Trouble is these are most of the same people blocking and sabotaging the
advance of socialism and the Bolivarian revolution>>>

Cort

Cilia Flores (first Vice-president of the PSUV), Elias Jaua Milano
(Vice-president of the Los Llanos region), *Nicolas Maduro (Vice-president
of the Southern region),* Francisco Ameliach (Vice-president of the
Central-Western region), Aristobulo Isturiz (Vice-president of the Eastern
region), Diosado Cabello (Vice-president of the Central region), Héctor
Rodríguez, Carlos Escarrá, Jorge Rodríguez, Darío Vivas, Érika Farías,
Freddy Bernal, Héctor Navarro, Jacqueline Faria, Luis Reyes, María Cristina
Iglesías, Alí Rodríguez Araque, Ana Elisa Osorio, Antonia Muñoz, Noelí
Pocaterra, Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, Tarek El Aissami, Yelitze Santaella and
Rodrigo Cabezas, amongst other members

[image: Logo Venezuela Analysis] The Bureaucratic Distortion of the
Strategic Lines of the PSUV

Oct 5th 2011, by Javier Biardeau - Rebelion

Given that prospects still exist for analysing the results of the discussion
assemblies on the so-called five “Strategic Lines of PSUV Political Action”
(which will now be 6), it’s necessary to demonstrate the most evident
symptoms of bureaucratic assimilation and neutralization of radical
criticism to the “party-machine” logic, which began to be voiced following
the problematic results of September 2010.

On the 20th of December 2010 in a meeting with the national leadership of
the PSUV, our very own Chávez began the first debate regarding the Strategic
Lines of Political Action of 2011-2012. There, in the presence of Cilia
Flores (first Vice-president of the PSUV), Elias Jaua Milano (Vice-president
of the Los Llanos region), Nicolas Maduro (Vice-president of the Southern
region), Francisco Ameliach (Vice-president of the Central-Western region),
Aristobulo Isturiz (Vice-president of the Eastern region), Diosado Cabello
(Vice-president of the Central region), Héctor Rodríguez, Carlos Escarrá,
Jorge Rodríguez, Darío Vivas, Érika Farías, Freddy Bernal, Héctor Navarro,
Jacqueline Faria, Luis Reyes, María Cristina Iglesías, Alí Rodríguez Araque,
Ana Elisa Osorio, Antonia Muñoz, Noelí Pocaterra, Ramón Rodríguez Chacín,
Tarek El Aissami, Yelitze Santaella and Rodrigo Cabezas, amongst other
members, Chávez outlined the reasons why 2011 and 2012 would be crucial
years for the Bolivarian Revolution.

*“The main reason for this meeting is to begin a discussion on the content
of the “Strategic Lines of Political Action”, a document which is a draft.
We have paid attention and interest to a series of constructive ideas. It is
us, the national leadership, alongside the bases of the party, who will
construct a new reality”.*

Chavez indicated that the document contained *fundamental ideas *for
tackling the tasks of 2011-2012 which relate to the political continuity of
the Bolivarian Revolution.

*“The next two years will be crucial for the Bolivarian Revolution. That’s
how the militancy and leadership of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
should see it”.*

Chávez set out clearly at the time that “beyond the PSUV, we have to
increase our forces, a *reunification of patriotic and nationalist forces,
on course for the creation of the Patriotic Pole*”. The interpretation of
“beyond the PSUV” implied a counterweight to the logic of the party-machine,
to overcome any overbearing intentions on the part of the PSUV (United
Socialist Party of Venezuela), or of any of the political organisations that
support the Bolivarian Revolution, leaving behind sectarianism, dogmatism,
and bureaucracy, that historically have done so much damage to the
construction of unified forces; preventing the formation of a great platform
of revolutionary parties, social movements, collective fronts now called the
“great patriotic pole”, but also similar to other experiences on the
continent called “the revolutionary broad front.

