http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6383/asad-apologists_the-ostrich-syndrome Asad Apologists: The Ostrich Syndrome<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6383/asad-apologists_the-ostrich-syndrome> 0<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6383/asad-apologists_the-ostrich-syndrome#comments> Jul 10 2012 by Hicham Safieddine<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/contributors/87091> [image: Listen to this page using ReadSpeaker]<http://app.readspeaker.com/cgi-bin/rsent?customerid=5919&lang=en_us&readid=rscontent&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jadaliyya.com%2Fpages%2Findex%2F6383%2Fasad-apologists_the-ostrich-syndrome> [image: [Monument commemorating the 1972 Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries when it was held in Guyana, 8 - 11 August, 1972. There are four busts sculpted to the likeness of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement: President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, President Pandit Jawaharlall Nehru of India and President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. Image by Amanda Richards via Flickr]] [Monument commemorating the 1972 Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries when it was held in Guyana, 8 - 11 August, 1972. There are four busts sculpted to the likeness of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement: President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, President Pandit Jawaharlall Nehru of India and President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. Image by Amanda Richards via Flickr]
The debate surrounding Syria has stooped very low among self-identified leftists and anti-imperialists. It is high time the discussion moves away from personal attacks, and focuses instead on presenting specific arguments and developing clearer political positions. *No group has been as pilloried by all sides as much as that which has come to be labeled “the third way,” composed of those who are simultaneously opposed to foreign intervention (cheered for by major opposition forces) and the Asad regime.* Apologists for the Asad regime, or what have become labeled as “first wayers,” will go to great lengths to discredit third-way politics. This essay serves as a rebuttal of apologist arguments. In doing so, the hope is not merely to expose the fallacies of first-way rhetoric, but to also elaborate what a third way might actually mean or entail. The latter is something that has yet to be fully expounded in terms of its principles and consequences. In their attempt to distort and discredit third-way politics, most first wayers identify the essence of the Asad regime as anti-imperialist, when in reality it is ultranationalist with an anti-Zionist silver lining—a thick lining one might still argue. Sometimes, they invoke Lenin’s critique of third-way politics, with little accompanying class analysis. However, a more apt analogy would be the non-aligned movement of the Cold War era. Apologists will confuse the lack of political power (i.e., the power of decision-making) with a lack of political position (i.e., a practical political agenda or plan), and draw a caricature of who is a third wayer as a criticism of last resort. *Anti-Imperialism a la Ba’th: The Secret of Succession* Asad apologists will discuss and debate every single aspect of the Syrian crisis with the exception of one: the phenomenon of cultish family rule and succession. They will invoke the geopolitics of regional and international rivalries, anti-imperialist struggles, resistance to Zionism, fear of sectarianism, outbreak of civil war, and the rise of Islamism. Asad apologists will also play the numbers game, asserting that the majority of Syrians support the regime, and–rightly—bash the unreliable media coverage across the world. They will even go so far as to explicitly defend Asad himself, in a manner similar to how other Arab rulers were defended. In this vein, they will argue that he is well-intentioned, surrounded by a clique of corrupt and conspiring aides, and hence either unaware of the political situation on the ground or unable to change it. Then, when the going gets tough and the ruler himself comes out to reinforce the regime’s unrelenting stance, they will argue that his rule remains favorable compared to that of the opposition or the unknown, never suspecting that tackling succession is itself part of fending off foreign-backed aggression and the unknown. It is no coincidence then that the issue of succession has been so intentionally ignored by Asad apologists. Hereditary succession never was and never will be a source of legitimacy, nor a viable long-term strategy to strengthen national unity and cohesion, all of which are necessary requirements for anti-imperialist resistance. Succession is the identifying marker that separates Asad from his “resistance” allies and lumps him into the same category as other Arab rulers. When cornered about succession, Asad apologists will compare Asad to Gulf monarchs (unaware perhaps that, at one symbolic level, a royal president in Syria is more scandalous than a petty monarch of an oil shaykhdom). That, however, is