----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Sid Shniad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

www.nzherald.co.nz/category/story.cfm?c_id=359&objectid=10469334&pnum=0

Afghanistan - A war won and lost

By Gwynne Dyer
New Zealand Herald: October 12, 2007

We have just had the sixth anniversary of the start of US air strikes
against al Qaeda and its Taleban hosts in Afghanistan.

It was a very clever politico-military operation, and by December of 2001
all of Afghanistan was under the control of the United States and its local
allies for a total cost of 12 American dead. Then, for no good reason, it
fell apart, and now the war is lost.

In the days after 9/11 George Tenet, the Central Intelligence Agency's
chief, came up with a bold proposal. Why invade Afghanistan with a large
American army, deploying massive firepower that kills large numbers of
locals and alienates the population?

Why give Osama bin Laden the long anti-American guerrilla war that he was
undoubtedly counting on? Instead, Tenet proposed sending teams of CIA agents
and special forces into the country to win the support of the various
militias, loosely linked as the Northern Alliance, that still dominated the
northern regions of the country.

Although the Taleban had controlled most of the country since 1996, they had
never decisively won the civil war. So why not intervene in that war, shower
their opponents with money and weapons, and tip the balance against the
Taleban?

It worked like a charm. Pakistan, whose intelligence services had originally
created the Taleban, withdrew its support, the regime fled Kabul, and most
of the Taleban troops melted back into their villages. The Government of a
country of 27 million people was taken down for a death toll that probably
did not exceed 4000 on all sides.

By mid-December 2001 the United States effectively controlled Afghanistan
through its local allies, all drawn from the northern minority groups:
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara. There had not been the mass killing of innocent
bystanders that would inevitably have accompanied a conventional US
invasion, so there was no guerrilla war.

The traditional ruling group and biggest minority, the Pashtun, who had put
their money on the Taleban and lost, would have to be brought back into the
game somehow, but the usual Afghan deal-making would suffice.

Washington had the wit to make Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from a clan that
never had much to do with the Taleban, its puppet President in Kabul, but it
didn't carry through. It froze out all the prominent Pashtun political and
religious leaders who had had dealings with the Taleban - which was, of
course, almost all of them.

The Taleban had been the Government of Afghanistan for almost five years,
and were at the time the political vehicle of the Pashtun ascendancy in the
country. If you were a traditional Pashtun leader, how could you not have
had dealings with them?

An amnesty that turned a blind eye to the past, plus pressure by the United
States on its recent allies to grant the Pashtuns a fair share of the
national pie, would have created a regime in Kabul to which Pashtuns could
give their loyalty, even if they were less dominant than usual.

But that never happened. The United States had so closely identified the
Taleban with al Qaeda (although bin Laden probably never told the Taleban
leadership what he was planning) that it would not talk to Pashtun leaders
who had been linked to the Taleban.

Six years after the invasion that wasn't, the Pashtuns are still largely
frozen out. That is why the Taleban are coming back.

Afghanistan has usually been run by regional and tribal warlords with little
central control. Nothing new there.

But now it is also a country where the biggest minority has been largely
excluded from power by foreign invaders who sided with the smaller
minorities, and then blocked the process of accommodation by which the
various Afghan ethnic groups normally make power-sharing deals.

The Taleban are still the main political vehicle of the Pashtuns, because
there has been no time to build another. It doesn't mean that all Pashtuns
are fanatics or terrorists. Indeed, not all the Taleban are fanatics (though
many of them are), and hardly any of them nurse the desire to carry out
terrorist acts in other countries.

That was the specialty of their (rather ungrateful) Arab guests, who fled
across the border into the tribal areas of Pakistan almost six years ago.
The current fighting in the south, the Pashtun heartland, which is causing a
steady dribble of American, British and Canadian casualties, will continue
until the Western countries pull out.

(Most other Nato members sent their troops to various parts of northern
Afghanistan, where non-Pashtun warlords rule non-Pashtun populations and
nobody dares attack the foreigners.) Then, after the foreigners are gone,
the Afghans will make the traditional inter-ethnic deals and something like
peace will return.

Will Karzai still be the President after that? Yes, if he can convince the
Pashtuns that he is open to such a deal once the foreigners leave.

