Hi. These first two sentences of Conn Hallinan's article on Pakistan should be enough to intrigue you: "In the aftermath of the Nov. 26 NATO attack on two border posts that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the question being asked is whether the assault was a "fog of war" incident or a calculated hit aimed at torpedoing peace talks in Afghanistan? Given that the incident has plunged relations between Washington and Islamabad to a new low at a critical juncture in the 10-year war, the answer is vitally important." But first; . <http://www.democracynow.org/2011/12/1/democracy_now_correspondent_anjali_kamat_on> http://www.democracynow.org/2011/12/1/democracy_now_correspondent_anjali_kamat_on
Democracy Now! Correspondent Anjali Kamat on Reporting the Revolutions in Egypt and Libya December 01, 2011 <http://www.democracynow.org/shows/2011/12/1> Anjalilibya_button <http://www.democracynow.org/images/story/35/20835/ANJALILIBYA_button.jpg> Democracy Now! special correspondent Anjali Kamat has just returned from Cairo after nearly a year reporting on the revolutions in Egypt and Libya. Anjali was on the ground in Cairo covering the uprising that overthrew Hosni Mubarak and the ensuing crackdowns on protesters opposed to military rule. Kamat also made two trips to Libya to cover the uprising and ultimate overthrow, with the aid of NATO forces, of the Gaddafi regime. "One of the things that was really remarkable over the past year that I saw in both Egypt and Libya is the fearlessness of people," Kamat says. "I was really taken aback by—you know, we’ve seen visually the scenes of crowds of people running into armed tanks, running into vehicles towards them that are opening fire, people just without any fear." Kamat also addresses an issue that has divided many progressive critics of Western militarism: the reality that the NATO intervention in Libya, despite charges of hypocrisy and ulterior motives, enjoyed widespread support amongst Libyans seeking to topple the hated Gaddafi regime. [includes rush transcript] AMY GOODMAN: Our guest is Democracy Now! special correspondent Anjali Kamat, back from a year, most of that time spent in Cairo, Egypt, reporting on what has been happening there. Today, the results coming in, more than 40 percent, it looks like, of the seats that were up in parliament have gone to the Muslim party, another more than 20 percent, perhaps 25 percent, to the Salafist, more conservative Islamist party, with the liberals coming in third. Juan? JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, Anjali, Egypt was not the only focus of your reporting. You also had many dispatches from the revolution in Libya.. And I’m wondering if you could reflect on what has happened in Libya, as well, and to some degree, whether the end of what happened to Mubarak did not then cause the other dictators of the region to decide they’ve had to fight to the death to stay, to prevent being put on trial, as Mubarak was. ANJALI KAMAT: Yeah, I mean, it was really an incredible year to be able to witness two revolutions, you know, something I never expected in my lifetime. And, all of what happened over this past year across the region, I think, has taken everyone by surprise, including people in the region, and certainly the U.S. government and, most importantly, the leaders, who I think assumed that they could continue to hold on to power until they died. And what we’ve seen in Libya, what we’re seeing in Syria and what—you know, things are changing a bit in Yemen now—is that these leaders do not want to give up power and will really hold on, do anything it takes to maintain their grip on power. One of the things that was really remarkable over the past year that I saw in both Egypt and Libya is the fearlessness of people. I was really taken aback by—you know, we’ve seen visually these scenes of crowds of people running into armed tanks, running into vehicles towards them that are opening fire, people just without any fear. And I think it’s this—people talked about the fear barrier being broken. And I think what happened in both Egypt and Libya, and also in Bahrain and Syria and Yemen, is the sense that there’s something more important than being afraid of being injured, of being killed, of being tortured, of being imprisoned, which was all a reality for many activists in this region for decades, and certainly this only multiplied over this year. In Egypt alone over the past year, you know, as many as a thousand people have been killed, if you count the number of deaths during the uprising and then in subsequent clashes. And in Libya, that number is much, much higher. It’s hard to put an exact death toll, but it could be in the thousands, it could be in the tens of thousands, the numbers of people who have been killed and/or missing. But there is a very clear sense in both countries that the fight was worth it. It’s been ugly, particularly in Libya. We’ve seen—it stretched on for many months. NATO’s involvement, many people had very many questions about it, what this meant for the legitimacy of their struggle. But I think, for