Gulf Dispersants: BP and Nalco Play Toxic Roulette
by Terry J. Allen, July 19, 2010, Corpwatch, 
<http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15609>www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15609


Dispersants may be doing more harm than good in the gulf,
but the almost 2 million gallons of Nalco's Corxit that BP
has dumped is certainly doing a great job of disguising
the extent of the spill and the inability of existing technology
to mitigate the disaster. And even if BP eventually staunches
the hemorrhage of oil, devastating toxins will linger for decades.
<http://www.corpwatch.org/img/original/dispersant.jpg>
[]


In the months since the Deepwater Horizon 
drilling rig exploded, and the well beneath 
spewed millions of gallons of crude into the Gulf 
of Mexico, BP has been accused of moving too 
slowly to clean its gigantic mess. Yet in one 
respect the oil giant acted swiftly. Shortly 
after the accident, BP began applying vast 
quantities of chemical dispersants in an effort 
to break up the torrent of oil from the mile-deep 
blowout. By mid-July, BP had released almost two 
million gallons of the dispersant Corexit.

BP and Corexit manufacturer Nalco claim that the 
chemicals will reduce the impact of the spill on 
coastal environments. Their lobbyists and 
executives say that the chemical is not only 
essential, but as harmless as dish soap.

But a fundamental question lingers like the 
petrochemical smell over the gulf: Is Corexit 
doing more harm than good? Dispersants, all 
agree, do not lessen the amount of oil in the 
environment. Rather, they break it into tiny 
drops that have different, but not necessarily less toxic properties.

"[Dispersants] make the oil more soluble in 
water, so it won't just sit on the surface," 
Jackie Savitz, senior scientist with Oceana told 
CNN. "Whether that's good or bad depends on 
whether you're a fish or a seabird."

But whether or not the dispersants work as 
promised, they are effective in other ways, 
critics charge. By breaking the peanut-butter 
thick sludge into tiny droplets, Nalco's Corexit 
has made the oil less visible, thereby disguising 
the full environmental impact of the spill, and 
helping BP limit its legal and financial 
liability. The availability of dispersants also 
gives the oil industry cover by allowing it to 
assure government agencies and the public that in 
the in the "unlikely" event of a spill, there is a quick, safe fix.

Out-of-Sight, Out-of-Mind

There are no accurate figures on how much oil has 
gushed from the mile-deep Macondo well since 
April 20, when the Deepwater Horizon, the 
drilling rig BP rented and directed, failed in an 
exploding firestorm of gas and oil and sank, killing 11 workers.

But from BP CEO Tony Hayward's May 17 statement 
that the environmental impact will be "very very 
modest," to BP's self-satirizing announcements 
that the amount of captured oil on a particular 
day exceeded the company's estimate of the amount 
leaking, BP has downplayed the volume of oil.

Aside from the public relations boon from low 
balling the flow, BP has a financial incentive: 
U.S.-government-imposed fines are based on quantity of oil released.

Still there is no way to hide the fact that, even 
if the well is capped for good, oil is spreading 
from Texas to Florida, and fouling a fragile, 
complex, and commercially lucrative environment.

BP has now applied an unprecedented almost 
one-million-and-counting gallons of chemical 
dispersants, some sprayed by the US Air Force 
from two C-130 Hercules cargo planes that can fly 
three missions a day, and cover up to 250 acres per flight.

And in an unprecedented experiment, a half 
million gallons of Corexit has been injected a 
mile deep at the blown-out well head. This 
untested technique has caused oil to become 
suspended in great plumes before it reaches the 
surface, further hiding the quantity of leaked 
oil. An added bonus of the deep sea application 
for BP is that marine life killed by the plumes 
dies out-of-sight, and sinks to the ocean floor, 
rather than grimly dying on camera in oil-coated misery.

"Right now there is a headlong rush to get this 
oil out-of-sight, out-of-mind," said Richard 
Charter, an expert on marine biology and oil 
spills who is a senior policy advisor for Marine 
Programs for Defenders of Wildlife and is 
chairman of the Gulf of the Farallones National 
Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council.

