*Continue in page(12) (please go to our electronic edition and navigate to page 12)*
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/electronic_edition.asp On Wed, Jun 1, 2011 at 11:01 AM, Cort Greene <[email protected]> wrote: > > http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-46/How%20Washington%20and%20Big%20Oil%20Fought%20PetroCaribe%20in%20Haiti.asp > > *New WikiLeaked Cables Reveal: > How Washington and Big Oil Fought PetroCaribe in Haiti* > > > > [image: ...]René Préval, who passed Haitis presidential sash to Joseph > Michel Martelly on May 14, was described by U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Janet > Sanderson as Haitis indispensable man in a Jun. 1, 2009 Embassy cable > released by WikiLeaks last December. > > Sanderson judged him still moderately popular, and likely the only > politician capable of imposing his will on Haiti - if so inclined.* At > the same time, dealing with Préval is a challenge, occasionally frustrating > and sometimes rewarding,* she continued. *He is wary of change and > suspicious of outsiders, even those who seek his success.* > > Prévals suspicions about outsiders seeking his success turned out to > be justified. In two rounds of presidential and legislative elections held > in November and March, Washington aggressively intervened, pushing out of > the presidential run-off Jude Célestin, the candidate of Prévals party > Inite (Unity), to replace him with Martelly, a neo-Duvalierist konpa singer > who vocally supported the 1991 and 2004 coups détat against former > president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. > > Now the U.S. has even challenged the legislative races which would have > given Inite virtual control of the Parliament, and hence approval of the > President-designated Prime Minister, Haitis most powerful executive post. > With U.S. support, challenges were brought against Inite victories in 17 > Deputy and two Senate races. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) ruled > in favor of only 15 challenges, leaving four seats with the original Inite > winners. The U.S. is not even letting this mild, partial impertinence go, > yanking the U.S. travel visas of six of the CEPs eight members. > > How did Haitis indispensable man become so dispensable? Why has > Washington so brazenly intervened in Haitis elections to limit the power of > Prévals party and oust Inites presidential candidate from the run-off? > > Clues to the answer lie in secret U.S. Embassy cables which the > transparency- advocacy group WikiLeaks has provided to Haïti Liberté. The > cables reveal that the U.S. was primarily irked by Prévals dealings with > Cuba and Venezuela, where the former Haitian president was unable to resist > displaying some show of independence or contrariness in dealing with > [Venezuelan president Hugo] Chavez, as Sanderson griped in a 2007 cable. > > U.S. dismay began when Préval signed the very day of his inauguration a > deal to join Venezuelas PetroCaribe alliance, under which Haiti would buy > oil paying only 60% to Venezuela up front with the remainder payable over 25 > years at 1% interest. The leaked U.S. Embassy cables provide a fascinating > look at how Washington sought to discourage, scuttle and sabotage the > PetroCaribe deal despite its unquestionable benefits, under which the > Haitian government would save USD 100 million per year from the delayed > payments, as the Embassy itself recognized in a 2006 cable. > > A review of PetroCaribes genesis and the Embassys response to it provides > a window into understanding why the U.S. has been so forceful in backing the > U.S.-centric Martelly team over Prévals two-timing sector. > > [image: ...]*Venezuelan Trial Balloon Shot Down* > > Venezuela first offered a Petro- Caribe deal to Haiti under the de facto > government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, whom Washington installed in > March 2004 after the Feb. 29 coup against Aristide. *The government of > Venezuela planned to send a negotiating team to Haiti (exact time > undetermined) to negotiate a deal to sell oil at a preferential rate via > PetroCaribe, Embassy Chargé daffaires Timothy Carney (the Charge) reported > in an Oct. 19, 2005 cable. Upon returning from a recent trip to Venezuela, > Minister of Culture and Communication, Magali Comeau Denis told the Charge > she was bringing Venezuelan oil back to Haiti with her.* > > Prior to that trip, Carney and Econ Counselor [his economic counselor] had > spoken to acting Prime Minister Henri Bazin who said that the Interim > Government of Haiti [IGOH] was looking for concessional terms for oil > purchases from Mexico and Nigeria --but not Venezuela, he was quick to > emphasize, Carney continued. In a follow-up conversation, Charge > reiterated the negatives of such a deal with Venezuela. Bazin listened and > understood the message, that Washington would be unhappy about any oil deal > with Venezuela. > > To drive the point home, Econ Counselor met with a contact at the Finance > Ministry October 13 who confirmed that the IGOH has no plans to participate > in any PetroCaribe deal, Carney explained. He added that our message to > Bazin had an impact: Bazin had seen a draft of comments to be made by > Haitis representative to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] that > included a vague reference to someday purchasing oil at concessional prices > from Venezuela, and Bazin had the sentence deleted, the only change he made > on the text. This was the kind of ultra-servile response Washington > expected from a puppet regime in Haiti. > > *But Carney understood that Venezuela had not really expected to strike a > deal with Latortues de facto government. We suspect that the recent > efforts by Venezuela here are designed more to get the issue on the agenda, > and that Chavezs strongest efforts will come after the elections, when a > new Haitian government is inaugurated in February 2006, Carney concluded. > * > > In a Nov. 7, 2005 cable, Carney noted that the pressure is still on the > IGOH to strike a deal with Venezuela as organizations that have organized > demonstrations in the past against high prices in Haiti have publicly called > on the IGOH to accept Venezuelas offer to negotiate on a concessional > deal. However Bazin reassured the Embassy that Haiti was far from any > agreement with Venezuela and instead discussions were ongoing with the > Government of Mexico to obtain a special deal from them on petroleum > imports. (Dominican Foreign Minister Morales Troncoso told the DRs U.S. > Ambassador and visiting Western Hemisphere Affairs Deputy Assistant > Secretary Patrick Duddy that President Fox of Mexico was proposing a Plan > Puebla Panama to counter Chavezs Petrocaribe, reported a Jan. 23, 2006 > cable from the Santo Domingo Embassy.) > > *As Préval Comes In, Troubles Emerge* > > Haitis presidential election did not take place until Feb. 7, 2006, and it > was won by René Préval. Even before his May 14, 2006 inauguration, Préval > clearly was anxious to allay Washingtons worries that he might lean towards > its South American challengers. *He wants to bury once and for all the > suspicion in Haiti that the United States is wary of him, Ambassador > Sanderson, then newly appointed, reported in a Mar. 26, 2006 cable. He is > seeking to enhance his status domestically and internationally with a > successful visit to the United States. This was so important that Préval > has declined invitations to visit France, Cuba, and Venezuela in order to > visit Washington first, Sanderson approvingly noted.* > > The new Haitian president went to great lengths to dispel the notion that > he had any political sympathies for Latin Americas socialist regimes. > *Préval > has close personal ties to Cuba, having received prostate cancer treatment > there, but has stressed to the Embassy that he will manage relations with > Cuba and Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and not > based on any ideological affinity toward those governments.* > > But in April, shortly after his Washington visit, Préval traveled to > Havana; the result confirmed Washingtons fears. *President-elect Préval > announced to the press April 18 that Haiti will soon join Venezuelan > President Hugo Chavezs energy initiative, PetroCaribe, Sanderson reported > in an April 19, 2006 cable. Préval made the announcement after returning > from a five-day trip to Cuba, where he discussed the subject of Petrocaribe > with the Venezuelan Ambassador to Cuba. But Sanderson made clear that the > Embassy her Post would not give up without a fight.* > > *Post will continue to pressure Préval against joining PetroCaribe, she > wrote. Ambassador will see Prévals senior advisor Bob Manuel today. In > previous meetings, he has acknowledged our concerns and is aware that a deal > with Chavez would cause problems with us.* > > In a cable nine days later, Sanderson recognized that Préval was under > *increasing > pressure to produce immediate and tangible changes in Haitis desperate > situation. She also noted that Préval has privately expressed some disdain > toward Chavez with Emboffs [Embassy officials], and delayed accepting > Chavez offer to visit Venezuela until after he had visited Washington and > several other key Haitian partners. Nevertheless, the chance to score > political points [with the Haitian people] and generate revenue he can > control himself proved too good an opportunity to miss.* > > Embassy cables always flag independence as this one decried Prévals > being able to generate revenue he can control himself . Sanderson went on > to warn that Préval could redirect the 40% that would have been spent on > fuel to special presidential development projects and we are wary of the > creation of a special presidential fund.... We will encourage Préval to > channel the money through existing programs, meaning those which the State > Departments U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded > and therefore controlled. > > In April 2006 cable, we see Sanderson hint at an observation that she would > make almost a year later, that *Préval and company may be overselling > their irritation toward Chavez for our benefit, but Préval has consistently > voiced wariness of Chavez in conversations with Emboffs going back to the > early stages of the presidential campaign in 2005.