Egypt opposition groups announce plans to march on presidential palace Ahram Online, Sunday 2 Dec 2012 Political forces opposed to President Morsi's November decree and draft constitution say they will stage peaceful march to presidential palace on Tuesday
Several Egyptian political parties and groups have issued a joint statement announcing their intention to peacefully march to the presidential palace in Cairo at 5pm on Tuesday to voice opposition to President Mohamed Morsi's recent decisions and the date that has been set for a nationwide popular referendum on Egypt's draft constitution. "The constitution project that Morsi wants to put before a referendum is in fact a project for tying down the political, civil, social and economic freedoms of Egyptians," read the statement, published on the Egyptian Popular Current's official Facebook page. The statement went on to question the draft charter's constitutionality, stressing its rejection of the date set 15 December for the upcoming referendum. Egypt's High Constitutional Court had been expected to issue a ruling on the constitutionality of Egypt's Constituent Assembly (which wrote the draft constitution), but the ruling was postponed indefinitely after large numbers of pro-Morsi protesters gathered outside the court's downtown headquarters on Sunday. Groups opposed to Morsi, which have been occupying Cairo's Tahrir Square for over two weeks, accuse the president of working in the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party. "This is a final warning to Mohamed Morsi, who was democratically elected president: his policies, which favour his party and group, will cause the dissolution of his legitimacy," read the statement. On Saturday, despite continued protests against Morsi's recent constitutional decree, which protects the Constituent Assembly from legal challenge, the president announced that the draft constitution would be put before a nationwide referendum in two week's time. The statement was signed by eighteen political parties and groups, including the Constitution Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party, the National Front for Justice and Democracy, the 6 April youth movement, the Democratic Front and the Kefaya movement. Anti-Morsi forces have threatened for several days to march on the presidential palace in Heliopolis if constitutional declaration was not withdrawn. Veteran journalist Abdel-Halim Qandil, a fierce critic of the president, and the Mubarak regime before the revolution, has called in a tweet "on the judges, workers, and underground metro drivers to strike and to march on the presidential palace" to defeat the president's decrees. Many judges, who are on strike against the decree, have already threatened not to monitor the referendum if the president did not rescind his decisions. Meanwhile, shortly after the president finished his speech on Saturday night calling for a vote on the draft constitution, Mohamed El-Beltagy, the Muslim Brotherhood main operative in the Constituent Assembly, called on the opponents of the draft to fight it - if they disagreed with it - by mobilising a NO vote not to protest. El-Beltagy, a leading member also in the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, told Ahram Online that if the opposition defeats the draft at the referendum set for 15 December, a new Constituent Assembly will be chosen via direct elections. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/59634.aspx ------------------------------------------------------------- The decisions of the president have been so high-handed as to be branded dictatorial by many of his critics, and have provoked revolutionary youth once again to call for the fall of the regime. Caricatures show Morsis face morphed with that of deposed dictator Hosni Mubarak. The composition of the Constituent Assembly was controversial. It was appointed by a parliament that was itself dissolved by the courts for electoral irregularities, and those irregularities contributed to a dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood and hard line Salafi fundamentalists. The resulting constitution-drafting committee was therefore unbalanced in being dominated by Muslim Brothers or their sympathizers. It began with 100 members, but 22 liberals, leftists, Copts and centrist Muslims gradually withdrew because of the Muslim Brotherhood dominance. Seven members of the reserve committee also resigned. For the remaining 78 to rush their favored text through instead of reconsidering their unrepresentative character is a slap in the face of pluralism and democracy. The resulting constitution is a strange hybrid of the current French constitution and more Islamically-tinged constitutions such as those of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US brought fundamentalist movements to power but attempted to moderate the constitutional text. The new constitution promises many rights, but also limits them in vague ways<http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/draft-constitution-some-controversial-stipulations> that could be opening to abuse. As a historian, I am fascinated by the parallels of this proposed constitution with the 1906 Iranian constitution. In