the wrong and easy comparison to make. Asad fails the test even according to first-way logic when compared to self-identified anti-imperialist leaders like Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, or even Asad’s closer allies, Hizbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinejad. Unlike all of the above, Asad’s ascension to power was no different in form and content from the process governing other Arab states. It is telling that this “anti-imperialist” president had no qualms allowing a Western white journalist like Barabra Walters question him about his coming to power. Such a question by one of his own people would be unthinkable. Some might argue that this is merely a detail, but I say it is a very symbolic one. It goes to the heart of how Arab leaders perceive themselves in relation to their own people vis-à-vis the West. But even if we grant Asad the benefit of the doubt regarding his ascension to power, what about the actual policies Asad implemented? Are they as socialist and anti-imperialist as Asad apologists would like us to believe? During his first decade of rule, Asad attempted to reverse whatever remained of Ba’thist socialism. He was a much more effective agent of neo-liberalism than his father was. Whatever non-neo-liberal realities apologists point to, they have nothing to do with the Asad regime. On the contrary, they have managed to survive the regime and were not borne by it. After the eruption of the uprising, Asad apologists—so eager now to fight liberal politics—seem blind to the fact that whatever “reforms” Asad introduced were themselves actually pro-liberal reforms. These include removing the reference to the socialist nature of the regime (a very anti-imperialist move indeed, clearly having everything to do with the fight for Palestine), maintaining the stipulation that the president be a Muslim, and allowing for elections under a multi-party system (i.e., the hallmark of liberal rule). Furthermore, and early on in during his reign, the “nationalist” in Asad seemingly had little qualms implicitly forfeiting the right of Syria to Iskandarun (Alexandretta) in order appease his then-new Turkish ally. In addition, it took Asad eleven years and the eruption of the Syrian uprising to grant thousands of Kurds their rightful Syrian citizenship, proving the move was a ploy to co-opt them out of the uprising and thus reinforcing the notion of the state is subservient to the power of the ruling elite rather than the ruling elite being subservient to the state. This is to say nothing of how the clique of corrupt networks that increasingly took control of the country’s resources grew bolder under his rule. Claiming Asad was ignorant of this clique’s machinations is too naive and false to respond to. By ignoring these “details,” Asad apologists fail to see that the Asad regime’s alliance with anti-US forces in the region has not prevented it from exhibiting the essential features of all the Arab dictatorial regimes: family rule; institutionalized corruption: cultish forms of obedience; and the overexpansion of the police state. All these features undermine the anti-imperialist struggle in subtle but deadly ways. These issues matter not only in the small (i.e., domestic) picture, but also in the big (i.e., regional) picture. They matter for anyone who keeps invoking geopolitics and long-term resistance as Asad apologists do. According to anti-imperialist logic, structural causes tend to prevail over individual or apparent ones in explaining history. On the basis of such a principle, structures of inequality, oppression, and domination are much more to blame for violence and extremism than are such factors as one’s personal proclivity for violence or extremist ideology (something Asad apologists are so keen to identify among the opposition camp). A comparative analysis of the Asad regime—in relation to its allies in the region—shows that these structures (of inequality, oppression, and domination)—in the case of Syria—are not *entirely*, even if largely, a product of external imperialist forces. Regimes and groups allied to Asad have arguably suffered a lot more from imperialist pressures but did not endorse the same governance structures adopted by the Ba’th. Since the uprising began, the regime has done nothing to significantly alleviate these problems. In fact, it has taken a more intransigent stance. As such, the destruction of Syria is as much an effect of regime policies as it is of the external forces colluding with internal agents. The silence of first wayers in favor of the regime in the face of the latter’s culpability becomes no better than the raucous of opportunist opposition forces. *Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Colonialism: The Fanon Factor* The regime has not done nearly enough compared to its allies in consolidating its anti-imperialist stance mainly because it is busier consolidating its internal control and dominance. To continue to insist on blanket support for Asad under the pretense of an anti-imperialist stance is to confuse anti-imperialism with blind support for nationalist elites. Furthermore, a refusal to conflate the two is not an