Corexit: How Much, How Toxic?

BP has used two dispersant formulations in the 
gulf -- Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527. Both, 
according to the manufacturer Nalco Co., contain 
propylene glycol, which is used in antifreeze, 
de-icers and detergents. But the older formula, 
Corexit 9527A -- which contains 2-butoxy ethanol, 
a compound associated with headaches, vomiting, 
and reproductive problems at high doses -- is more toxic.

While state and federal agencies have been 
testing gulf seafood for oil, no one is 
conducting chemical testing for the presence of dispersants.

Numerous Corexit formulae including 9527 and 9500 
were applied to the Alaska shore after the 1989 
Exxon Valdez tanker disaster. Their efficacy in 
cleaning up the oil was limited, and the Alaska 
Community Action on Toxics later linked the 
chemicals to human health impacts including 
respiratory, nervous system, liver, kidney, and blood disorders.

Backing away from the Corexit 9527 formula, a 
Nalco press release parsed its words carefully 
(Emphasis added.): "COREXIT 9500 is the sole 
product we have been making for Gulf responders 
since the spill began. Limited quantities of 
COREXIT 9527 may have been drawn from existing 
dispersant stockpiles from around the world. 
COREXIT 9500 does not include the ingredient 
2-butoxy ethanol, an ingredient in COREXIT 9527."

Given that the company admits selling BP 9527 for 
use in the gulf, "making" is obfuscating and "may" is just silly.

Asked to define "limited quantities," Nalco 
senior manager for external communications, 
Charlie Pajor, said he didn't know. Corexit 9527, 
he said, was drawn from global stores, and used 
to fill the gap until Nalco could produce more of 
the "improved" Corexit 9500. Nor would Pajor say 
how much of the 9527 formula was available around 
the world, or has been sold or manufactured in 
the ten or so years that the Corexit 9500 went on the market.

At the time of the spill, Nalco had only "10,000 
gallons of Corexit on hand," he told CorpWatch - 
roughly a day's worth - so Nalco quickly began ramping up production.

By April 28, eight days after the blowout, 
"Responders had already used about 56,000 gallons 
of oil dispersant," according to Chemical News & 
Intelligence, and, given the limited supply of 
the Corexit 9500, presumably much of that was the more toxic 9527 formula.

In mid-May, EPA head Jackson said she didn't know 
for sure how much of each formulation was 
deployed, but she understood that use so far had 
been "roughly 50/50." At that point, BP had 
dispersed at least 400,000 gallons of Corexit.

Garbage In, Garbage Out

Although Nalco had marketed Corexit 9500 since 
the mid-1990s and the 9527 formula even longer, 
there is a paucity of good independent data on 
their short- and long-term effects on the 
environment, on humans, and on sea life.

Nonetheless, by April 22, even before the extent 
of the leak became apparent, the EPA had 
authorized the use of 100,000 gallons of 
dispersants. Almost 50 days later, public and 
congressional pressure forced the agency to 
finally release the ingredients (but not the 
proportions used) in two Nalco formulae.

The use of dispersants to mitigate oil spills 
rests on two assumptions-one accurate and the 
other unproven. The accurate rational is that 
dispersants break up oil. Under some 
circumstances, treated oil becomes more biodegradable.

The second assumption -the unproven rational for 
using dispersants - is that breaking up spilled 
crude is effective in mitigating the oil's long- 
and short-term impact, and is less toxic to the 
environment than other approaches in similar circumstance.

"Decision-making about dispersants," Carys 
Mitchelmore told the New Orleans Time Picayune, 
is undermined by “fundamental, basic questions 
that have not been addressed. Like is it really 
true that oil is more degradable by bacteria when 
it's in the small oil droplet form, and is 
dispersed oil less damaging to birds and marine 
mammals? There's all kind of conflicting science 
on both of those questions." Mitchelmore is an 
associate professor of environmental toxicology 
and chemistry at the University of Maryland's Chesapeake Biological Laboratory.

