All this on top of Uribe working with death squads killing thousands,
being a lackey and front man for the US, supporting political
assassinations, murdering trade unionists and now we find out from
Salvatore Mancuso of the AUC( one of many death squads) in prison in the
US, was backing Uribe and Santos campaign with money,workers  and revealing
a political plan to supporting  a military coup against President
Chavez while backing the opposition.

 Cort  U.S. military and police aid grants to Colombia (total aid since
1996) Thats over 7 Billion dollars-Colombia ($7,133,790,536) Uribe accuses
Chavez of covering up murders
<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/24014-colombian-president-uribe-accuses-chavez-of-murder.html>
Monday, 14 May 2012 06:52 Christan Leonard
 Tags:

   - Alvaro Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/alvaro-uribe.html>
   - Henrique 
Capriles<http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/henrique-capriles.html>
   - Hugo Chavez <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/hugo-chavez.html>
   - Kidnapping <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/kidnapping.html>
   - Murder <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/murder.html>
   - Twitter <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/twitter.html>
   - Venezuela <http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/venezuela.html>


<http://digg.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fcolombiareports.com%2Fcolombia-news%2Fnews%2F24014-colombian-president-uribe-accuses-chavez-of-murder.html&title=Uribe%20accuses%20Chavez%20of%20covering%20up%20murders>

[image: Alvaro Uribe]

Former Colombian President Alvaro
Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/20404-alvaro-uribe.html>accused
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of covering up government impunity
for the murder of thousands of citizens via Twitter on Sunday.

In a post on his Twitter
page<https://twitter.com/#!/AlvaroUribeVel/status/201747872075616256>,
Uribe wrote that Chavez "wants to cover up the unpunished murder of 19
thousand Venezuelans each year."

In another Uribe wrote that Chavez "wants to plug up that between 1998 and
2011 homicides increased from just over 4,000 to almost 19,000 per year."

Uribe called Chavez a murderer and said that Chavez wants to "cover that he
has made Venezuela a haven for terrorists."

Uribe also gave his support for the presidential candidacy of Henrique
Capriles, saying "Venezuela will hopefully have decent private investment
without the Chavez dictatorship."


Uribe’s broken promises, Part 2
<http://colombiareports.com/opinion/julian-e-torres/23895-uribes-broken-promises-part-two.html>
Monday, 07 May 2012 08:41 Julián Esteban Torres López
 Tags:

   - Alvaro Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/component/tag/alvaro-uribe.html>


<http://digg.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fcolombiareports.com%2Fopinion%2Fjulian-e-torres%2F23895-uribes-broken-promises-part-two.html&title=Uribe’s%20broken%20promises,%20Part%202>

[image: uribe 2002]

Former President Alvaro
Uribe<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/20404-alvaro-uribe.html>is
on a Twitter tirade claiming his successor Juan
Manuel 
Santos<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/9075-profile-juan-manuel-santos.html>has
not lived up to 2010 campaign pledges. Not only is this false, but the
former President is conveniently forgetting a large number of promises he
broke himself.

In fact, his failures to observe and fulfill his own proposed objectives
are too numerous and remarkable to forget. They are so numerous that they
wouldn’t fit in one op-ed.

This is part two of a series of five that compares (a) the promises Uribe
made before the 2002 elections and the discourse held during his presidency
and (b) what actually transpired.
*Broken Promise #2: Strengthening public institutions*

In a September 2004 interview with weekly Cambio, Gustavo
Petro<http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/profiles/9088-profile-gustavo-petro.html>expressed
his fear of a democratically elected president like Uribe
destroying the pillars of democracy. In August of 2003, Jaime Araúo
Rentería, former magistrate of Colombia <http://colombiareports.com/>’s
Constitutional Court, according to newspaper El Tiempo, feared that with
Uribe Colombia would turn into an authoritarian state. In 2002, activists,
such as members of Organización Femenina Popular, also expressed similar
fears after Uribe’s first election because they expected to see the
realization of a totalitarian model blessed by the U.S. In 2002, Jorge
Rojas, Director of CODHES (Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement)
said it appeared that Uribe’s initiatives would lead to a presidential
dictatorship. Such preoccupations and concerns were not unfounded.
State of Internal Commotion

