http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iv.html Thursday, December 9, 2010 Wikileaks El Salvador IV<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iv.html> The subject of the second released Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "With ARENA Fractured, Funes is FMLN's Only Rival<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/crisis/Gobierno/Funes/elpepuint/20101207elpepuint_30/Tes>." The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on January 26, 2010.
Here's the summary: Eight months into the Funes presidency, the GOES can best be characterized as schizophrenic. The part of the government that Funes controls is moderate, pragmatic, responsibly left-of-center and friendly to the USG. The part he has ceded to hard-line elements of the (left-wing) Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is seeking to carry out the Bolivarian, Chavista game-plan, including implacable hostility towards the USG. Divisions on the right have given the FMLN a dominant position in the Legislative Assembly. However, the FMLN does not have an outright majority in the legislature, and it faces strong opposition in the popular and independent-minded President Funes. Funes's popularity could erode quickly if his administration does not start showing visible results in reducing violent crime and reviving the economy. The government's long-run inability to tackle crime or produce economic growth, coupled with petty infighting and corruption within the country's political parties, raises questions about the future of democratic governance in El Salvador. A few quick hits - First, I don't think that it is accurate to say that the hard-line elements of the FMLN are "seeking to carry out the Bolivarian, Chavista game-plan, including implacable hostility towards the USG." The hard-line elements of the FMLN were Chavista before Chavez and will probably remain so when he is gone. While they share affinity for Chavez and might receive support from him, it's not all about Chavez. It doesn't allow policymakers in Washington to objectively weight matters in El Salvador when one side is characterized as Chavista. Similarly, it doesn't make sense to characterize ARENA as center-right (which Blau does latter in the cable). Second, I also don't think it is helpful to characterize Funes' foreign policy as "a moderate, pro-U.S. foreign policy." I imagine that Funes is pursuing a foreign policy that he believes is in the national interests of El Salvador. Fortunately, for the US and I would say the people of El Salvador, he deems economic and political cooperation on issues such as free trade, democracy promotion, and comprehensive immigration reform to be in the interests of the country. It's not a "pro-U.S. foreign policy" but a "pro-El Salvador policy that seeks strong ties with the US." Third, schizophrenic? I'm not a doctor (well, not that kind) but here is Google health on schizophrenia: Schizophrenia is a mental disorder that makes it difficult to tell the difference between real and unreal experiences, to think logically, to have normal emotional responses, and to behave normally in social situations. All I see from the cable is a description of intraparty rivalries. The president and vice president represent different factions of the FMLN-Friends of Mauricio coalition that came to power in 2009. The two factions are competing to guide the country over the next 3+ years and beyond. Funes has control over foreign and economic policy as well as the military. Ceren and other hard-line elements of the FMLN are in charge of labor and education. Finally, how different would the cable have read during the twenty years of ARENA rule? There are serious divisions within the party over the government's economic model and its approach to crime. There are leadership battles within the executive branch and the party in preparation for the upcoming elections. At the same time, the opposition (FMLN) is in chaos and the moderate members have been purged (Villalobos, Guardado, etc.). We might never know what those cables said, but they might not have been too different from the recent revelations. Most of the remaining analysis in the cable is mere speculation. The embassy is trying to work to understand the divisions within ARENA and the FMLN. ARENA's division led to the creation of GANA. There's some serious disagreement between Cristiani (and others) and the corrupt Saca. One of the interesting tidbits here was Cristiani's orders to ARENA last January. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ARENA president Alfredo Cristiani has instructed party leaders to focus their criticism on the FMLN and avoid attacking GANA or President Funes, both of which ARENA views as potential allies. Until the 2012 legislative elections, however, ARENA will remain a marginalized force in national politics. I'm not sure about a potential alliance. It seems like smart politics to not attack a president with a near 90% approval rating. At the same time, don't attack GANA because all new political parties that have splintered from ARENA and the FMLN have failed. There's good reason to believe that the same would occur with GANA. [image: Bookmark and Share] Posted by Mike at 1:19 PM<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iv.html> 0 comments<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iv.