------------------------------
December 23, 2010
 U.S. Approved Business With Blacklisted Nations By JO
BECKER<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/jo_becker/index.html?inline=nyt-per>

Despite sanctions and trade embargoes, over the past decade the United
States government has allowed American companies to do billions of dollars
in business with Iran and other countries blacklisted as state sponsors of
terrorism, an examination by The New York Times has found.

At the behest of a host of companies — from Kraft Food and Pepsi to some of
the nation’s largest banks — a little-known office of the Treasury
Department<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/treasury_department/index.html?inline=nyt-org>has
granted nearly 10,000 licenses for deals involving countries that have
been cast into economic purgatory, beyond the reach of American business.

Most of the licenses were approved under a decade-old law mandating that
agricultural and medical humanitarian aid be exempted from sanctions. But
the law, pushed by the farm lobby and other industry groups, was written so
broadly that allowable humanitarian aid has included
cigarettes<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#r-j--reynolds-tobacco-company>,
Wrigley’s 
gum<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#william-wrigley-jr--company>,
Louisiana hot 
sauce<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#bruce-foods-corporation>,
weight-loss 
remedies<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#hollywood-usa-brands--inc->,
body-building 
supplements<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#ardess-international>and
sports
rehabilitation 
equipment<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#computer-sports-medicine-inc->sold
to the institute that trains Iran’s Olympic athletes.

Hundreds of other licenses were approved because they passed a litmus test:
They were deemed to serve American foreign policy goals. And many clearly
do, among them deals to provide famine relief in North Korea or to improve
Internet connections — and nurture democracy — in Iran. But the examination
also found cases in which the foreign-policy benefits were considerably less
clear.

In one instance, an American company was permitted to bid on a pipeline job
that would have helped Iran sell natural
gas<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#solar-turbines-incorporated>to
Europe, even though the United States opposes such projects. Several
other American businesses were permitted to deal with foreign companies
believed to be involved in terrorism or weapons proliferation. In one such
case, involving equipment bought by a medical waste disposal
plant<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#hawaii-medical-vitrification>in
Hawaii, the government was preparing to deny the license until an
influential politician intervened.

In an interview, the Obama administration’s point man on sanctions, Stuart
A. Levey, said that focusing on the exceptions “misses the forest for the
trees.” Indeed, the exceptions represent only a small counterweight to the
overall force of America’s trade sanctions, which are among the toughest in
the world. Now they are particularly focused on Iran, where on top of a
broad embargo that prohibits most trade, the United States and its allies
this year adopted a new round of sanctions that have effectively shut Iran
off from much of the international financial system.

“No one can doubt that we are serious about this,” Mr. Levey said.

But as the administration tries to press Iran even harder to abandon its
nuclear program — officials this week announced several new sanctions
measures — some diplomats and foreign affairs experts worry that by allowing
the sale of even small-ticket items with no military application, the United
States muddies its moral and diplomatic authority.

“It’s not a bad thing to grant exceptions if it represents a conscious
policy decision to give countries an incentive,” said Stuart Eizenstat, who
oversaw sanctions policy for the Clinton administration when the
humanitarian-aid law was passed. “But when you create loopholes like this
that you can drive a Mack truck through, you are giving countries something
for nothing, and they just laugh in their teeth. I think there have been
abuses.”

What’s more, in countries like Iran where elements of the government have
assumed control over large portions of the economy, it is increasingly
difficult to separate exceptions that help the people from those that enrich
the state. Indeed, records show that the United States has approved the sale
of luxury food items to chain stores owned by blacklisted banks, despite
requirements that potential purchasers be scrutinized for just such
connections.

Enforcement of America’s sanctions rests with Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control, which can make exceptions with guidance from the State
Department. The Treasury office resisted disclosing information about the
licenses, but after The Times filed a federal Freedom of Information
lawsuit, the government agreed to turn over a list of companies granted
exceptions and, in a little more than 100 cases, underlying files explaining
the nature and details of the deals. The process took three years, and the
government heavily redacted many documents, saying they contained trade
secrets and personal information. Still, the files offer a snapshot — albeit
a piecemeal one — of a system that at times appears out of sync with its own
licensing policies and America’s goals abroad.

In some cases, licensing rules failed to keep pace with changing diplomatic
circumstances. For instance, American companies were able to import cheap
blouses<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html#mappsy-international>and
raw material for steel from North Korea because restrictions loosened
when that government promised to renounce its nuclear weapons program and
were not recalibrated after the agreement fell apart.