people in Libya, the overwhelming sense that I got is that the most important goal for them was to get—was to topple their regime. And they were so inspired by what they saw in Tunisia and Egypt, and every time one dictator fell or took a beating, there was a sense—there was a renewed sense of optimism around. So, when Tripoli fell, there was excitement in the streets of Cairo and in Bahrain and in Yemen and Syria. You know, there’s also this, there’s a real realization and acknowledgment on the part of many people in Libya and in Egypt that the struggle—that the road ahead is going to be paved with struggles, and it’s not going to be an easy road. Many people feel that really hard work begins now. So, it remains to be seen how people will continue to fight to keep their voices heard. AMY GOODMAN: Since the revolution in Egypt, 12,000 people now being put before military trials, 12,000 people. In Libya, what, 7,000 the rebels have detained? ANJALI KAMAT: Yeah, the U.N. just came out with a report that, you know, says that 7,000 people have been detained by different militias in Libya, loosely under the control of the Transitional National Council. This is disturbingly high in a country where tens of thousands of people were imprisoned under Gaddafi. And one of the main reasons that brought people out onto the streets was the repressive security state. JUAN GONZALEZ: And a country with far less population than Egypt. ANJALI KAMAT: With six million people, yes. AMY GOODMAN: We talked to you just after the fall of Gaddafi. You’ve been to Libya a number of times from Egypt, just going over the border. We spoke to you in Cairo, just as you had come back, and with Mahmood Mamdani, who has written extensively on the global implications of NATO’s intervention in Libya. A big difference between Egypt and Libya was NATO’s attack. I want to go to a clip of the Columbia University professor, Mahmood Mamdani, talking about a report that you had filed on post-Gaddafi Libya. MAHMOOD MAMDANI: What struck me about Anjali’s description is the backdrop is missing. The backdrop is the manner of change in Libya, the heavy involvement of external forces in expediting, rapid fashion, change in Libya, and that manner of involvement being basically bombardment. In East Africa, which is where I’ve been for the last eight months, this has been the cause of huge concern, huge concern because Libya is not atypical. Egypt and Tunisia might be slightly atypical when it comes to the African continent. Libya is far more characteristic of countries which are divided, which have leaders who have been in power for several decades, which have strong military forces and sort of formally democratic regimes, but otherwise really autocratic regimes, and where the opposition is salivating at the prospect of any kind of external involvement which will bring about a regime change inside these countries. So there is a real sense of danger around the corner. AMY GOODMAN: That was Professor Mahmood Mamdani from Columbia University. Anjali, your response? ANJALI KAMAT: I think, people were very divided in Libya about the NATO intervention. Initially there was a very clear sense that people didn’t want foreign intervention. People wanted to do this on their own. But I think it reached a point where people felt they just weren’t able to do this on their own, and there was no going back. Already hundreds of people had been killed. The attacks were continuing, and there was a real sense of the imbalance of power. And they put out a call for external support. And there’s much to be said about the machinations that took place in Europe, in the United States, countries that had long supported Gaddafi and that had armed Gaddafi, that had now decided to switch sides. But I think if we’re looking at this from the perspective of the Libyan people, there’s a sense that it was worth it. And, one might take issue with that for many reasons, many grounds. But I think, for Libyans, it’s important—they see this as their revolution. And they are—many of them are thankful for NATO’s role and the air support and the ground support, the special forces that came in from Qatar. I mean, let’s not forget Qatar’s role in this, as well. It’s not just NATO. And I think in the post-Gaddafi situation, the real power struggle is between NATO and Qatar in some ways and the different forces that they are backing on the ground in Libya and what the future of Libya will look like. A lot of the activists in Libya are trying to maintain their independence and critique both NATO and Qatar, as well as the new leadership in Libya. AMY GOODMAN: We only have a minute to go, but in this period of this year that you’ve been away, you also returned home to India because your dad died. Your dad and mom, who have had such an important influence on your life, of course—could we end by you talking about what it meant to go home and to reflect on their lives and yours, where you’re headed now? ANJALI KAMAT: You know, the interesting thing is, I think the reason I got interested in the Middle East is because my parents lived there, and