In a war, the formation of the “great patriotic pole” is a *superior and
principal objective* for tackling the strategic political tasks of 2012,
which in itself, allows for a “democratic deepening” of Venezuelan society,
in order to guarantee the “socialist horizon”; given that to not do this
would be to go backwards, not only to the neanderthal obscurantism of the
Fourth Republic, but also to a “low intensity democracy”, a neo-colonial
protectorate controlled by Washington.

That is how Chávez, in those days of 2010, reiterated the fundamental
importance of carrying out “critical and self critical” efforts to debate,
without losing our main and superior objective. In conclusion, he called for
a constructive debate which produces proposals that add to and multiply
within the process of accumulating revolutionary forces, not proposals which
subtract from and divide those forces in a suicidal process which weakens
the revolution.

If there is a political-ethical element which defines “socialist militancy”,
it is precisely the need for honest debate of ideas (not disqualification
amongst peoples, groups or currents), amongst those who consider the
socialist horizon to be a great project of liberation, democratisation,
substantive justice and social inclusion.  From our point of view, the
transition from a political capitalist culture to a socialist militancy
would involve a sustained and consistent “intellectual and moral reform”, an
active assimilation and rethinking of Gramsci’s teachings on the
construction of a cultural counter-hegemony from the very horizon of the
struggle and from the lives of the popular and subaltern classes. This would
involve the overcoming of the conception of a hegemonic world, as it has
been up until now, of its value system, of its ethical cultural codes and
its behavioural maxims.

>From another point of view, it would involve making a great effort towards
creating a *permanent cultural revolution*, a radical response to both local
and global hegemony which *reproduces the spiritual domination, on a
global-system modern-colonial scale, of the dominant transnational
classes*every day. Not only confronting specific elements of the
ideological
formation of the dominant local sectors and their political representatives,
but undertaking a necessary diagnosis with regards to the *new character of
the system of global domination*, its role in defining the positions and
functions adopted by each country, group, sector and class, still engaged in
processes visibly controlled by the imperial spirit of restructuring towards
“*neo-liberal globalism*”. Changing capitalist political culture is a
profound revolutionary task, with advances and retreats, with ambushes and
its own inconsistencies, it shouldn’t be analysed in a superficial way.

*“This first [strategic] line is the essence of the battle, a change in
customs and culture. This is the biggest of all of the challenges within a
revolution. It’s necessary to develop it, beginning with conscience and
values. There we have to make a huge effort. That selfish capitalist
culture, of individualism, we have to combat it, and replace it with our own
values.” (Chavez, December 20th 2010) *

This change in customs, habits, uses and imagination, cannot be decreed or
imposed from “bank conceptions” (Freire) which reproduce the cultural action
of the dominant local or transnational classes. It involves putting an
*insurgent
counter-culture *on the scene, *as a spiritual climate of plebeian power*,
projecting a whole new kind of life, relations and way of living together,
which will inevitably end up overcoming the deep characteristics of our
specific *capitalist culture (rentier but capitalist), *deeply rooted and
solidified in our relations, practices, environment, representations,
attitudes and speech.

First of all, the *spirit of capitalism *(with its incessant search for
capitalist accumulation through exploitation and domination of other human
beings) must be recognised as being embodied in our everyday lives, in our
practices, in our institutions and in our logic, even in our political
institutions.

Additionally, overcoming a political capitalist culture involves overcoming
structures of political leadership as well, conceiving of politics as
something which goes beyond the calculation of power quotas and privileges,
overcoming the stains of corruption within the politician, as Latin American
Enrique Dussel calls it - who developed the *Philosophy of Liberation – *a
work* *far removed from much of the dogma and reasoning of the old Latin
American Left.* *

*“First of all, it would be necessary to try debating what politics “is
not”, in order to understand what it is. Politics is not exclusively one of
a its components, but all of them together (...). We must know how to
describe him in totality (...) Politics ends up corrupted in its totality,
when the its essential functions are distorted, when the origins and sources
of politics are destroyed.” (Dussel: 20 political thesis). *