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=3794059081344596602> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=3794059081344596602> Labels: El Salvador<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/El%20Salvador>, Wikileaks<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/Wikileaks> Wikileaks El Salvador III<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iii.html> The subject of the third Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "FMLN Affirms Socialist Course; Leadership Acknowledges Need for Strong Relations with U.S.<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/25/Convencion/Nacional/FMLN/elpepuint/20101207elpepuint_29/Tes>" The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on December 15, 2009. Here's the summary: At its 25th annual convention December 13, the FMLN, without President Funes present, voiced solidarity with Cuba and Venezuela, repeated opposition to "the Empire," and voted to join the Fifth Socialist International. It decided to devolve authority to select candidates for local office to local party organizations. Senior FMLN leadership told us December 14 there had been no change in the FMLN's stated desire for good relations with the U.S. and attributed some of the anti-U.S. rhetoric by FMLN members (including VP Sanchez Ceren) to events outside of El Salvador, and an inability to adapt to new circumstances. The cable starts off with a summary of the XXV 2009 Convention where the party reaffirmed its socialist platform. That's nothing new (as I'll mention in the next post). Blau then goes on to summarize a meeting help between Embassy officials and FMLN representatives Medardo Gonzalez, Sigfrido Reyes, and Oscar Ortiz on December 14. Medardo Gonzalez, FMLN General Coordinator and head of legislative bloc, Sigfrido Reyes, FMLN Spokesman and Assembly Deputy, and Oscar Ortiz, Santa Tecla Mayor. Gonzalez atated categorically there had been no change in the FMLN's stance of seeking a constructive relationship with the U.S. Noting recent statements by VP Sanchez Ceren criticizing the U.S., the three were quick to say there was no anti-U.S. policy in the FMLN and, on the contrary, the FMLN and the Funes Government saw strengthening U.S.-Salvadoran relations as a priority. In many ways, I think that the FMLN representatives are just telling the US Government what they want to hear. The truth is that there is a split within the party. There are some who see a strong relationship with the US as crucial to the stability and future of El Salvador while others see the FMLN's future aligned more closely with ALBA and other leftists governments in Latin America. It's not uncommon for members of a political party to be divided on such issues of foreign and economic policy. Granted, in the case of El Salvador, the polarization between parties (the FMLN and ARENA) and within parties (the FMLN) is a little more extreme than most. Ortiz explains that extreme rhetoric coming from the Convention and the VP as a reflection of some failing to adapt to new times. Ortiz suggested much of the anti-Imperialist commentary still emanating from the FMLN was, in part, a function of the party's slow adaptation to a new world of governing and the difficulty of setting aside long-held political rhetoric. I'm sorry, but this sure sounds like Villalobos and the ERP/RN cadre in the early to mid-1990s. And the final comment from Blau The FMLN's historic, guerrilla roots run deep, and the rhetoric of years on the battlefield and two decades in opposition will not disappear quickly, or maybe ever. While our outreach to the FMLN during the 2008-2009 campaign and since Funes' inauguration has paid off in open channels of communications, we continue to combat old suspicions of U.S. motives in El Salvador and the region. On the other hand, good relations with the U.S. enjoys a 90 percent approval rating. If the FMLN overdoes its radicalism, it will have a hard time sustaining its current electoral advantages. Blau analysis seems accurate. There are good reasons why the FMLN and the US government do not get along and the relationship might never improve to the extent the people of El Salvador and the US would like. However, the last sentence is a little difficult to understand without additional information. I'm not sure what it would mean for the FMLN to overdo its radicalism - start nationalizing businesses and property? emphasizing popular democracy? strengthening ties with Communist Cuba and China? joining ALBA? And with regards to "sustaining its electoral advantages," there is little that the FMLN can do in the next five to ten years that will cause it to lose enough popular support so that it is no longer the first or second largest party in the country. I don't know, it's just not a really helpful insight. [image: Bookmark and Share] Posted by Mike at 9:22 AM<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iii.html> 0 comments<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-iii.