Mr. Levey, a Treasury under secretary who held the same job in the Bush
administration, pointed out that the United States did far less business
with Iran than did China or Europe; in the first quarter of this year, 0.02
percent of American exports went to Iran. And while it is “a fair policy
question” to ask whether Congress’s definition of humanitarian aid is overly
broad, he said, the exception has helped the United States argue that it
opposes Iran’s government, not its people. That, in turn, has helped build
international support for the tightly focused financial sanctions.

Beyond that, he and the licensing office’s director, Adam Szubin, said the
agency’s other, case-by-case, determinations often reflected a desire to
balance sanctions policy against the realities of the business world, where
companies may unwittingly find themselves in transactions involving
blacklisted entities.

“I haven’t seen any licenses that I thought we should have done
differently,” Mr. Szubin said.

*Behind a 2000 Law*

For all the speechifying about humanitarian aid that attended its passage,
the 2000 law allowing agricultural and medical exceptions to sanctions was
ultimately the product of economic stress and political pressure. American
farmers, facing sharp declines in commodity prices and exports, hoped to
offset their losses with sales to blacklisted countries.

The law defined allowable agricultural exports as any product on a list
maintained by the Agriculture Department, which went beyond traditional
humanitarian aid like seed and grain and included products like beer, soda,
utility poles and more loosely defined categories of “food commodities” and
“food additives.”

Even before the law’s final passage, companies and their lobbyists inundated
the licensing office with claims that their products fit the bill.

Take, for instance, chewing gum, sold in a number of blacklisted countries
by Mars 
Inc.<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/mars_inc/index.html?inline=nyt-org>,
which owns Wrigley’s. “We debated that one for a month. Was it food? Did it
have nutritional value? We concluded it did,” Hal Eren, a former senior
sanctions adviser at the licensing office, recalled before pausing and
conceding, “We were probably rolled on that issue by outside forces.”

While Cuba was the primary focus of the initial legislative push, Iran, with
its relative wealth and large population, was also a promising prospect.
American exports, virtually nonexistent before the law’s passage, have
totaled more than $1.7 billion since.

In response to questions for this article, companies argued that they were
operating in full accordance with American law.

Henry Lapidos, export manager for the American Pop Corn Company,
acknowledged that calling the Jolly Time popcorn he sold in Sudan and Iran a
humanitarian good was “pushing the envelope,” though he did give it a try.
“It depends on how you look at it — popcorn has fibers, which are helpful to
the digestive system,” he explained, before switching to a different tack.
“What’s the harm?” he asked, adding that he didn’t think Iranian soldiers
“would be taking microwavable popcorn” to war.

Even the sale of benign goods can benefit bad actors, though, which is why
the licensing office and State Department are required to check the
purchasers of humanitarian aid products for links to terrorism. But that
does not always happen.

In its application to sell salt substitutes, marinades, food colorings and
cake sprinkles in Iran, McCormick & Co. listed a number of chain stores that
planned to buy its products. A quick check of the Web site of one store,
Refah, revealed that its major investors were banks on an American
blacklist. The government of Tehran owns Shahrvand, another store listed in
the license. A third chain store, Ghods, draws many top officials from
the Islamic
Revolutionary 
Guards<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/islamic_revolutionary_guard_corps/index.html?inline=nyt-org>Corps,
which the United States considers a terrorist organization.

The licensing office’s director, Mr. Szubin, said that given his limited
resources, they were better spent on stopping weapons technology from
reaching Iran. Even if the connections in the McCormick case had come to
light, he said, he still might have had to approve the license: the law
requires him to do so unless he can prove that the investors engaged in
terrorist activities own more than half of a company.

“Are we checking end users? Yes,” he said. “But are we doing corporate due
diligence on every Iranian importer? No.”

A McCormick spokesman, Jim Lynn, said, “We were not aware of the information
you shared with us and are looking into it.”

*Political Influence*

Beyond the humanitarian umbrella, the agency has wide discretion to make
case-by-case exceptions. Sometimes, political influence plays a role in
those deliberations, as in a case involving Senator Daniel
Inouye<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/i/daniel_k_inouye/index.html?inline=nyt-per>of
Hawaii and a medical-waste disposal plant in Honolulu.