* > > On the surface, Préval feigned ignorance of the hemispheric conflict > between the U.S. and Venezuela. One journalist asked Préval when he > returned from Caracas if there would be *consequences for Haiti building > links with Venezuela, which Washington increasingly sees as a regional > threat, wrote the weekly Haïti Progrés in May 2006. The problems between > the United States and Venezuela are problems that those two countries have > to resolve themselves, Préval responded. It does not affect Haiti in any > way.* > > This was patently untrue. In a May 15, 2006 cable reviewing the > nowinaugurated president, Sanderson noted that despite U.S. discomfort with > his links to Cuba and Venezuela, Préval seems determined to mine those > relationships for what he can obtain. This pragmatism would become the > essence of U.S. dissatisfaction with Préval. > > *Big Oil Fights PetroCaribe in Haiti* > > On May 14, 2006, immediately after his inauguration, Préval summoned the > press to a room in the Palace where he ostensibly signed the Petro- Caribe > agreement with Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vincente Rangel *(Apparently, > the signing... at the inauguration on May 14 was ceremonial... and the first > shipment was a grant, not a part of the loan agreement,* Sanderson wrote > later in an August cable.) > > But it would be almost two years before PetroCaribe oil would begin flowing > into Haiti, due to a myriad of political and logistical obstacles. The first > hurdle was that Venezuela needed to give the petroleum to a state-owned oil > company, which Haiti doesnt have. So it was proposed that the oil be given > to Electricité dHaïti (EDH), the state-owned power company. > > Michel Guerrier, the director of Haitis only domestic oil distribution > company, Dinasa or National (which is owned by Haitis richest man, Gilbert > Bigio), told the Embassys Economic Officer *one possibility is that > PetroCaribe will sell the oil to Haitis National Electricity Company ... > which will then sell to the four oil companies operating in Haiti: Texaco, > Esso (a.k.a. Exxon), National (formally Shell), and [French-owned] Total, > explains a May 12, 2006 cable. Guerrier also said that PetroCaribe is a > great deal for the Haitian government and speculated that the government, > in order to retain total control over the supply of the oil market (they > already control the price), may put an end to the non- PetroCaribe > oil-bearing ship which arrives every three weeks.* > > Sanderson predictably opposed to the idea, calling EDH *an inefficient > and corrupt public entity while recognizing that filtering oil through EDH > could ensure enough fuel to power the electricity plants, without relying on > the oil companies as a costly back-up plan. Not surprisingly, all three > foreign oil companies also opposed the Haitian governments plan. Sanderson > reported in a May 17, 2006 cable that Dinasa, which supplies to Haitis > domestic oil company, National, is the only voice in the oil business to > endorse Prévals proposal to have EDH control the oil supply. The other > international oil companies are increasingly concerned -- both Texaco and > Esso will meet with the Ambassador in the near future -- that they will have > to buy their oil from the GOH [Government of Haiti]. On behalf of the oil > companies and against the obvious benefits for Haiti, Sanderson said we > will continue to raise our concerns about the Petro- Caribe deal with the > highest levels of government...* > > In a June 1 cable, Sanderson reported that Haitians have noted... that > electricity in Port-au-Prince has improved since Prévals inauguration with > 6 to 8 hours a day, usually late at night until morning in residential > areas, but the Embassy continued to oppose the Venezuelan oil delivery. > > In a July 7 cable, she said that Dinasa President Edouard Baussan told her > that the three international oil companies in Haiti feel uninformed about > Haitis PetroCaribe plan and are wary of how PetroCaribe will affect their > operations. Baussan did not know that separately, the Ambassador met with > representatives of ExxonMobil and Texaco [owned by Chevron], as Sanderson > explained to Washington. *Both companies were concerned and curious about > how Préval planned to implement Petro- Caribe. Sanderson finished with some > wishful thinking: PetroCaribe seems stalled indefinitely, and it is > possible that Haiti will not move forward with the agreement. The first and > so far only ship, which was a minor victory for Venezuelas Caribbean > campaign and a tangible sign from Préval to his constituents that he will > bring change, may mark both the beginning and the end of PetroCaribe in > Haiti.* > > *Venezuelan Oil Starts to Flow* > > However, it was not to be the end, as the Embassy was to quickly learn. > Three weeks later, on July 28, Sanderson had to write that the Petro- > Caribe petroleum ... has finally hit the local market. The Haitian > Government (GOH) is selling the entire shipment, including the diesel > (initially intended > > *Continue in page(12) (please go to our electronic edition and navigate > to page 12)* > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:[email protected]?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/laamn/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/laamn/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: [email protected] [email protected] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [email protected] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