As with most chemicals used in the U.S., most of 
the research data on Corexit comes from industry 
rather than independent research. In 2009, the 
nonpartisan Government Accountability Office 
criticized the EPA for failing to adequately 
assess risks from thousands of toxic chemicals.

“Under current law, only a few short-term aquatic 
toxicity tests of dispersants are required … and 
the EPA is not mandated to assess the safety of 
dispersants or their ingredients,” charged the 
non-profit environmental coalition, Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families.

"We're basically rolling the dice with the use of 
chemical dispersants in the Gulf," said Richard 
Denison, an Environmental Defense Fund scientist.

In addition to concerns about the safety and 
efficacy of the dispersants themselves is 
evidence that the interaction of the dispersants 
and the oil creates a toxic synergy worse than any of the ingredients alone.

"[A] mixture of oil and dispersant gives rise to 
a more toxic effect on aquatic organisms than oil 
and dispersants do alone," suggested a study for 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. "The 
research on toxicity of oils mixed with 
dispersants has, however, shown high toxicity 
values even when the dispersant per se was not very toxic."

A 1999 report on Corexit 9500 for the Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation Division 
of Spill Prevention and Response found that under 
some conditions: "Following dispersant use … the 
toxicity of the resulting oil residue (on an oil mass basis) may be increased."

Concerned about toxicity, the UK has banned 
Corexit for off-shore use in the North Sea. The 
dangers of off-shore use in the Gulf of Mexico 
include killing fish larvae - including those of 
imperiled Atlantic bluefin tuna which spawn in 
the region -- threatening filter-feeders, and 
disrupting the viability of the region's 
ecosystem by destroying organisms low on the food 
chain that sustain larger marine creatures.

Serious as concerns about surface application 
are, they are dwarfed by the unknowns in applying 
dispersants far below the surface where water 
temperatures hover above freezing. A 2006 study 
found that oil droplets treated with a chemical 
dispersant did not degrade nearly as fast in frigid water.

Conflicting Data, Research Holes

Lisa Jackson, head of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA,) which has approved the 
unprecedented quantities and uses of dispersants, 
has delivered mixed messages. At one point she 
asserted that "We know that dispersants are less 
toxic than oil. We know that surface use of 
dispersants decreases the risk to shorelines and 
organisms at the surface when they are properly applied."

But she also acknowledged that, "none of the 
testing that was done prior to this incident was 
what I'd call extensive, and geared toward the 
long-term effects or effects in the sub-sea."

The EPA also acknowledged that no studies had 
been carried out on how long Corexit 9500 
persists in the environment-perhaps even after 
the oil it was meant to control has biodegraded. 
"We are currently unaware of published scientific 
information in the peer-reviewed literature about 
the biodegradation of the dispersant itself," the agency website noted.

Mitchelmore, who has testified five times to 
Congress on dispersants since the spill, lamented 
that the available data on dispersants were an 
industry-supplied jumble that didn't parse, 
according to the Times-Picayune: "When I looked 
at that contingency table, I just couldn't 
believe it. I thought I must be seeing things, 
because surely they can't be posting this data," she said.

"There's research out there that shows that 
dispersed oil is more toxic than the oil itself, 
and then there are studies that say it's the 
same," she told McClatchy-Tribune News Service. 
"The big questions are: What are the long-term or 
delayed effects, and how will the different 
routes of oil exposure due to dispersant use 
affect exposed organisms? Those are topics that 
really haven't been looked at in detail and were 
highlighted in the NRC report."

  The 2005 National Research Council report that 
Mitchelmore worked on summarized current 
information on dispersants, and called for more 
research on the effects of dispersant and 
dispersed oil and on how they impact marine life.

The EPA, which recognizes Corexit as a toxin, had 
left that research to industry. On May 13, facing 
charges that safer alternatives to Corexit were 
available, Jackson said that BP was free to 
decide which of the 18 agency-approved 
dispersants it wanted to use. "Our regular 
responsibilities say, if it's on the list and 
they want to use it, then they are preauthorized to do so," she said.