my father had lived in the region for a decade. He ran a small publishing house out of Beirut and traveled to capitals across the Arab world and Middle East and North Africa, was in Cairo in the late ’60s and early ’70s and helped start the Cairo Book Fair there. And he was very, very happy in February that I was in Egypt. He was very sick when I left India to come to Egypt. And it was a hard decision to leave him and go, but he was very happy. AMY GOODMAN: You talked every night? ANJALI KAMAT: Yes, we talked every day. And he was very happy that I was there witnessing the revolution and called me on the 11th, crying, saying he never believed this day would come. And I think he was—you know, it was a happy—he said he was very happy to be alive to see this day. AMY GOODMAN: Well, Anjali, I trust your mom and your dad would be so proud of you today, as we are. Thank you so much for coming home. It’s great to see you. Anjali Kamat, Democracy Now! special correspondent. *** From: Portside Moderator [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] Dispatches from the Edge By Conn Hallinan December 2, 2011 Pakistan: Anatomy Of A Crisis In the aftermath of the Nov. 26 NATO attack on two border posts that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the question being asked is whether the assault was a "fog of war" incident or a calculated hit aimed at torpedoing peace talks in Afghanistan? Given that the incident has plunged relations between Washington and Islamabad to a new low at a critical juncture in the 10-year war, the answer is vitally important According to NATO, U.S. and Afghan troops came under fire from the Pakistani side of the border and retaliated in self-defense. American officials have suggested that the Taliban engineered the incident in order to poison U.S.-Pakistani relations. But there are some facts suggesting that the encounter may have been more than a "friendly fire" encounter brought on by a clever foe, an ill-defined border, and the normal chaos of the battlefield. Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Samiullah Rahmani denies they were even in the area-and the insurgent group is never shy about taking credit for military engagements (of course, if deception was involved that is what the Taliban would say). However, this particular region is one that the Pakistani army has occupied for several years and is considered fairly "cleansed" of insurgents. The incident was not the case of a drone attack or bombing gone awry, a common enough event. For all the talk of "precision weapons" and "surgical strikes," drones have inflicted hundreds of civilian deaths and 500 lb bombs have very little in common with operating rooms. Instead, the NATO instruments were Apache attack helicopters and, according to Associated Press, an A-130 gunship. In short, the assault was led by live pilots presumingly indentifying targets to their superiors. Those targets were two border forts, architecture that has never been associated with the Taliban. It is true the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is porous and not always clearly defined, but the Afghan insurgents don't build concrete posts. A "fort" is duck soup for a drone or a fighter-bomber, which is why the Taliban favor caves and hidden bunkers. Naturally enough, both sides disagree on what happened. The Americans say they took fire from the Pakistani border, engaged in a three-hour running fight, and called in the choppers at the end of the battle. But, according to the Pakistanis, there was no fire from their side of the border, and helicopters started the battle, which went on for a little less than two hours. Pakistan also says there were two Apache attacks. The first struck outpost Volcano, and when the fort's nearby companion, outpost Boulder, fired on the helicopters, it also came under assault. Pakistan claims that its military contacted NATO to warn them they were attacking Pakistani troops, but the firing continued. The helicopters finally withdrew, only to reappear and renew the attack when the Pakistanis tried to reinforce the besieged forts. Might it have been a matter of bad intelligence? According to the Pakistanis, Islamabad has been careful to identify its posts to NATO in order to avoid incidents exactly like this. Pakistan Gen. Ashfaq Nadeem said, "it is not possible" that the "NATO forces did not know of the location of the Pakistani posts." Pakistan Gen. Ashram Nader called the attack a "deliberate act of aggression." Could it have been "deliberate"? Mistakes happen in war, but the timing of this engagement is deeply suspicious. It comes at a delicate moment, when some 50 countries were preparing to gather in Bonn, Germany for talks aimed at a settling the Afghan War. Central to that meeting is Pakistan, the only country in the region with extensive contacts among the various insurgent groups. If the U.S. plans to really withdraw troops by 2014, it will need close cooperation with Pakistan. "This could be a watershed in Pakistan's relations with the U.S.," Islamabad's high commissioner to Britain, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, told