerns, it ended up getting
him into trouble anyway. In 1983, he clashed with
his superiors over his conclusion that the Soviet
Union was more committed to controlling
proliferation of nuclear weapons than the
administration wanted to hear.
When Dickson stood by his evidence, he
soon found himself facing accusations about his
psychological fitness and other pressures that
eventually caused him to leave the CIA.
Dickson also was among the analysts who
raised alarms about Pakistan's development of
nuclear weapons, another sore point because the
Reagan-Bush administration wanted Pakistan's
assistance in funneling weapons to Islamic
fundamentalists fighting the Soviets in
Afghanistan.
One of the effects from the exaggerated
intelligence about Soviet power and intentions
was to make other potential risks - such as
allowing development of a nuclear bomb in the
Islamic world or training Islamic fundamentalists
in techniques of sabotage - paled in comparison.
While worst-case scenarios were in order
for the Soviet Union and other communist enemies,
best-case scenarios were the order of the day for
Reagan-Bush allies, including Osama bin Laden and
other Arab extremists rushing to Afghanistan to
wage a holy war against European invaders, in
this case, the Russians.
As for the Pakistani drive to get a
nuclear bomb, the Reagan-Bush administration
turned to word games to avoid triggering
anti-proliferation penalties that otherwise would
be imposed on Pakistan.
"There was a distinction made to say that
the possession of the device is not the same as
developing it," Dickson told me. "They got into
the argument that they don't quite possess it yet
because they haven't turned the last screw into
the warhead."
Finally, the intelligence on the Pakistan
Bomb grew too strong to continue denying the
reality. But the delay in confronting Pakistan
ultimately allowed the Muslim government in
Islamabad to produce nuclear weapons. Pakistani
scientists also shared their know-how with
"rogue" states, such as North Korea and Libya.
"The politicization that took place
during the Casey-Gates era is directly
responsible for the CIA's loss of its ethical
compass and the erosion of its credibility,"
Goodman told the Senate Intelligence Committee in
1991. "The fact that the CIA missed the most
important historical development in its history -
the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Soviet
Union itself - is due in large measure to the
culture and process that Gates established in his
directorate."
Confirmation Battle
To push through Gates's nomination to be
CIA director in 1991, the elder George Bush lined
up solid Republican backing for Gates and enough
accommodating Democrats - particularly Sen.
Boren, the Senate Intelligence Committee chairman.
In his memoirs, Gates credited his
friend, Boren, for clearing away any obstacles.
"David took it as a personal challenge to get me
confirmed," Gates wrote.
Part of running interference for Gates
included rejecting the testimony of witnesses who
implicated Gates in scandals beginning with the
alleged back-channel negotiations with Iran in
1980 through the arming of Iraq's Saddam Hussein
in the mid-1980s.
Boren's Intelligence Committee brushed
aside two witnesses connecting Gates to the
alleged schemes, former Israeli intelligence
official Ari Ben-Menashe and Iranian businessman
Richard Babayan. Both offered detailed accounts
about Gates's alleged connections to the schemes.
Ben-Menashe, who worked for Israeli
military intelligence from 1977-87, first
fingered Gates as an operative in the secret Iraq
arms pipeline in August 1990 during an interview
that I conducted with him for PBS Frontline.
At the time, Ben-Menashe was in jail in
New York on charges of trying to sell cargo
planes to Iran (charges which were later
dismissed). When the interview took place, Gates
was in a relatively obscure position, as deputy
national security adviser to President George
H.W. Bush and not yet a candidate for the top CIA
job.
In that interview and later under oath to
Congress, Ben-Menashe said Gates joined in
meetings between Republicans and senior Iranians
in October 1980. Ben-Menashe said he also
arranged Gates's personal help in bringing a
suitcase full of cash into Miami in early 1981 to
pay off some of the participants in the hostage
gambit.
Ben-Menashe also placed Gates in a 1986
meeting with Chilean arms manufacturer Cardoen,
who allegedly was supplying cluster bombs and
chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein's army.
Babayan, an Iranian exile working with Iraq, also
connected Gates to the Iraqi supply lines and to
Cardoen.
Gates has steadfastly denied involvement
in either the Iran-hostage caper or the Iraqgate
arms deals.
"I was accused on television and in the
print media by people I had never spoken to or
met of selling weapons to Iraq, or walking
through Miami airport with suitcases full of
cash, of being with Bush in Paris in October 1980
to meet with Iranians, and on and on," Gates
wrote in his memoirs. "The allegations of
meetings with me around the world were easily
disproved for the committee by my travel records,
calendars, and countless witnesses."