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=6865893512850952180> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=6865893512850952180> Labels: El Salvador<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/El%20Salvador>, Wikileaks<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/Wikileaks> Wednesday, December 8, 2010 Wikileaks El Salvador II<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-ii.html> The subject of the second released Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "Wave of Protests May Signal FMLN Effort to Undermine Funes<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/protestas/callejeras/Salvador/elpepuint/20101207elpepuint_28/Tes>." The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on August 28, 2009. Here's the summary: A recent wave of protests organized by a so-called environmental group, "La Coordinadora Nacional de Medio Ambiente (CNMA)", are likely part of a movement by hard-line elements of the FMLN to undermine President Funes. Over the past several weeks, the CNMA has carried out large-scale, coordinated protests throughout the country ostensibly protesting GOES plans to continue with the construction of the hydroelectric dam "Chaparral" and perceived inequities in the seed disbursement program to farmers. It seems that hard-line members of the FMLN party are using this relatively unknown organization to vent their frustration about the direction of economic policy and directly challenge the President. Blau then comments: Mass street protests are part of the traditional FMLN play book and are one battlefront in an ongoing struggle for power between the orthodox FMLN and President Funes. Funes said at a meeting Thursday August 27 that his administration will not yield to blackmail. There is broad public support for the need for Funes to prevail. Sorry, but I don't know anything about these strikes and neither does it appear from the cable that Blau does (or at least he isn't saying). Blau argues that these protests were "sophisticated" because they involved a simultaneous "series of road blocks at nine key points in the highway" while "past CNMA protests consisted of no more than small-scale demonstrations outside of the Presidential Palace." Therefore, they must have been organized by the FMLN and they must have been an attempt by hard-liners to undermine Funes. Anybody have any more information? [image: Bookmark and Share] Posted by Mike at 7:19 PM<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-ii.html> 0 comments<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador-ii.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=2239421830786653381> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=2239421830786653381> Labels: El Salvador<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/El%20Salvador>, Wikileaks<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/Wikileaks> Some additional Comments on Wikileaks El Salvador I<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/some-additional-comments-on-wikileaks.html> Let me just add to the first leaked cable<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador.html> why I didn't find that much revealing from it. For much of the FMLN's existence as a political party, the orthodox wing of the FMLN has continually forced out the "moderates" (those that eventually formed the PD and the FDR, among others). Finally, in 2004 the orthodox wing adopted a plan to eventually realize socialism in El Salvador - a plan that ended any debate within the party about social democracy (or a more socially conscious capitalism) versus socialism. From an unpublished paper with Alberto Martin, we wrote In a doctrinal document drafted in 2004 by order of the National Council, the FMLN established a strategy of transition to socialism that would first pass through a phase of state takeover and deepening of democracy (FMLN 2004). To achieve power, they raised the possibility of concluding a series of broad political alliances with non-revolutionary sectors in the short-tem. This policy is a tactical partnership with those political forces that the FMLN leadership considered democratic, but not left. In the words of José Luis Merino one of the partys historic leaders: "The road to socialism passes through the democratization of the country, in that sense all the democratic forces are our potential allies ... We have a strategic objective that might take ten, 20 or 30 years, because until one arrives at conscience: one arrives at socialism. To get there you have to consolidate democracy" (El Faro 2005). The FMLN's avowed goal of socialism (and thereby stronger relations with Venezuela and Cuba) is not compatible with Funes' social democratic vision for the country (with strong US ties). Instead, the FMLN sees Funes as a bridge to a time when Salvadorans would accept a true FMLN candidate. The *Friends of Mauricio* and the *Citizens Movement for Change* were created because Funes lacked support among the FMLN party leadership. These friends' groups give him some organized support within the country and maybe leverage within the party. These organizations were also created to convince non-FMLN (both domestic and international) of his administration's moderate / pragmatic approach to the country's problems, hopefully as a counterweight to the orthodox VP. [image: Bookmark and Share] Posted by Mike at 11:28 AM<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/some-additional-comments-on-wikileaks.html> 0 comments<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/some-additional-comments-on-wikileaks.