invention of “liberal armchair intellectuals” as some first wayers claim. Such a refusal was substantively formulated by one of the pillars of anti-colonial thought, Frantz Fanon, whose name is conspicuously absent from the political lexicon of Asad apologists. Long before neo-liberal elites had come to power, Fanon warned against the excesses of nationalist bourgeois elites in using anti-imperialist or anti-colonial discourse to disguise their own comprador role in consolidating imperialist structures of control. Fanon’s analysis might actually help explain why some Arab leftists, who are likely more sensitive to anti-colonial history than international anti-imperialists, are third wayers rather than outright supporters of the regime. But instead of invoking Fanon, apologists will go so far as to invoke Lenin’s quote about third-party politics, which is really a language trick no different than someone quoting Tony Blair’s own reference to a “third way” in order to undermine third-way politics in Syria. Lenin was at times more than willing to compromise when it came to dealing with imperialist forces (i.e., the Brest Liovsk treaty). In the instance of his critique of third-way politics, the communist leader was actually more concerned with class struggle and contemptuous of those, like liberal socialists, who did not take a firm and uncompromising position in this struggle against the bourgeois class. In fact, a reference that would have better served Asad apologists is Lenin’s disagreement with Rosa Luxemburg over backing the third-world bourgeoisie. Lenin’s critique of third-way politics may thus ironically lend itself more to backing calls for no compromise with Asad, given that the Syrian uprising’s class composition is largely made up of the countryside peasantry and suburban working class. It is true that the peasantry have a very dubious representation in the intellectual history of Marxism. In the case of Syria, the dominant political expression of their uprising has not only taken on a reactionary form (read “religious” in Marxist terms). It is in fact, contrary to what many pro-uprising folks want us to believe for romantic or more sinister reasons, backed by imperialist and reactionary regional regimes. However, admitting this problematic political expression of the uprising necessitates a third way, not a stance that is apologetic for the Asad regime. As mentioned above, a much more apt —even if far from perfect—invocation of third-way politics in the Syrian case is the non-aligned movement that spread across the global south during the Cold War. Back then, the Soviet Union was much more anti-imperialist than today’s oligarchy-ruled and market-oriented Russia. Yet, leaders from the global south such as Nasser, Nehru, and Nkrumah recognized the need to chart an independent path of anti-colonial struggle to avoid total dependency on the great powers. A similar—but certainly not identical—logic might well be behind third-way thinking. Syria has turned into a playground for a global power struggle, and the ultimate losers are the Syrian people themselves. One of many crucial differences between the non-aligned movement then and third way politics in Syria today is that the third way in Syria today has remained largely a political position, with little political power to make such a position more concretely visible. Asad apologists fail to make this distinction between the lack of political power and the lack of a political position. To be fair to Asad apologists who complain, one must admit that there is no well-defined articulation of third-way politics. However, such a lacking is a far cry from the caricature portrait of third wayers that apologists have come to draw. *Third Way Thinking: An Elitist Liberal Bunch?* The primary factual misrepresentation of third way politics is of the very make up of the third way camp. The third way current, we are told, is comprised of intellectuals and activists drawn from academia, non-governmental organizations, and the mainstream media. These are the usual suspects of liberal elitist ideology. It is easy, then, to make all sorts of claims about the privileged and liberal tendencies of this group. Conveniently excluded in such representations are elements of the Syrian home-grown opposition, the majority of which are non-academic in the classic sense. Some members of this latter group have served years in prison and suffered from torture at the hands of the regime (and for reasons that have nothing to do with liberating Palestine from Zionism or the world from imperialism). Instead of being described as an integral subset of third wayers, Syrian internal opposition elements are portrayed by Asad apologists as a distinct group supported by the third wayers! This makes sure third wayers are seen as merely those engaged in bench politics. It also obscures the possibility that third wayers have an actual political position, possibly similar to the concrete one endorsed and *acted upon* by the home-grown opposition. In short, what apologists fail to see, or perhaps even hide, is the fact that third wayers are no different from the pro-Asad and dominant opposition camps, with people