Then in a May 20 directive, the EPA announced it 
"requires BP to identify a less toxic alternative 
- to be used both on the surface and under the 
water at the source of the oil leak - within 24 
hours and to begin using the less toxic 
dispersant within 72 hours of submitting the alternative

"BP is using this dispersant in unprecedented 
volumes and, last week, began using it underwater 
at the source of the leak -- a procedure that has 
never been tried before. Because of its use in 
unprecedented volumes, and because much is 
unknown about the underwater use of dispersants, 
EPA wants to ensure BP is using the least toxic product authorized for use."

The company balked at stopping Corexit use, and 
the EPA, lacking solid research on alternative 
dispersants, caved. The agency admitted that it 
could not readily find an effective and safer 
alternative to Corexit since data in the National 
Contingency Plan Product Schedule was provided by 
the companies themselves, and had been criticized as unreliable.

The EPA was reluctant to challenge BP. "If you're 
going to tie our hands, then we don't own this 
spill," BP Vice President David Rainey had warned 
at a May 12 meeting with state officials on BP's 
dispersant plans, according to Alan Levine, 
Louisiana secretary of Health and Hospitals and 
the Jindal administration's point man.

In a corner, Jackson told BP to "establish an 
overall goal of reducing dispersant application 
by 75 percent from the maximum daily amount." 
That careful wording allowed BP to use the day of 
highest dispersal - 70,000 gallons - as the 
benchmark. Jackson was then able to accurately 
(but misleadingly) claim that BP had reduced 
dispersant use 68 percent. In fact the average 
daily use has only gone down slightly from 24,700 
gallons before the directive to 22,600 after it.

Good News, Bad News

In the first month of the spill, Nalco stock 
spiked, and estimated sales of Corexit garnered 
$40 million. Next quarter sales will be released 
on July 27. Watching with envy, other dispersant 
manufacturers have cried foul, and linked the 
exclusive use of Corexit to Nalco's close 
relationship to BP, rather than to the products' superiority.

Nalco board member Rodney F. Chase, is a nearly 
four-decade veteran of BP, most recently as a 
managing director and deputy group chief 
executive. (A former Exxon Mobil Corp. president 
is also on Nalco's board of directors.)

"It's a chemical that the oil industry makes to 
sell to itself, basically," Richard Charter, a 
senior policy adviser for Defenders of Wildlife, 
was quoted in a May 13 Greenwire blog.

Members of the U.S. Congress have also questioned 
BP's exclusive use of Corexit. "Why would you use 
something that is much more toxic and much less 
effective, other than you have a corporate 
relationship with the manufacturer?" asked 
Jerrold Nadler, a Democrat from New York, during 
a May 19 committee hearing on the disaster.

"When we came out with a safer product 
[Dispersit], we thought people would jump on 
board," said U.S. Polychemical Corp head Bruce 
Gebhardt in an interview with Greenwire. "That's 
not the case. We were never able to move anyone 
of any size off the Corexit product," "We're just 
up against a giant." His company, Gebhardt said, 
could make 60,000 gallons a day of Dispersit, 
which "was formulated to outperform Corexit, and 
got EPA approval 10 years ago."

BP was still using only Corexit on June 30 when 
the EPA released tests that determined the eight 
dispersants it researched "have roughly the same 
impact on aquatic life." In fact, several were 
rated slightly less toxic than Corexit.[i]

"We are not making any such recommendation [to 
tell BP to switch products] at this time," Paul 
Anastas, EPA's assistant administrator for 
research and development said in a conference 
call with reporters. "We will need to have this 
additional testing of the dispersants plus the oil."

The good news, the EPA concluded, is that the 
dispersants are no more toxic than the spilled 
oil. The bad news is that the dispersants are no 
less toxic than the spilled oil that continues to 
poison the gulf waters, shores, wildlife, and human livelihoods.

contact Terry J. Allen:
<mailto:[email protected]>[email protected]

[i] 
<http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/reports/ComparativeToxTest.Final.6.30.10.pdf>http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/reports/ComparativeToxTest.Final.6.30.10.pdf




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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