All this on top of Uribe working with death squads killing thousands, being a lackey and front man for the US, supporting political assassinations, murdering trade unionists and now we find out from Salvatore Mancuso of the AUC( one of many death squads) in prison in the US, was backing Uribe and Santos campaign with money,workers and revealing a political plan to supporting a military coup against President Chavez while backing the opposition.
Cort U.S. military and police aid grants to Colombia (total aid since 1996) Thats over 7 Billion dollars-Colombia ($7,133,790,536) Uribe accuses Chavez of covering up murders <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/24014-colombian-president-uribe-accuses-chavez-of-murder.html> Monday, 14 May 2012 06:52 Christan Leonard Tags: - Alvaro Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/alvaro-uribe.html> - Henrique Capriles<http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/henrique-capriles.html> - Hugo Chavez <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/hugo-chavez.html> - Kidnapping <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/kidnapping.html> - Murder <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/murder.html> - Twitter <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/twitter.html> - Venezuela <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/venezuela.html> <http://digg.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fcolombiareports.com%2Fcolombia-news%2Fnews%2F24014-colombian-president-uribe-accuses-chavez-of-murder.html&title=Uribe%20accuses%20Chavez%20of%20covering%20up%20murders> [image: Alvaro Uribe] Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/20404-alvaro-uribe.html>accused Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of covering up government impunity for the murder of thousands of citizens via Twitter on Sunday. In a post on his Twitter page<https://twitter.com/#!/AlvaroUribeVel/status/201747872075616256>, Uribe wrote that Chavez "wants to cover up the unpunished murder of 19 thousand Venezuelans each year." In another Uribe wrote that Chavez "wants to plug up that between 1998 and 2011 homicides increased from just over 4,000 to almost 19,000 per year." Uribe called Chavez a murderer and said that Chavez wants to "cover that he has made Venezuela a haven for terrorists." Uribe also gave his support for the presidential candidacy of Henrique Capriles, saying "Venezuela will hopefully have decent private investment without the Chavez dictatorship." Uribes broken promises, Part 2 <http://colombiareports.com/opinion/julian-e-torres/23895-uribes-broken-promises-part-two.html> Monday, 07 May 2012 08:41 Julián Esteban Torres López Tags: - Alvaro Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/alvaro-uribe.html> <http://digg.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fcolombiareports.com%2Fopinion%2Fjulian-e-torres%2F23895-uribes-broken-promises-part-two.html&title=Uribes%20broken%20promises,%20Part%202> [image: uribe 2002] Former President Alvaro Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/20404-alvaro-uribe.html>is on a Twitter tirade claiming his successor Juan Manuel Santos<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/9075-profile-juan-manuel-santos.html>has not lived up to 2010 campaign pledges. Not only is this false, but the former President is conveniently forgetting a large number of promises he broke himself. In fact, his failures to observe and fulfill his own proposed objectives are too numerous and remarkable to forget. They are so numerous that they wouldnt fit in one op-ed. This is part two of a series of five that compares (a) the promises Uribe made before the 2002 elections and the discourse held during his presidency and (b) what actually transpired. *Broken Promise #2: Strengthening public institutions* In a September 2004 interview with weekly Cambio, Gustavo Petro<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/9088-profile-gustavo-petro.html>expressed his fear of a democratically elected president like Uribe destroying the pillars of democracy. In August of 2003, Jaime Araúo Rentería, former magistrate of Colombia <http://colombiareports.com/>s Constitutional Court, according to newspaper El Tiempo, feared that with Uribe Colombia would turn into an authoritarian state. In 2002, activists, such as members of Organización Femenina Popular, also expressed similar fears after Uribes first election because they expected to see the realization of a totalitarian model blessed by the U.S. In 2002, Jorge Rojas, Director of CODHES (Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement) said it appeared that Uribes initiatives would lead to a presidential dictatorship. Such preoccupations and concerns were not unfounded. State of Internal Commotion Fernando Londoño, Uribes Justice and Interior Minister from 2002-2004, claimed that Colombians should be prepared to sacrifice all rights for the sake of security because, as he saw it, There are no absolute rights. Uribes declaration of a State of Internal Commotion, for example, just five days after inauguration, went against certain Constitutional rights. In 2002, *The Washington Post *summarized Uribes declaration in the following manner: [The] decree, which will last from three to nine months, allows the government to impose extended curfews and prevent access to areas without prior court approval; restrict information reported by the news media; commandeer land, equipment and professional expertise from private citizens; and suspend elected officials contributing to public unrest. Two weeks after the declaration, Londoño, while speaking to Congress, suggested that some of the powers the declaration guaranteed should be made permanent. In June of 2010, Uribe again was set to declare another State of Internal Commotion. Both times the state of emergency was defended by the government as necessary to fight terrorism. Executive Branch increases influence* * An October 2009 study by the Center of Law, Justice and Society concluded that the Executive Branch increased its influence during Uribes tenure. By the time of the reports publication it was said that when Uribe was first elected, the Presidency had influence in appointing the Ombudsman and the Prosecutor General. However, after eight years that rose to influence over eight state institutions. Further, during the last couple of weeks of his second term, Uribe proposed a bill to the House of Representatives that would transfer the ability to select the Colombian Prosecutor from the Supreme Court to the Executive Branch. Presidential term extension His search for dominance was also present in his desire to remain in the nations highest office for as long as possible. Though during his second term Uribe remained vague as to whether or not he supported the referendum though he did end up backing it publicly toward the end , during his first term