Fernando Londoño, Uribe’s Justice and Interior Minister from 2002-2004,
claimed that Colombians should be prepared to sacrifice all rights for the
sake of security because, as he saw it, “There are no absolute rights.”
Uribe’s declaration of a “State of Internal Commotion,” for example, just
five days after inauguration, went against certain Constitutional rights.
In 2002, *The Washington Post *summarized Uribe’s declaration in the
following manner: “[The] decree, which will last from three to nine months,
allows the government to impose extended curfews and prevent access to
areas without prior court approval; restrict information reported by the
news media; commandeer land, equipment and professional expertise from
private citizens; and suspend elected officials contributing to public
unrest.” Two weeks after the declaration, Londoño, while speaking to
Congress, suggested that some of the powers the declaration guaranteed
should be made permanent. In June of 2010, Uribe again was set to declare
another “State of Internal Commotion.”  Both times the state of emergency
was defended by the government as necessary to fight terrorism.
Executive Branch increases influence*
*

An October 2009 study by the Center of Law, Justice and Society concluded
that the Executive Branch increased its influence during Uribe’s tenure. By
the time of the report’s publication it was said that when Uribe was first
elected, the Presidency had influence in appointing the Ombudsman and the
Prosecutor General.  However, after eight years that rose to influence over
eight state institutions. Further, during the last couple of weeks of his
second term, Uribe proposed a bill to the House of Representatives that
would transfer the ability to select the Colombian Prosecutor from the
Supreme Court to the Executive Branch.
Presidential term extension

His search for dominance was also present in his desire to remain in the
nation’s highest office for as long as possible. Though during his second
term Uribe remained vague as to whether or not he supported the referendum
— though he did end up backing it publicly toward the end —, during his
first term he was more vocal about it: “I shall be frank. I’m a politician
and I would like it if the mayors would campaign for the referendum, why
should I disregard the reality, that’s how it is.” Two years after Uribe’s
second election, a political bribery scandal —* yidispolítica —* erupted
that would put the legitimacy of Uribe’s second term into question. Yidis
Medina, former congresswoman, testified to the Supreme Court and was found
guilty of selling her vote in favour of Uribe’s re-election bill.  Also,
investigations were also assumed against Tomás Uribe, the former
president’s son, for a notary scandal and bribery to ensure his father’s
2006 re-election.  Though Uribe and supporters successfully changed the
constitution to run for a second term, they were unsuccessful the second
time. The Constitutional Court found irregularities in the manner the
signatures for the referendum were collected, concluding Uribe’s second
re-election bid “unconstitutional in its entirety” and contained
“substantial violations to the democratic principle.”
Underfunding of conflict resolution and reconciliation institutions

Further, public institutions essential for conflict resolution and
reconciliation were under-funded. For example, in April of 2010, the
Colombian Prosecutor General’s Office confirmed 300,000 official registered
complaints against the paramilitaries, including 157,000 extrajudicial
executions — to which 32,000 assassinations the paramilitaries had already
confessed at the time. However, on 24 August 2010, the same office
expressed it did not have a budget and “sufficient resources” to
investigate the large number of complaints, of which only 7 percent had
been investigated.
Attack on independence of judiciary

Uribe also had a history of lashing out against the judiciary for
investigating him, his family, his military, and his political party
claiming that such investigations destroyed justice and replaced it with
hatred. Yet, at the same time, Uribe pushed for judges to fully investigate
his opposition and even submitted bills that limited civil liberties if his
military wanted to investigate leads. The International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH) called Uribe’s actions “another attack on the
independence of the judiciary.”