the Guardian (UK). "It could wreck the time table for the American troop withdrawal." Pakistan has now withdrawn from the Bonn talks, and relations between Washington and Islamabad are as bad as they have ever been. The Pakistanis have shut down two major land routes into Afghanistan, routes over which some 50 percent of supplies for the war move. Islamabad has also demanded that the CIA close down its drone base at Shamsi in Pakistan's Balochistan Province. Who would benefit from all this fallout? It is no secret that many in the U.S. military are unhappy about the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban, in particular the organization's most lethal ally, the Haqqani Group. There is an unspoken but generally acknowledged split between the Defense Department and the State Department, with the former wanting to pound the insurgents before sitting down to talk, while the latter is not sure that tactic will work. Could someone on the uniformed side of the division have decided to derail, or at least damage, the Bonn meeting? It is also no secret that not everyone in Afghanistan wants peace, particularly if it involves a settlement with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance, made up of mostly Tajiks and Uzbeks, want nothing to do with the Pashtun-based Taliban that is mainly grouped in the south and east, and in the tribal regions of Pakistan. The Afghan Army is mostly Tajik, who not only make up the bulk of the soldiers, but 70 percent of the command staff. President Hamid Karzi is a Pashtun, but he is largely window dressing in the Northern Alliance- dominated Kabul government. There are broader regional issues at stake as well. It was no surprise that China immediately came to Pakistan's defense, with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechu expressing "deep shock and strong concern" over the incident. China is not happy about the NATO deployment in Afghanistan and less so about the possibility of permanent U.S. bases in that country. At a Nov. 2 meeting in Istanbul, China, along with Pakistan, Iran and Russia, opposed a long-term American deployment in the area. Iran is worried about the threat of U.S. military power on its border, Islamabad is concerned that prolonging the war will further destabilize Pakistan, and Beijing and Moscow are suspicious that the Americans have their sights set on Central Asia gas and oil resources. Both Russia and China rely on Central Asia hydrocarbons, the former for export to Europe, and the latter to run its burgeoning industries. China is also anxious about the Obama administration's recent strategic shift toward Asia. The U.S. has openly intervened in disputes between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea, and recently signed an agreement to deploy 2,500 Marines in Australia. Washington has also tightened its ties with Indonesia and warmed up to Myanmar. To China, all this looks like a campaign to surround Beijing with U.S. allies and to keep its finger on the Chinese energy jugular vein. Some 80 percent of China's oil moves through the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. A key ingredient in any formula to offset Beijing's growing power and influence in Asia is the role of India. New Delhi has traditionally been neutral in foreign policy, but, starting with the Bush administration, it has grown increasingly close to Washington. China and India have a prickly relationship dating back to the 1962 border war between the two countries and China's support for India's traditional enemy, Pakistan. China claims on part of India's border area have not improved matters. India would also like a Taliban-free government in Kabul, and anything that discomforts Islamabad is just fine with New Delhi. There are elements in the American military and diplomatic community that would like to see Washington dump its alliance with Pakistan and pull India into a closer relationship. A fair number of Indians feel the same way. So far, the White House has refused to apologize, instead leaking a story that showing any softness vis- Ã -vis Pakistan during an election year is impossible. In the end, the border fight may turn out to be an accident, although we are unlikely to know that for certain. Military investigations are not known for accuracy, and much of what happened will remain classified. But with all these crosscurrents coming together in the night skies over Pakistan, maybe somebody saw an opportunity and took it. In a sense, it is irrelevant whether the attack was deliberate or dumb: the consequences are going to be with us for a long time, and the ripples are likely to spread from a rocky hillside in Pakistan to the far edges of the Indian Ocean and beyond. _________________ Conn Hallinan can be read at dispatchesfromtheedgeblog.wordpress.com and middleempireseries.wordpress.com ___________________________________________ Portside aims to provide material of interest to people on the left that will help them to interpret the world and to change it. 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