But none of Gates's supposedly supportive
evidence was ever made public by either the
Senate Intelligence Committee or the later
inquiries into either the Iran hostage initiative
or Iraqgate.
Not one of Gates's "countless witnesses"
who could vouch for Gates's whereabouts was
identified. Though Boren pledged publicly to have
his investigators question Babayan, they never
did.
Perhaps most galling for those of us who
tried to assess Ben-Menashe's credibility was the
Intelligence Committee's failure to test
Ben-Menashe's claim that he met with Gates in
Paramus, New Jersey, on the afternoon of April
20, 1989.
The date was pinned down by the fact that
Ben-Menashe had been under Customs surveillance
in the morning. So it was a perfect test for
whether Ben-Menashe - or Gates - was lying.
When I first asked about this claim,
congressional investigators told me that Gates
had a perfect alibi for that day. They said Gates
had been with Senator Boren at a speech in
Oklahoma. But when we checked that out, we
discovered that Gates's Oklahoma speech had been
on April 19, a day earlier. Gates also had not
been with Boren and had returned to Washington by
that evening.
So where was Gates the next day? Could he
have taken a quick trip to northern New Jersey?
Since senior White House national security
advisers keep detailed notes on their daily
meetings, it should have been easy for Boren's
investigators to interview someone who could
vouch for Gates's whereabouts on the afternoon of
April 20.
But the committee chose not to nail down
an alibi for Gates. The committee said further
investigation wasn't needed because Gates denied
going to New Jersey and his personal calendar
made no reference to the trip.
But the investigators couldn't tell me
where Gates was that afternoon or with whom he
may have met. Essentially, the alibi came down to
Gates's word.
Ironically, Boren's key aide who helped
limit the investigation of Gates was George
Tenet, whose behind-the-scenes maneuvering on
Gates's behalf won the personal appreciation of
the senior George Bush. Tenet later became
President Bill Clinton's last CIA director and
was kept on in 2001 by the younger George Bush
partly on his father's advice.
Now, as the Bush Family grapples with the
disaster in Iraq, it is turning to an even more
trusted hand to run the Defense Department. The
appointment of Robert Gates suggests that the
Bush Family is circling the wagons to save the
embattled presidency of George W. Bush.
To determine whether Gates can be counted
on to do what's in the interest of the larger
American public is another question altogether.
--------
Robert Parry broke many of the
Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the
Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book,
Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty
from Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at
secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at
Amazon.com, as is his 1999 book, Lost History:
Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth.'
Senator Tom Harkin | Robert Gates Not Right for CIA in 1991
t r u t h o u t | Report
Thursday 09 November 2006
Editor's Note: Yesterday, President
George W. Bush announced the appointment of
Robert Gates as US Secretary of Defense to
replace Donald H. Rumsfeld. The following is a
Senate floor statement by Senator Tom Harkin,
made during the 1991 confirmation hearings to
nominate Robert Gates as Director of the CIA. -
cw/TO
Gates Nomination (Senate - November 07, 1991)
Mr. Harkin [Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)]:
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to
the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. President, at the outset of the
confirmation hearings, I had serious reservations
about the nominee. The confirmation hearings only
raised more questions and greater doubts.
Questions and doubts about Mr. Gates' past
activities, managerial style, judgment, lapses in
memory and analytical abilities. Questions and
doubts about his role in the Iran-Contra Affair
and in providing military intelligence to Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war; and questions and
doubts about whether he will be able to remove
the ideological blinders reflected in his
writings and speeches or whether Mr. Gates is so
rooted in the past, that he will not be able to
lead the Agency into the post-cold war era.
Because of these concerns, I have concluded that
Mr. Gates is not the right person for the
important job of overseeing our intelligence
operations in this New World.
Mr. President, Robert Gates is a career
Soviet analyst and former Deputy Director of the
CIA who was wrong about what CIA analyst Harold
Ford described as 'the central analytic target of
the past few years: the probable fortunes of the
USSR and the Soviet European bloc.' And I believe
that the committee report points out one possible
reason why the CIA failed to predict the collapse
of the Soviet Union. According to testimony, Mr.
Gates was busy pursuing hypotheses and making
unsubstantiated arguments attempting to show
Soviet expansion in the Third World, instead of
looking for or paying attention to facts that
pointed in the opposite direction. Why? Why, as
Mentor Moynihan has pointed out, was the CIA able
to tell Presidents everything about the Soviet
Union except the fact that it was falling apart?