The FIDH also had concerns regarding the safety and security of Colombian
judges, and with Uribe the FIDH feared he was “attempting to hinder the
process of the ‘cleaning up’ of Colombian institutions which should
contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of the State and to the full
implementation of the Rule of Law.” On June 10 of 2010, Jaime Arrubla,
acting Supreme Court President, speaking for the court, called “upon the
international community to give their support and solidarity to the
[Colombian] judicial system, which once again is being attacked for
exercising its functions, and urges the national government to implement
the recommendations that have been imposed by the international
rapporteurs.” According to Amnesty International, “[s]everal Supreme Court
judges investigating the scandal [parapolítica], and their families, were
reportedly threatened.”

The Judicial Branch and the Executive had eight years of tension. The
unrelenting “train crash” between Uribe and the courts was wide in scope
covering the scandals of *yidispolítica*, *parapolítica*, DAS wiretaps,
extradition of paramilitaries, the Justice and Peace Law (which granted
near impunity to demobilized paramilitaries), electing Colombia’s Attorney
General, the implications of Uribe’s son and cousin, Mario Uribe, in a
notary and election scandal, and so forth. In February of 2008, the FIDH
called for the Colombian government to “respect the independence of the
judiciary and to guarantee the safety and integrity of the judges, who have
been publicly stigmatized by the President himself.” With such pressures
directed at the Judiciary, it is difficult to assess if it was able to
effectively fulfill its purpose during the times of Uribe, a concern that
has been expressed by FIDH and the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective
(CCAJAR).
*Prioritizing security forces over state’s human rights obligations*

Uribe prioritized trying to pass anti-terrorist legislation that would
legalize torture and violate human rights and the 1991 Constitution. His
first administration tried to give judicial powers to the country’s
security forces — the very armed group with some of the worst crimes
against humanity and human rights records in the country and hemisphere,
especially during Uribe’s two terms in office. Uribe was also successful in
suspending consequences for armed groups, like its allied paramilitaries,
that demobilize regardless if they themselves had been direct perpetrators
of torture and extrajudicial assassinations.

Through the Antiterrorist Amendment (2003) and the Antiterrorist Law (2004)
the administration tried to give the country’s armed forces the ability to
arrest people for 36 hours, search homes, and spy on private communications
without judicial oversight or warrant. As the International Crisis Group
(ICG) warned in 2003, the Uribe administration policy for democracy and
security would be “sending a message that the security forces would be more
successful if less constrained by the state’s human rights obligations.”
This message, concluded ICG, “is dangerous and, as history has often shown,
counterproductive.”

The statute, looking to increase the power of the military, was struck down
in August of 2004 by the Colombian Constitutional Court. These Bills would
have severely limited the fundamental civil liberties and rights
established by the 1991 Constitution all under the name of security and the
war on terror, which, in turn, could fuel a greater increase in
extrajudicial assassinations, torture, forced disappearances, force
displacements, and forced detainments than the country has already
experienced under Uribe’s armed forces. Christian Salazar, a representative
of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, was
worried about such a proposal: “One can say that human rights can never
weaken the Armed Forces. On the contrary, the respect of human rights
strengthens the legitimacy of the armed forces of any democratic state,
also in Colombia.”

The only institutions that significantly got stronger during Uribe’s watch
were the Executive Branch and the Armed Forces. I don’t even want to
imagine what a third Uribe term would have entailed.

*Julián Esteban Torres López has a BA in Philosophy, BA in Communication,
and MA in Justice Studies from the University of New Hampshire. He is
currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of British Columbia Okanagan
concentrating on Political Science and Latin American Studies. A Medellín
native, he is presently working on his dissertation, which focuses on
trying to find feasible paths for political conflict resolution in
Colombia. You can follow him on Twitter <http://twitter.com/JEstebanTorres>and
Facebook <http://www.facebook.com/Journalist.Julian.Esteban.Torres.Lopez>.*


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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