he was more vocal about it: I shall be frank. Im a politician and I would like it if the mayors would campaign for the referendum, why should I disregard the reality, thats how it is. Two years after Uribes second election, a political bribery scandal * yidispolítica * erupted that would put the legitimacy of Uribes second term into question. Yidis Medina, former congresswoman, testified to the Supreme Court and was found guilty of selling her vote in favour of Uribes re-election bill. Also, investigations were also assumed against Tomás Uribe, the former presidents son, for a notary scandal and bribery to ensure his fathers 2006 re-election. Though Uribe and supporters successfully changed the constitution to run for a second term, they were unsuccessful the second time. The Constitutional Court found irregularities in the manner the signatures for the referendum were collected, concluding Uribes second re-election bid unconstitutional in its entirety and contained substantial violations to the democratic principle. Underfunding of conflict resolution and reconciliation institutions Further, public institutions essential for conflict resolution and reconciliation were under-funded. For example, in April of 2010, the Colombian Prosecutor Generals Office confirmed 300,000 official registered complaints against the paramilitaries, including 157,000 extrajudicial executions to which 32,000 assassinations the paramilitaries had already confessed at the time. However, on 24 August 2010, the same office expressed it did not have a budget and sufficient resources to investigate the large number of complaints, of which only 7 percent had been investigated. Attack on independence of judiciary Uribe also had a history of lashing out against the judiciary for investigating him, his family, his military, and his political party claiming that such investigations destroyed justice and replaced it with hatred. Yet, at the same time, Uribe pushed for judges to fully investigate his opposition and even submitted bills that limited civil liberties if his military wanted to investigate leads. The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) called Uribes actions another attack on the independence of the judiciary. The FIDH also had concerns regarding the safety and security of Colombian judges, and with Uribe the FIDH feared he was attempting to hinder the process of the cleaning up of Colombian institutions which should contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of the State and to the full implementation of the Rule of Law. On June 10 of 2010, Jaime Arrubla, acting Supreme Court President, speaking for the court, called upon the international community to give their support and solidarity to the [Colombian] judicial system, which once again is being attacked for exercising its functions, and urges the national government to implement the recommendations that have been imposed by the international rapporteurs. According to Amnesty International, [s]everal Supreme Court judges investigating the scandal [parapolítica], and their families, were reportedly threatened. The Judicial Branch and the Executive had eight years of tension. The unrelenting train crash between Uribe and the courts was wide in scope covering the scandals of *yidispolítica*, *parapolítica*, DAS wiretaps, extradition of paramilitaries, the Justice and Peace Law (which granted near impunity to demobilized paramilitaries), electing Colombias Attorney General, the implications of Uribes son and cousin, Mario Uribe, in a notary and election scandal, and so forth. In February of 2008, the FIDH called for the Colombian government to respect the independence of the judiciary and to guarantee the safety and integrity of the judges, who have been publicly stigmatized by the President himself. With such pressures directed at the Judiciary, it is difficult to assess if it was able to effectively fulfill its purpose during the times of Uribe, a concern that has been expressed by FIDH and the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective (CCAJAR). *Prioritizing security forces over states human rights obligations* Uribe prioritized trying to pass anti-terrorist legislation that would legalize torture and violate human rights and the 1991 Constitution. His first administration tried to give judicial powers to the countrys security forces the very armed group with some of the worst crimes against humanity and human rights records in the country and hemisphere, especially during Uribes two terms in office. Uribe was also successful in suspending consequences for armed groups, like its allied paramilitaries, that demobilize regardless if they themselves had been direct perpetrators of torture and extrajudicial assassinations. Through the Antiterrorist Amendment (2003) and the Antiterrorist Law (2004) the administration tried to give the countrys armed forces the ability to arrest people for 36 hours, search homes, and spy on private communications without judicial oversight or warrant. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) warned in 2003, the Uribe administration policy for democracy and security would be sending a message that the security forces would be more successful if less constrained by the states human rights obligations. This message, concluded ICG, is dangerous and, as history has often shown, counterproductive. The statute, looking to increase the power of the military, was struck down in August of 2004 by the Colombian Constitutional Court. These Bills would have severely limited the fundamental civil liberties and rights established by the 1991 Constitution all under the name of security and the war on terror, which, in turn, could fuel a greater increase in extrajudicial assassinations, torture, forced disappearances, force displacements, and forced detainments than the country has already experienced under Uribes armed forces. Christian Salazar, a representative of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, was worried about such a proposal: One can say that human rights can never weaken the Armed Forces. On the contrary, the respect of human rights strengthens the legitimacy of the armed forces of any democratic state, also in Colombia. The only institutions that significantly got stronger during Uribes watch were the Executive Branch and the Armed Forces. I dont even want to imagine what a third Uribe term would have entailed. *Julián Esteban Torres López has a BA in Philosophy, BA in Communication, and MA in Justice Studies from the University of New Hampshire. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of British Columbia Okanagan concentrating on Political Science and Latin American Studies. A Medellín native, he is presently working on his dissertation, which focuses on trying to find feasible paths for political conflict resolution in Colombia. 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