from all stripes of life identifying with one political streak or another. Throwing in the reference to mainstream media as an outlet of third-way rhetoric is another misleading move. In terms of the media (globally speaking), divisions between third wayers, first wayers, and those problematic elements of the Syrian opposition have little to do with academic backgrounds, NGO-affiliations, or other liberal proclivities. This is the case even in an alternative media outlet like Lebanon’s self-identified anti-imperialist paper Al-Akhbar. If anything, the vast majority of mainstream media journalists in the West are uncritical cheerleaders of the rebels and have few qualms with military intervention. As for the Arab media, the bulk of it is Saudi-owned or allied, and parrots Western discourse (at times in even cruder forms). The other (minority) part of Arab media outlets is largely owned or supported by pro-Asad forces or its allies. Radical third wayers are thus left out to dry when it comes to the media landscape. To demand that third wayers—who are intellectuals, specially leftists—cease being as publically critical as they are is to give them—their egos notwithstanding—more credit in terms of their impact on events while denying them what little role they can play as critical and radical voices in the midst of this crisis. Being critical is not merely done for the sake of being critical, nor is it simply a matter of moral consistency (not that moral consistency is now a crime, is it?). It is equally about a reading of the realities on the ground (both the details and the big picture) and—as argued above—definitely about fighting the anti-imperialism first wayers are so fond of invoking. But a close analysis of first way discourse shows that anti-imperialism is the last thing on the mind of first wayers. In such a discourse, anti-imperialism is a code word for anti-Zionist struggle as crystallized over the last two decades in the form of armed resistance centered in Lebanon, facilitated by Damascus, and backed by Tehran. The two are of course interrelated but not identical. It is best then to name things as they are and agree or disagree over them accordingly. *The Question of Palestine: The Teflon Test* The gist of the arguments advanced by many self-proclaimed anti-imperialist first wayers is less about the larger questions of anti-imperialism, and ultimately boils down to armed resistance against Israel. To be fair to first wayers, discussion of the Syrian regime’s role in the Palestinian struggle (both by pro- and anti-Asad forces) suffers from a total lack of measured and informed analysis wherein the regime comes out as either the be all and end all end of resistance or a total sell out. The role of the Syrian regime has changed over the years and to paint it as either an entirely positive or negative one is counterfactual. To invoke what the regime did over thirty years ago, like some leftists do, is polemical and I would argue inaccurate. For the purpose of understanding the current crisis, what counts is its more-recent history. Since the Oslo Accords (1993), there is no denial that the Asad regime, for many reasons and regardless of motives, was a pillar of the resistance axis to US and Israeli aggression and imperial/colonial aims in the region. Just as Asad the son was a more effective agent of neo-liberal policies compared to his father, one has to admit he was also a bolder supporter of armed resistance in the region. Consequently, to claim that the Syrian regime is “worthless” to the resistance project is thus another surprising distortion advanced by apologists, as well as some third wayers (i.e., the liberal type). If third wayers did not see any such worth, they would not call for a third way to begin with. In fact, opposing foreign intervention may have a very high cost in terms of human life given that the regime might be capable of unleashing its full wrath on dissenters in the absence of external restraint. Some third wayers might argue that it is a painful price one has to bear if the issue is indeed about organic revolution and not either a grand struggle for power or merely saving lives in the short term. A better articulated *radical* third way stance may help clear out much of these positions. Such a stance means, for example, seeking to overthrow the regime, but not at any cost. It means refusing to “dialogue” with the regime, but accepting negotiations under certain terms that ensure an exit strategy that safeguards the sacrifices of the Syrian people while preventing the usurpation of the uprising by external powers. Simply stating these general claims is not enough. But neither is burying one’s head in the sand and parroting absolutisms about anti-imperialism like apologists do. Asad apologists are gasping to stop the ebbing tide of a past history. Opposition opportunists are eager to replace that past with a double-faced one masquerading as revolution. The time is ripe for a radical third way to assert itself and engage in a constructive political debate about what has turned out to be the most complex of all the Arab uprisings.* * [image: Maysaloon - ميسلون] <http://www.maysaloon.org/> Wednesday, July 11, 2012 The Never Ending Lies...