Mr. Gates was also wrong about the Soviet
threat to Iran in 1985. The 1985 Special National
Intelligence Estimate on Iran stressed possible
Soviet inroads into Iran. Gates admits that the
analysis was an anomaly. It was a clear departure
from previous analyses and almost immediately
proven wrong by subsequent events. Gates was
involved in preparing that analysis. According to
Hal Ford, whose testimony the nominee never
refuted, Gates leaned heavily on the Iran
Estimate, in effect, 'insisting on his own views
and discouraging dissent.' What was the result?
The 1985 estimate was skewed and contributed to
the biggest foreign policy debacle of the Reagan
administration, the sale of arms to Iran.
Mr. President, Graham Fuller, the CIA's
National Intelligence Officer for the Near East,
suggested that the 1985 SNIE estimate was based
on intuition in the absence of hard evidence. I
agree there is nothing wrong with preparing worse
case scenarios or using 'intuition' as opposed to
hard evidence in the preparation of analysis,
provided it is made clear to policymakers that
the finished analysis is based on intuition and
not hard evidence. It is the job of the CIA to
sort out fact from fiction, not convert one into
the other.
Mr. President, I also have doubts and
questions about Mr. Gates' role in the secret
intelligence sharing operation with Iraq. Robert
Gates served as assistant to the Director of the
CIA in 1981 and as Deputy Director for
Intelligence for 1982 to 1986. In that capacity
he helped develop options in dealing with the
Iran-Iraq war, which eventually involved into a
secret intelligence liaison relationship with
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Gates was in charge of the
directorate that prepared the intelligence
information that was passed on to Iraq. He
testified that he was also an active participant
in the operation during 1986. The secret
intelligence sharing operation with Iraq was not
only a highly questionable and possibly illegal
operation, but also may have jeopardized American
lives and our national interests. The photo
reconnaissance, highly sensitive electronic
eavesdropping and narrative texts provided to
Saddam, may not only have helped him in Iraq's
war against Iran but also in the recent gulf war.
Saddam Hussein may have discovered the value of
underground land lines as opposed to radio
communications after he was give our intelligence
information. That made it more difficult for the
allied coalition to get quick and accurate
intelligence during the gulf war.
Further, after the Persian Gulf war, our
intelligence community was surprised at the
extent of Iraq's nuclear program. One reason
Saddam may have hidden his nuclear program so
effectively from detection was because of his
knowledge of our satellite photos. What also
concerns me about that operation is that we spend
millions of dollars keeping secrets from the
Soviets and then we give it to Saddam who sells
them to the Soviets. In short, the coddling of
Saddam was a mistake of the first order.
Mr. President, I've stated a very simple
case for rejecting the nomination of Robert Gates
to be Director of the CIA. The fact that he was
wrong on major issues which in some instances led
to foreign policy debacles. I haven't addressed
concerns about the allegations of his
politicization of intelligence analysis, his
apparently poor managerial style or still
unanswered questions about his role in the
Iran-Contra affair. Regarding the Iran-Contra
affair, I should mention that I was quite
disturbed to hear testimony that portrayed Robert
Gates as someone concerned about Agency's role
and not sufficiently concerned about pursuing
possible illegal Government activities. In his
opening statement before the Intelligence
Committee, Mr. Gates said that he should have
taken more seriously 'the possibility of
impropriety or possible wrongdoing in the
Government and pursued this possibility more
aggressively.' I agree.
I should also mention, Mr. President,
that aside from Mr. Gates' poor judgment in not
pursuing the possibility of Government wrongdoing
more aggressively, I still find it incredible
that the Deputy Director of CIA was not aware of
that major covert operation. How could such a
high ranking official not know about the CIA's
efforts to support the Contras? Did he purposely
avoid trying to find out what was happening? The
testimony seemed to indicate he did. Gates'
selective lapses in recall about the affair by a
man with a photographic memory raises serious
doubts.
The US Congress and the American people
depend on accurate and reliable intelligence
information. Our expenditures on defense and
other areas are often decided on the basis of
that information. We cannot afford to waste
billion of dollars in the future. After reviewing
the record, I do not believe that the Central
Intelligence Agency under the directorship of
Robert Gates will provide the clear intelligence
assessments necessary for Congress to make
decisions to deal with the future threats
confronting our nation.
Mr. President, I do not believe that
Robert Gates is the right person to lead the CIA
at this time. The cold war is over and it's time
for some of the old warriors to rest. Now we must
take a fresh new look at the world, think new
thoughts and reassess the future role of the
intelligence community. I urge my colleagues to
vote against Robert Gates.
-------
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