*“Corruption originates from the political, from what we will call a power
fetish, which lies within the political actor (the members of the political
community, whether that be a citizen or representative), who believes he is
able to assert himself, either through his own subjectivity or through the
institution in which he holds some kind of position (which can be called a
government employee), whether that be president, representative, judge,
governor, military, police, as the main source of political power. In this
way, for example, the state is able to affirm its sovereignty as the last
instance of power, within which the fetishism for state power and corruption
in all of those that claim to exert state power is defined. If the members
of the government, for example, believe that they exercise power from their
positions of self-referred authority (as in, referred to by themselves),
then their power has been corrupted”. (ibid)*

This covers up and conceals the source of power: which is the constituent or
institutionalised power of the people or community. Here, Dussel suggests
that we should undertake a radical criticism of the political culture of
capitalism (and of bureaucratic socialism), understanding it as a radical
criticism of power fetishism, of the fetishism of representation, as a
criticism of those who believe that they exercise power from referring to
their own authority.

Dussel continues: *“Why? Because the whole exercise of power in each
institution (from the president down to the policeman) or in each political
function (when, for example, the citizen meets in open town council, or
elects a representative) has the power of community politics (or of the
people, in the strict sense) as its first and last reference. Not referring
to, or isolating or curtailing the relationship of the delegate exercise
from the power determined by each political institution with the political
power of the community (or people), fetishises, corrupts and makes absolute
the power of the representative, whatever his role”.*

To put it more succinctly: the exercise of power as a privilege, as a power
quota, as an authority which is not subject to popular legitimization, power
which is not at the service of or delegated by the community or the people.

*The corruption is double: from the governor who believes himself to be
sovereign and from the political community which allows it, which consents
to it, which becomes servile, as opposed to being a constructive actor
within politics.” *A double responsibility which passes through a double
interpellation and power checks.

*“The corrupted representative can use his fetishised power for the pleasure
of exercising his will, as an ostentatious vainglory, like a despotic
arrogance, a kind of sadism before his enemies, an improper appropriation of
goods and riches. It doesn’t matter which benefits are provided to the
corrupted governor, the worst aspect of the situation is not the ill-gotten
gains, but the fact that his attention is diverted from being a
representative: the servant or the obedient exerciore of power in favour of
the community is transformed into something which sucks it dry, a
bloodsucker, a parasite, its weakness, even resulting in its extinction as a
political community.” *(ibid)* *

The corruption of the political transforms itself into a process of
extinction for the political community. In the long term, this consists of
the doubtless “professionalization” of politics, what we call “
representation” within the capitalist political culture: “professionalised
political corruption”: the fight for one’s own interests, one’s own
centuries, one’s own power quotas, one’s own spaces to control resources and
decisions, be it those of an individual (a dictator), a class (the
bourgeoisie), of an elite (like the Creoles), a “tribe” (the heirs of old
political commitments), or of representatives who do not have an imperative
mandate from their social bases -  all are political corruption.

Within Dussel’s conceptual prism, it is senseless to debate over changes
within the capitalist political culture, to criticise representative
democracy or the leadership and major players of the Fourth Republic, only
to end up drowning in a sea of coarse procedures, such as “co-optation”, a
method of “internal democracy”. For this to be happen, what Dussell calls
double corruption must be committed. We end up with a contradiction in
terms, a contradiction of the phrase: “I’m sticking with my social bases”.
It isn’t a matter of calling primary elections for anything, but about
casting doubt on the act of rejecting the face-to-face interpellation of a
community, of a popular assembly, of  politics which (at the very least)
engages in an open consultation process with the popular bases. In this
sense, the first symptom of the bureaucratic neutralisation of the
“Strategic Lines of Political Action”, has been an act of machinery praised
by our very own Chávez (in agreement with the evaluation of circumstances),
it is called co-optation.

How do we transform the logic of the party-machine into that of the
party-movement, if we are beginning by using the worst tricks of the
party-machine, if the first act of “questioning” the capitalist political
culture is to widely reproduce it? Yes we know what an asymptote is, whilst
we are fighting with weapons that have been moulded by the capitalist
political culture, our rapprochement to a socialist militancy will be equal
to zero: just illusion, fiction and simulation.