<http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/never-ending-lies.html> *The first Syrian diplomat has defected, the ambassador to Iraq Nawaf al Fares. But some people will, as always, seek to minimise the importance of this fact. Let's get this straight, this is a big deal. The people who work for the Syrian foreign ministry and diplomatic service practically worshipBashar. They cannot pass the rigorous inspections and monitoring to hold such positions if they did not. If an ambassador has finally decided to defect, then it is the latest in a series of important developments. * But firstly, here is a list of the lies I can remember being told since the start of this revolution: 1. There is nothing happening. 2. There are some minor protests, but these are isolated and not important. 3. Some people have been killed, it was a mistake. 4. People are getting killed, but it is because they are being violent. 5. There are armed gangs who are shooting at the security services - one month into the uprising. 6. Hamza al Khateeb was not tortured to death by the security services, and neither was his friend. Hamza al Khateeb is a rapist, he is not a child. 7. The repression in Bayada never happened, the footage was in Iraq and the perpetrators were Kurdish peshmerga. 8. The repression in Bayada did happen, and the man the regime arrested who was filmed disproving the lie was alive and well in a Syrian prison, to show Syrians that the man they hold, who was repressed in the town that was not in Syria, allegedly by the Kurdish peshmerga, has not been murdered. 9. The demonstrators are getting paid and being given drugs. Some of the drugs had al Jazeera stamped on them. 10. The demonstrators were waving Israeli flags. 11. The demonstrators were all salafists and funded by Bandar bin Sultan. 12. The first defection videos of soldiers are a lie, the uniforms and ID's presented are fakes. 13. The first defections of government officials and high ranking officers are a lie, the men were kidnapped and coerced. 14. The people crossing the border to escape the violence were "visiting their family" in Turkey or Lebanon. 15. The refugee camps in Turkey were set up months in advance. 16. The women in the refugee camps were getting raped and giving birth to illegitimate children - five months into the uprising... 17. The protests shown on Youtube were filmed in elaborate studios and film sets in Qatar. 18. The people who were allegedly out protesting were really out to celebrate the fall of the rains. 19. The massacres in Deraa were committed by the salafists, the massacres in Houla were committed by salafists, the massacres all over the country were carried out by salafists. 20. It's over. 21. It's really over. 22. It's definitely, certainly over. 23. The defection of the treasury official is a lie, he is an embezzler. 24. Seventy percent of the Syrian people want Assad to stay. 25. Assad has no interest in power and will leave if the people no longer want him. 26. Syria will have a democracy that will be the envy of the world. 27. The Syrian revolution is a conspiracy hatched by the Mossad, Al Qaeda, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the West. 28. Syria is the last bastion of Arabism and is being targeted because of its foreign policy 29. Syria is a sovereign nation Please feel free to add more to this list, I'm tired and I want to go to bed now. Email This<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=8609274603242997974&target=email> BlogThis!<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=8609274603242997974&target=blog>Share to Twitter<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=8609274603242997974&target=twitter>Share to Facebook<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=8609274603242997974&target=facebook> . <http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/never-ending-lies.html> Posted by Maysaloon at 10:34 PM<http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/never-ending-lies.html> 0 comments<http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=30984739&postID=8609274603242997974&isPopup=true> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=8609274603242997974> Monday, July 09, 2012 A Word on the Tlass Departure<http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/word-on-tlass-departure.html> <http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/media/news/images/2012/photo_1341597817874-1-0.jpg> Something stinks to high heaven. First there is the defection of Manaf Tlass, a Republican Guard General, son of Mustafa, the former Syrian defence minister under Hafez Assad, and friend of the latter's son, Bashar. In one news story I heard Tlass referred to as a member of the Damascene "aristocracy", and then we hear reports that Michel Kilo gives a radio interview to a Russian station saying that Tlass is an acceptable head for a transition government. Firstly I don't think the Tlass family are members of any "aristocracy". No offence but the town of Rastan is not known for its riches, it is a military town, and its sons find a career in the military far more appealing than the other opportunities available