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=8232556681956716275> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=8232556681956716275> Labels: El Salvador<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/El%20Salvador>, Wikileaks<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/Wikileaks> Tuesday, December 7, 2010 Wikileaks El Salvador<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador.html> Cables between the US Embassy in El Salvador and Washington, D.C. have begun to leak out. Spain's El Pais has coverage here<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Funes/pide/ayuda/EE/UU/frente/socios/ex/guerrilleros/elpepuint/20101207elpepuint_33/Tes>. There are links to the cables at the bottom of the page. I am in the middle of grading, so I'll probably just take a stab at one cable per day. The first<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/preocupacion/Funes/seguridad/elpepuint/20101207elpepuint_27/Tes>cable is dated August, 21, 2009 and deals primarily with relations between President Funes and the FMLN. The cable's subject line is "FRIENDS OF MAURICIO: FUNES NEEDS YOUR HELP." While Funes did not write it, I can't imagine how this is going to win him friends among the FMLN. First, the cable enters in to a bit of a discussion about the then recently constituted *Citizens Movement for Change*, formerly the *Friends of Mauricio Movement*. It's unclear who the US Charge d'Affairs Blau met with, but the source concluded that the near-term goal of the organization was to accompany President Funes as he governed and to provide him non-FMLN political support during his term. A second area of the cable dealt with Funes' concerns about his physical security and that of the integrity of his officials' communications. Funes is worried about the physical security of the president's house. In one failure, intelligence officials did not provide him with advanced warning of protestors camping out in front of the presidential compound. Funes was disappointed that Eduardo Linares (aka Douglas Santamaria), the Director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization (OIE), failed to learn of the protestors ahead of time. Linares also withheld information from the president including daily intelligence briefings and even information about a visit to the country by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister shortly after the Honduran coup. Funes was also concerned that hard-line members of the FMLN were listening in on his phone calls as well as those of other non-FMLN members of the Government. Interestingly enough, he was asking the US Government for assistance and the US was open to the request. Funes also wanted US assistance in interrupting phone calls from prisons, presumably involving extortion rackets. However, the US was reluctant to work with the Manuel Melgar, the Minister of Public Security and Justice. The source told Blau that Melgar's appointment was not taken to display any disrespect to the U.S., but had been a compromise with the FMLN, which had sought appointment of FMLN hard-liner Jose Luis Merino (aka Ramiro Vasquez) as Public Security Minister. Funes, he said, had pushed back and preferred to name Melgar to that position because he had developed a certain rapport with Melgar during the campaign. XXXXXXXXXXXX described Melgar's behavior around Funes during the campaign as compliant and loyal to Funes, characteristics he said would not have been the case with Merino. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Funes would consider new information on Melgar and take appropriate action, fully cognizant of Melgar's linkage to the 1985 Zona Rosa killings. >From this August 2009 cable, it's clear that Funes' relationship with the FMLN was a clear concern for the US Embassy just a few months into his administration. This isn't much of a surprise. I think that this was (and is) a topic that everyone was interested in learning as much about as possible. The information is nothing extraordinary, but the extent to which Funes was reaching out to the US for help and his mistrust of FMLN hardliners are likely to increase tensions between him and the FMLN. [image: Bookmark and Share] Posted by Mike at 9:53 PM<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador.html> 0 comments<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-el-salvador.html#comments> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=8907476218809001481> <http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=8929513019181240765&postID=8907476218809001481> Labels: El Salvador<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/El%20Salvador>, Wikileaks<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/search/label/Wikileaks> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:[email protected]?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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