the latter, a committee of five ayatollahs was given review power to decide if legislation is in accordance with Islam. That provision was never really implemented (in 1979 it was made moot when the clerics just took over altogether). Likewise, the Egyptian constitution gives to the Muslim clerics of Al-Azhar Seminary (the closest thing the Sunni world has to a Vatican) the prerogative of interpreting Islamic law as it pertains to the constitution. Since the constitution puts Muslim Egyptians under Islamic law for personal status purposes, and has other provisions that invoke Islamic law, someone had to decide what Islamic law is. Having al-Azhar make determinations that then feed into constitutional law is a way of ensuring orthodoxy. The Iraqi Constituent Assembly in 2005 drafted a similar provision, for the Shiite clergy of Najaf to review legislation and interpret Islamic law as it touched the constitution. That article was dropped, however, under severe pressure from the US ambassador of the time, Zalmay Khalilzad, and from other Iraqi groups such as the Kurds. Putting Muslim Egyptians under Islamic law for matters of personal status is also troubling. Many secularists would not want to have their private lives governed in this way. In cases of intestacy, their daughters would only inherit half what their sons did. There is also a danger that this constitution could normalize the interference of religious groups and authorities in private matters such as marriage. In the 1990s, academic scholar of the Quran, the late Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd<http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/nasr-hamed-abu-zaid-end-controversial-scholarly-legacy>, was declared an apostate by fundamentalists. They then brought a public-morals case against his marriage, insisting that the authorities dissolve it and divorce him from his wife, Professor Ibtihal Younis, who taught Romance Languages at Cairo University. (Muslim women under Islamic law may not be married to non-Muslims). The two fled to Europe, where he found a position in the Netherlands. The Mubarak government allowed all this to happen, but said, at least, that it would tweak procedures to keep it from occurring again. Now, it could be open season on liberal Muslim thinkers like Abu Zayd. Article 10 allows the state to intervene in the family, and article 44 forbids insults to the Prophet Muhammad. If a group decided that a scholar had insulted the Prophet, and brought a case against his marriage just as happened to Abu Zayd, who would adjudicate all that? The al-Azhar Seminary! *The constitution is therefore a big step toward the Iranization of Egypt, and very possibly a death knell for freedom of speech and freedom of conscience.* In turn, such religious restrictions on what can be said publicly can be used to suppress science. Relatively few high-powered scientific articles are produced in Egypt that get cited by other scholars, and few patents are achieved. Things wont get better if Salafis can go around accusing scientists of disrespecting the Prophet by contradicting some saying of his that they interpret literally. (This kind of thing has happened in Pakistan, which has a blasphemy law). *Part of and taken from:* * http://www.juancole.com/2012/12/egyptians-to-decide-on-fundamentalist-influenced-constitution-via-referendum.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+juancole%2Fymbn+%28Informed+Comment%29 * *-------------------------------------------------* Reading the Draft Constitution of Egypt: Setbacks in substance, process, and legitimacy Chibli Mallat, Sunday 2 Dec 2012 Rather than enshrine the democratic aspirations of the Egyptian revolution, the draft Constitution to be put to referendum in mid Dec. is faulty in execution, lacking in legitimacy and a set-back in terms of rights and liberties Thousands of Egyptian citizens have been pouring in the street to ask for a constitution for all Egyptians. Thousands others are marching for legitimacy and Islamic law. In the profound political and constitutional crisis in which revolutionary Egypt finds itself, one matter is certain: the constitutional process was rushed in the week of 22-30 November, and the Draft Constitution that emerged on Friday is highly divisive. The presidential announcement setting the referendum on December 15 is bound to make the crisis worse. How does the Draft Constitution compare with the Amended 1971 Constitution it is meant to replace? Process The process for the adoption of the Draft Constitution (hereinafter DC) is important for the coherence and appeal of the text that the citizen is asked to adopt as his main contract with the state. A cardinal principle in constitution-making is being ignored in Egypt. Passing a law is unlike passing a constitution. While a majority generally suffices to pass a law, it does not become effective without a thorough and complex process to ensure that is carefully discussed. A constitution is far more demanding in terms of legitimacy and comprehensive appeal than a simple law. When a fundamental text is rushed through the night (literally the night of 29-30 December) with no particular reason for such urgency, constituents being