to them. The Tlass' have done well under Assad's forty year rule, and they have considerable wealth. I don't remember hearing them have any issues about corruption, torture and regime heavy handedness during the eighties. Tlass junior's departure today is even more suspect now that the Assad regime appears to be on the way to collapse. So why is he now being pushed as a potential successor to Assad? I think he ticks all the boxes. He is charismatic, handsome, wealthy and comes from a military background. That means he is respected by Assad's old guard - both the new and the old. His friendship of Assad might mean he won't pursue Assad and his family should the latter leave power, and the country could safely retain its security apparatus under a new Sunni dynasty, the Tlasses. I find myself wondering if this is the result of some compromise between Russia and the West, with both sides not very happy about this revolution, and neither of them wanting the country and the region to crumble into oblivion. Iran is quietly watching from the sidelines, and it is no coincidence that Annan has hurried between Damascus and Tehran; most likely to deliver the final ultimatum offered by the West. Whatever the contents of this final lifeline are, the alternative is a very destructive war. The FSA will definitely see an upsurge in supply from the West and the Gulf states. Ultimately this means a catastrophic refugee situation. It is clear by now that the Gulf states intend to herd all Syrians fleeing the violence into refugee camps, as the GCC has been denying visas to all Syrians for months. This is a particularly devastating and humiliating option for many Syrians, as their other routes, whether to Turkey, which will be perilous, or to Lebanon, which might just be a case of jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire. Not many people realise this, but Damascus in particular is packed with families that have left Homs, Hama and the neighbouring areas and rents in the capital have sky rocketed in the past year. If war reaches Damascus then where will these people go? And how will they be fed, clothed and sheltered? Clinton is not joking when she warns of an impending catastrophe, but the real question is whether Assad cares or not. The mantra chanted by his supporters, "Assad or the country burns" might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Tlass might be the least worst option, but this still isn't good enough for a country that has given over fifteen thousand lives for its freedom, and tens of thousands of refugees and prisoners. I doubt that all these people died to replace an Alawite dictator with a Sunni one, but I'm confident about one thing, and that is that Syria's freshly grown grass roots will now, and should remain, the final line of defence for the Syrian people's liberties and fight against oppression. It is now more vital than ever that these grass roots groups and coordination committees dig in and consolidate. The hard work really begins once Assad goes. Email This<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=6553638538635391903&target=email> BlogThis!<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=6553638538635391903&target=blog>Share to Twitter<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=6553638538635391903&target=twitter>Share to Facebook<http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=6553638538635391903&target=facebook> . <http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/word-on-tlass-departure.html> Posted by Maysaloon at 8:10 PM<http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/word-on-tlass-departure.html> 1 comments<http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=30984739&postID=6553638538635391903&isPopup=true> <http://www.blogger.com/email-post.g?blogID=30984739&postID=6553638538635391903> Labels: Syria <http://www.maysaloon.org/search/label/Syria> Sunday, July 08, 2012 So Iran wants a "political solution" in Syria?<http://www.maysaloon.org/2012/07/so-iran-wants-political-solution-in.html> OK, I'm going to stop reading the Guardian's CiF pieces for the day. They seem to really be scraping the barrel for commentators in Syria these days. I guess all we need now is to start seeing pieces by Lizzie Phellan or Sharmine Narwani on there. This poor chap thinks<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/iran-political-solution-in-syria>, "Iran is trying to broker a political solution in Syria". This is like saying Nazi Germany was trying to broker a political solution in Republican Spain. He goes on: Iran, though certainly intent on safeguarding its key regional ally, does not see its fundamental interest in a security crackdown, but rather in reform and serious dialogue between Assad and the opposition. This is utter nonsense if we remember what was happening in Iran in 2009. The murder of Neda Agha-Sultan by a member of the Basij - Iranian shabiha - tells me everything I need to know about the political solutions that Tehran implements. We've had over fifteen thousand Neda Sultans in Syria for sixteen months now. I feel like I want to cry when I read things like this. 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