Moving on, let’s suppose in good faith that (as a product of a weighted
evaluation of circumstances) a section of virtuous politicians within the
party leadership, uncontaminated by a “power fetish”, are going to use the
process of cooptation adequately and for the benefit of the collective, of
the community and the people. Let’s keep going: Are we really transforming
the conception of power as a fetish, as an element of domination, in order
to create institutions (authorities) at the head of those from which
relative authorities will emerge, that administer that power by obeying the
wishes of the people (a power which obeys) and not leading by convincing
themselves that they are the sovereign origin of power?

If the answer is positive, then I believe we are advancing towards moving on
from the capitalist political culture; if it is not positive, then we are
splashing around in the capitalist political culture’s puddle. At least,
from Dussel’s perspective. Obviously, Dussel could also be wrong.

However, there is also political corruption when we are unaware of the
principal of direct popular sovereignty in our carta magna (art.5), when we
no longer have a passionate attachment to the most beautiful values,
principles and norms which sealed our commitment to the popular constituent
process activated in 1998, when we rip participatory democracy into shreds;
when the so-called “protagonist revolutionary democracy” (National Simon
Bolivar Plan) moves from “leading through obeying the constituent power” to
self-referential power, when revolutionary politics, upon falling victim to
bureaucracy, is a symptom of the conversation of its authorities into
“oligarchies”.

The best way of looking at the decadency of a revolution that has plebeian
and popular bases is to look into the historic mirror towards the much
forgotten, but extremely well quoted Mexican Revolution, to observe step by
step what the institutionalisation of a revolution consists of: to
experience in every detail the trajectory of its corruption.

The United Socialist Party of Venezuela can avoid this tragic trajectory and
ending, it could still be a driving force for the direct participation of
the people, and a wide, efficient and well-aimed instrument for the
construction of “socialist and participative democracy”. It could be one of
the exemplary organizational axes in the creation of a new *socialist,
nationalist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary political culture *through
the great patriotic pole. If it assumes with honesty (getting rid of
lethargy and the numerous counts of self-deception), not a “rhetoric of
self-criticism”, but a vast campaign of restructuring and  a renewed drive
from the top-down: from the president, that’s to say, Chávez in full
recovery, passing down throughout the leadership, right to the popular
bases, such as the patrols, which are right now newly enlisted, registered
and drawn towards a plan of political activation in stages, similar to that
driven forward by Bolivar-Command-200.

This restructuring and renewed drive could be a motor for vast, democratic
and comprehensive participation made up of workers, peasants, the youth,
intellectuals, professionals, artists, women, children, medium-sized
producers in the city and countryside, indigenous peoples and the
non-submissive black population. It dependson if the effort to include,
reunify and regroup does not reproduce the vices of the logic of the
party-machine in the creation and functioning of all its bodies of power, in
the production, discussion and resolution of its programmes and strategies,
in the promotion and election of its spokespeople, delegates and leadership,
in equality of conditions, in order to create a collective leadership for
the revolutionary process, concentrated within the construction of the great
patriotic pole. Could the party really be this?

Let’s say yes, on the condition that the strategic lines of political action
are taken seriously, and not converted into a document which “is complied
with but never carried out”. When we talk about converting the PSUV machine
into a party-movement, that means, at the service of the people. We are
almost convinced that everything is being done in order to create the
conditions for a strategic defeat of the revolution; if instead of aligning
all forces in the direction of creating the great patriotic pole, we claim
to prioritise and consolidate the logic of the vanguard apparatus and of the
electoral machine at the heart of the PSUV.

If the announced transformations of the “strategic lines of political
action” document point towards weakening the increasingly needed and deep
politics of the alliances between revolutionary parties, social movements,
collectives and individuals, and instead strengthen the exclusive horizon of
the party-machine, then we will have a very unfavourable panorama for a
resounding victory in 2012.