replaced at the last moment, and representatives of the youth who made the revolution as well as members of historically victimised groups like women and Christians all but absent from the process, the constitution becomes intrinsically divisive and fails its calling to speak for all the countrys citizens. The constitutional draft itself underlines the basic contradiction in the process. To be ratified, the 237 articles adopted by the Constituent Assembly require a simple majority of voters voting in the referendum on the document as a whole (Art. 225 DC). For one article to be amended under any constitution, including the current Draft Constitution, the process is far more complicated, with votes going through presidential and parliamentary deliberations, qualified majorities, and a robust civil society involvement. Article 225 is one line-long. In contrast, the Amendment procedure adopted by the Draft Constitution is ten lines long, with a complex procedure that regulate debates, deadlines, majorities before any referendum is considered. (Arts. 217, 218 DC) The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt invalidated an electoral law which distinguished between representatives of party members that number 3 million, and independents representing 50 million (SCC decision of 14 June 2012). A constituent assembly with an ever shrinking number of representatives of the many groups that form Egypt, which is then rushed into a referendum that is passed by a simple majority of the voters under Article 225 DC, cannot deliver a constitution for all Egyptians. In light of the SCC precedent, Egyptian courts should hardly find it difficult to invalidate the unprecedented divisive process in the rush to adopt the Draft, and in the rush to ratify it. Substance The rush has affected the quality of constitutional language. Some articles in the Draft Constitution are awkwardly phrased, such as Article 117 on the budget. Art. 131 illustrates the problem: If these laws are not brought [to the houses after they reconvene], or if they are brought to them and are not confirmed, they lose retroactively the effectiveness of law that they had, except if the house [singular, it is unclear which of the two houses] decides it was effective for the previous period, or regulates its consequences in another way. Nor is the need for both a National Security Council (Art.193 DC) and a National Defense Council (Art.197 DC) fathomable, while the fog persists around the role of the military, which President Morsi and the revolution were united to force out of the political process once and for all. There are a few innovative measures, for instance the request for members of the two houses (the lower house, council of deputies or representatives, majlis al-nuwwab and the upper house, majlis al-shura) to provide a list of their assets at the beginning and end of their term, as well as annually, to their respective chambers (Art. 88); this is also required for the president and for the ministers, who present their respective financial status to the lower house (Art.138 and Art.158) Another useful advance is the requirement for associations to simply notify (ikhtar, Art.51) the authorities to become legal, as opposed to the state of limbo in which they were left because they were previously deemed legal only after the approval of the authorities, usually the Ministry of Interior. Otherwise, the basic rights list does not improve much on the current Constitution, and even includes some unnecessary repetitions, for example both Article 35 and Article 77 provide the right of the accused to an attorney. More worryingly, one counts at least twenty qualifications of basic rights by a deferral clause to the law. Since thousands of laws and various legislative and executive instruments are bound to be passed in any case, such reference is inherently dangerous. The use by Mubarak and SCAF of laws to stifle constitutional rights attests to the easy manipulation of the Constitution by way of deferral clauses. Overall, there are more than 50 instances of clauses of the type this will be later decided by law. These deferral clauses are typical of disagreement and rush, as the constituents abdicate their role in important constitutional matters they have not been able to frame correctly. On balance, it is hard to see a democratic improvement in the Draft Constitution of what is presently the Constitution of Egypt. There are also serious setbacks which undermine the integrity of constitutional substance one expects in a founding document. Where the DC fails most the calling of a revolution that united over the end of a self-perpetuating dictator and the protection of the citizens basic rights, is apparent in two central areas of constitution-making. The Draft Constitution (1) undermines the Egyptian judiciary, and (2) brings back the specter of religious sectarianism against the citizens fundamental right to equality. The judiciary undermined. The judiciary is undermined in several ways. The Draft Constitution fragments it into different subaltern roles (Arts 168-182 DC). While this was true of the Mubarak regime, courts are further compartmentalised, with each having its own rules and its own budget (Art. 169 DC), leading to inevitable conflicts that disorient the citizen and weaken the rule of law. The constitution drafters also failed to correct a major flaw inherited from French practice. All legislation is supposed to be reviewed by the top administrative court (Majlis al-dawla) before it is passed, even though the court retains a judicial review power in a dispute between the citizen and the administration (Art. 174 DC). The military courts remain (Art.198 DC), despite their central role in the repressive security apparatus under the former regime and under SCAF -- SCAF had reportedly tried over 13,000 people before it folded. President Morsi has been actively putting an end to these trials, so retaining military courts in the Draft Constitution appears as a step back from revolutionary demands to do away with all special courts. The main nemesis of the constitution drafters seems to be the Supreme Constitutional Court. Art.235 was added in a midnight deliberation on November 30 to reduce the number of SCC judges, a court packing in reverse. In addition, the SCC is now forced into a meaningless constitutional review of voting and electoral laws which it is forbidden to consider subsequently if a case is brought by a harmed citizen (Art.177). This is a major setback for voting rights. In sum, instead of advancing the rule of law by consolidating it in a coherent judicial system, the Draft Constitution undermines the state institution that has been the most important voice of peaceful, thoughtful, and active resistance to Egypts authoritarian rulers, from Naser to Mubarak. Sectarian discrimination. There is no mention in the Draft Constitution of any mechanism for the protection of historically victimised and marginalised groups in Egypt, especially women and religious minorities. Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution (as amended in 1980) is kept as is (the principles of the sharia are the main sources for legislation). This text had been enhanced by thirty years of SCC case-law demonstrating that Islamic law can live well in a modern constitution, and indeed enrich the constitutional life of citizens. With the SCC in jeopardy, this legacy is under threat. Despite the welcome inclusion in Article 3 of Jewish Egyptians, the article limits the legal traditions of Jewish and Christian Egyptians to the organization of their personal status and the choice of their community leaders. Buddhist, Hindu, and non-believers find no place in the Draft Constitution. Instead, Article 2 declares that Islam is the official religion (literally, the religion of the state, din al-dawla). Millions of Egyptians are not Muslim, and the Draft Constitution continues to discriminate against them openly. An addition and an omission raise further concerns of increased sectarianism. The drafters added Article 219, which stipulates that the principles of Islamic law comprise its general rules and jurisprudential method as understood in the Sunni schools. Egypt was never so sectarian as to openly express Sunnism as the exclusive source of its Islamic tradition. This Article is clearly set against Shiis, despite their constituting an insignificant minority in Egypt, but also against Copts and any denomination that is not Sunni. Instead of honoring all legal traditions in Egypt across the board, sectarianism comes stronger from this unexpected addition. The omission is revealed by the disregard for the substance of Islamic and other laws in the rich Egyptian legal corpus. Despite the call to for the sharia to be the main source of legislation in the country, the drafters can hardly point to any serious trace of Islamic law in the text they passed. No legacy of individual rights dear to the Islamic legal tradition can be found in the Draft Constitution. An example would have been the adoption of the clear Quranic injunction prohibiting duress in religion (No compulsion in religion, la ikrah fil-din). Examples can be multiplied, including various injunctions on the equality of men and women, the protection of life, limb and property, or the privileged role of the impartial judge. The drafters made no effort to revive the best and most enlightened aspects of the Islamic legal corpus. Egyptians deserve better. In the last few months, a free presidential election brought hope to all those who supported the Nile Revolution for more freedom and equality under a new constitution. In just one week, the process was dramatically reversed, augmenting the risks of civil war and reviving the prospects of military intervention. The SCC and the courts should stand up for the preservation of the Egyptian Constitution, which the Draft Constitution sets back. Only the judges remain between Egypt and the abyss. Chibli Mallat is Chairman of Right to Nonviolence, a Middle East based NGO that focuses on nonviolence, constitutionalism and judicial accountability. He is a visiting professor at Yale Law School, and a scholar of Islamic law. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/59606.aspx [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:[email protected]?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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