Will the Taleban come back to power? No, only to a share of power, and only
to the extent that they can still command the loyalty of the Pashtuns once
it is no longer a question of resistance to foreigners.

Will Osama bin Laden return and recreate a "nest of terrorists" in
Afghanistan. Very unlikely. The Afghans paid too high a price for their
hospitality the first time round.

* Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist whose articles are
published in 45 countries.

***

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Mha Atma/Earth Action Network


Hi Ed.  The below reply from someone on my list came after I
passed on the Rich article which you sent to your list.

-----Forwarded Message----- 
From: Paul Rosenberger
Sent: Oct 14, 2007 10:04 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: The 'Good Germans' Among Us

You might be interested in the letter to the editor that I just submitted to
the New York Times on this subject.  Please see below:
  As a native German who grew up under the Nazi regime, I appreciate the
parallels that Frank Rich draws between the “Good Germans” under Hitler and
current Americans under the Bush administration.  These comparisons are
indeed valid and frighteningly so.  To make matters worse, under the Bush
administration we still have a largely free and independent press(although
there is some legitimate doubt as to the latter),  that informs us as to
what is really going on.  We also still enjoy free expression of opinion and
the opportunity of peaceful protest against practices that we deem immoral.
The “Good Germans” had none of these privileges.  The only information
available was the official Nazi propaganda and protest or just open verbal
dissent meant predawn arrest and disappearance in a concentration camp or a
kangaroo court that meted out death sentences to be carried out without
recourse to any judicial review.


  This makes us worse than the “Good Germans”.  We have the information and
we have the freedom to act on it, yet we do nothing.


  Paul W. Rosenberger
  133 16th. Street
  Manhattan Beach, Ca 90266
  310-545-3531
  =
***

From: All the News That Doesn't Fit <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [NYTr] From Dachau to Jerusalem to Nuremberg to Munich to
Annapolis

sent by  Francis Boyle - Oct 5, 2007

 From Dachau to Jerusalem to Nuremberg to Munich to Annapolis

by Francis A. Boyle

During the summer of 1982 I had the opportunity to visit the Nazi
concentration camp just outside Dachau, Germany and then the little town
itself.  Given the proximity of the town to the camp, my immediate
reaction was: "This town is so close to the camp that the citizens of
Dachau must have known what was going on out there.  Why did they not do
anything about it?"  I had the exact same reaction during the last two
weeks of May 1986 as I traveled up and down the West Bank and Gaza Strip
in order to investigate Israel's atrocities and war crimes against the
Palestinians.

When I then complained about these reprehensible practices to the
appropriate high-level legal officials sequentially at the Israeli
Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, I was told that they were all required by and could be
justified under the doctrine of "military necessity."  Rather than
engaging in an extended debate over this point, I simply responded to
all three of these lawyers that this was precisely the argument used by
the Nazi war criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 to justify
their own incredible outrages upon humanity, including the Jewish
people.  After a bit more argumentation, these three lawyers basically
conceded my Nuremberg analysis, but then each independently, uncannily,
and matter-of-factly informed me: "We have public relations people in
the United States who take care of these matters for us."

Even more distressingly, upon a visit to the office of the Legal
Adviser to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the prospects for peace, I
was immediately informed by him that Israel had a "claim" under
international law to the West Bank:  it might not constitute the basis
for perfect title, but it was nevertheless a "claim."  At the time I
recalled the fact that of course Hitler had a "claim" to the
Sudetenland as well.  Although the Munich Pact of 1938 permitted German
occupation and annexation of the Sudetenland into the Nazi Reich, this
act of cowardice by Great Britain and France ultimately paved the way
for the outbreak of the Second World War one year later, with all the
tragic consequences that conflagration entailed for the Jewish people,
among others.

Today, the United States and Israel are striving to consummate a Middle
East version of the Munich Pact that will sell out of the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination and a real independent state
of their own.  Only history will tell if the consequences shall be as
tragic for the fate of the Arab and Jewish peoples in the Middle East,
if not the rest of the world.  I fear that there is a high probability
that history will repeat itself.

[Professor Francis A. Boyle, University of Illinois College of Law served as
Legal Advisor to the Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace
Negotiations and its Chair  Dr Haidar Abdul Shaffi  from 1991 to 1993. He
is the author of Palestine, Palestinians and International Law (Clarity
Press: 2003).]




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