When Chávez has spoken about the second strategic line for converting the
machinery of the PSUV into a party-movement, at the service of the popular
struggle in order to satisfy human necessities and not just to deal with
electoral events, at least it was clear that: “*This is extremely important,
because that’s where the MVR is (the Fifth Republic Movement), which ended
up being just an electoral machine. It is an extremely dangerous deviation,
because the MVR ended up distanced from the everyday struggles of the
people. We cannot let that happen with the PSUV. We have to tackle this from
now on”.*

Is it really being tackled? The creation of the great patriotic pole, as a
daring policy of reunification, re-politicisation and re-polarisation,
involves having political organisations that will be something more than
vanguard apparatuses or electoral machines. The call to currents, social
movements, patriotic and nationalist forces, to join together in support of
a great patriotic pole must go beyond the prestige and credibility of those
who set it in motion, it involves assuming that sectarianism, opportunism,
bureaucracy and dogmatism are being effectively eradicated. This involves
creating spaces and requests which force criticism in order to construct
alternatives, even Chavez is open to critical voices:

“*I call on all the currents and movements. The more critical, the better. A
call to all sectors of national life. Without sectarianism, let us see
ourselves with humility. I am saying this to all the militants of the party.
The party cannot assume the attitude of being the main player. It is a
party, an open system which can unify and empower - here there are two
paths: That which we are taking (socialism) or we go backwards, which would
be a catastrophe that leads us back into the past”.*

If the new strategic map is honestly being re-thought, then there is a
strategic window and it is important to put to use visions such as the
conception of a “party-movement”, as if it were a “machine in movement”.
Will it really be a great patriotic pole, or a great agglomeration of
“machines in movement”?

It would be very irresponsible politically (and our history has demonstrated
that the left was capable of being extremely irresponsible in the
20thcentury), to deal with the immense strategic objectives of the
reunification
of political, democratic and revolutionary forces with a view to creating
the great patriotic pole, through the logic of the party-machine.

Without socialist self-criticism, the revolution will not be able to go
hand-in-hand with the people, in spiritual accompaniment, in order to
“suffer and be questioned by the people, those who hold true power”. We are
saying this for the following reasons:

   1. The failures of the revolution are named: bureaucracy, opportunism,
   sectarianism, nepotism, the gradual distancing of itself from its Bolivarian
   base, the imposition of party leaders’ will, a lack of compromise, passivity
   within militancy, individualist protagonism, elitism, corruption,
   disinformation, exclusion, disloyalty, a lack of ideological training,
   however, what are the concrete ways of correcting these problems? Who are
   their perpetrators? What is the plan of action and a timetable for carrying
   i tout? What are the consequences of these problems?
   2. The thesis of “the organic development of the party” is prioritised,
   assuming that ideological training through courses and grassroots workshops
   is sufficient for the political work of the masses; as well as implementing
   punitive action and obtaining a direct social link to the diverse examples
   of popular power, when it has been the party leadership which displays the
   greatest distancing and removal from the problems of the community and from
   popular demands.
   3. Exemplary behaviour, high morale, an active insertion into the agenda
   of the popular struggles and the ethics of compromise within the
   party-leadership, are necessary conditions to re-propel, re-politicise,
   re-unify and re-focus on the construction base of the majority in the
   current conjuncture.
   4. Ideological debate and attention to the problems, needs and demands
   felt by the people are not separate aspects of political work. To know and
   apply the rules, to declare principles and the programmatic bases of the
   party, to be worried by the “organic functioning of the party”, is not an
   excuse to abandon political work with those sectors which are not “organic
   militants” of the PSUV, who form great majorities of the people, including
   sectors, collectives and movements with social base organisation, but also
   with those who are still seen as “beneficiaries” of politics and not as
   “protagonists of the transformations”.
   5. The hidden preoccupation with activating “disciplinary tribunals” is a
   possible symptom of the lost capacity to articulate criticisms, process
   differences, articulate unsatisfied demands, to look for “scapegoats” in the
   face of this loss of connection between the organic structures of the party
   and popular problems, accusing any manifestation of unease as a case of
   indiscipline, disloyalty or even betrayal.
   6. It is pre-supposed that the socialist transformation depends almost
   exclusively on the party-instrument, without taking into consideration the
   meaning and autonomy of the social movements, the popular base
   organisations, the organisational mechanisms of the workers, peasants,
   professionals, settlers, students, women, indigenous peoples and other
   collectives within the struggle. We are returning to the old thesis of the
   party-apparatus, which manages and colonises a whole range of organisations
   within society and acts as a “mass which carries our manoeuvres”.
   7. The continuous control of the time of leadership responsibilities or
   of the government by the same people has generated power quotas and a
   control of resources which has prevented the effective execution of internal
   democracy within the party as a result of imposing personal loyalties;
   limiting the action and promotion of natural leadership from the base,
   generating a system of clans and internal strongmen (caudillos) with almost
   life-long positions within the party, government, mayoralties and other
   bodies of national power.
   8. The dynamic of the party is being drowned in its internal functioning,
   in its organic structures, in its management of the political, in
   informational meetings and internal coordination, instead of working
   politically with the communities and sectors of the people’s struggle. The
   party is going through a process which limits itself and alienates itself
   from popular demands, it conceives of itself as a separate entity which is
   superior to the people, an entity that imposes its will over the “masses who
   have no ideological consciousness”. It conceives of the people as a
   beneficial client, and not as a protagonist of change, it conceives of
   itself as a checkpoint which hands out favours and privileges.
   9. Any party thesis as a school for the public service, to spread out a
   permanent politics of alliances and mutual beneficial and respectful
   relationships with social movements, communities, organisations of workers’
   demands, peasants, students, public sector employees, professionals
   indigenous peoples, women and a whole conjunction of citizenship
   organisations is omitted. Without this politics of activity and popular
   leverage, the everyday struggle to transform living conditions, satisfy
   human necessities, channel institutional responses and social
   responsibility, the party becomes a type of toll gate or road block in the
   relationship between the government and the people.
   10. The party s perceived of as a separate entity which does not include,
   convoke incorporate or add itself to the revolutionary cause and movements
   within the population, which maintains itself on the margins of political
   life. The popular organisations are sick, tired and disillusioned with being
   treated as “beneficiaries” or as an “electoral flock” and not as
   protagonists of the “democratic deepening of society”.
   11. The party does not perceive, echo or channel the unsatisfied demands
   of the people, it represents itself as the party of the government; it does
   not critically question state bodies, or their directors, for making it
   difficult to satisfy social demands or needs.

These reasons and others are responsible for blocking the internal
restructuring of the PSUV as it advances towards the creation of the great
patriotic pole, a fact which transcends party authority, since this fact
involves the deployment of a revolutionary politics (of alliances and
articulation of forces, social movements, groups and individuals) which go
beyond revolutionary political parties.

If the great patriotic pole does not conceive of itself as something which
goes beyond electoral calculations, and apply itself to a project which
articulates a strategic content for the construction of Bolivarian,
democratic and revolutionary socialism, accelerating the construction of
spaces and instances of popular power, such as the defence of national
sovereignty and the *democratic radicalisation of Venezuelan society, *then
the future of our revolutionary advances will remain confined to the defence
and preservation of the social victories which have been won up until now.
In order to leave this stagnation behind, which serves to advance the
rightwing and its imperialist interests, it is necessary to climb out of the
puddle of the party-machine logic, exorcise vanguardism, *accumulate forces
for a wide revolutionary front,* which draws its inspiration once again *from
the plebeian power of different social fronts*, of a sectorial and
territorial character, which in its constituent power can create new
positions that consolidate an *authentic and mended socialist horizon. *

*Translated by Rachael Boothroyd for Venezuelanalysis.com*
 ------------------------------
*Source URL (retrieved on 06/10/2011 - 6:47am):*
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6539


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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