On July 28, 2003, the plant’s owner, Samuel Liu, ordered 200 graphite
electrodes from a Chinese government-owned company, China Precision
Machinery Import Export Corporation. In an interview, Mr. Liu said he had
chosen the company because the electrodes available in the United States
were harder to find and more expensive. Two days later, the Bush
administration barred American citizens from doing business with the Chinese
company, which had already been penalized repeatedly for providing missile
technology to Pakistan and Iran.

By the time Customs seized the electrodes on Nov. 5, waste was piling up in
the sun. Nor did prospects look good for Mr. Liu’s application to the
licensing office seeking to do an end run around the sanctions. On Nov. 21,
a State Department official, Ralph Palmiero, recommended that the agency
deny the request since the sanctions explicitly mandated the “termination of
existing contracts” like Mr. Liu’s.

That is when Senator Inouye’s office stepped in. While his electrodes were
at sea, Mr. Liu had made his first ever political contribution, giving the
senator’s campaign $2,000. Mr. Liu says the timing was coincidental, that he
was simply feeling more politically inclined. Records show that an Inouye
aide called the licensing office on Mr. Liu’s behalf the same day that Mr.
Palmiero recommended denying the application. The senator himself wrote two
days later.

Mr. Inouye’s spokesman, Peter Boylan, said the contribution had “no impact
whatsoever” on the senator’s actions, which he said were motivated solely by
concern for the community’s health and welfare.

The pressure appears to have worked. The following day, the licensing
office’s director at the time asked the State Department to reconsider in an
e-mail that prominently noted the senator’s interest. A few days later, the
State Department found that the purchase qualified for a special “medical
and humanitarian” exception.

The license was issued Dec. 10. Two months later, Mr. Liu sent the senator
another $2,000 contribution, the maximum allowable. Mr. Levey said he could
not comment on the details of a decision predating his tenure. But he noted
that sanctions against the Chinese company had since been toughened, and
added, “Certainly this transaction wouldn’t be authorized today.”

*Curious Exemptions*

Mr. Liu’s license is hardly the only one to raise questions about how the
government determines that a license serves American foreign policy.

There is also, for instance, the case of Irisl, an Iranian government-owned
shipping line that the United States blacklisted in 2008, charging that
because it routinely used front companies and misleading terms to shroud
shipments of banned arms and other technology with military uses, it was
impossible to tell whether its shipments were “licit or illicit.”

Less than nine months earlier, the licensing office had permitted a Japanese
subsidiary of Citibank to carry out the very type of transaction it was now
warning against. Records show that the bank had agreed to confirm a letter
of credit guaranteeing payment to a Malaysian exporter upon delivery of what
were described as split-system air-conditioners to a Turkish importer.
Though the government had yet to blacklist Irisl, sanctions rules already
prohibited dealings with Iranian companies. So when the bank learned that
the goods were to be shipped aboard the Irisl-owned Iran Ilam, it sought a
license.

The license was granted, even though the Treasury Department’s investigation
of Irisl was well under way and the United States had reason to be
suspicious of the Iran Ilam in particular; that summer, the ship had
attracted the attention of the intelligence community when it delivered a
lathe used to make nuclear centrifuge parts from China to Iran, according to
government officials who requested anonymity to speak about a previously
unpublicized intelligence matter.

Mr. Szubin said that since the blacklisting of Irisl, his agency had forced
banks to extricate themselves from such transactions. But at the time the
Citibank license was issued, his agency regularly issued licenses in cases
like this one, where at the time of the transaction, the bank had no way of
knowing that Irisl was involved and where the shipping line would be paid by
a foreign third party anyway. To depart from the norm, he said, risked
facing a lawsuit charging unfair treatment and tipping Irisl off that it was
under investigation.

But if the government has sometimes been willing to grant American
businesses a break, some companies have recently decided that the cost to
their reputations outweighs the potential profit.

General Electric, which has been one of the leading recipients of licenses,
says it has stopped all but humanitarian business in countries listed as
sponsors of terrorism and has promised to donate its profits from Iran to
charity.

As Joshua Kamens, the head of a company called Anndorll, put it, he knew
from almost the minute he applied for a license to sell sugar in Iran that
“it would come back to haunt me.” Although he received the go-ahead, he
decided to back out of the deal.

“I’m an American,” he said. “Even though it’s legal to sell that type of
product, I didn’t want to have any trade with a country like Iran.”

Ron Nixon contributed reporting from Washington, and William Yong from
Tehran.


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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