I worked for over a year in Venezuela in 2005-2006, contracted in PDVSA on a very exciting open source information technology project. I had occasion to meet among my co-workers many who participated in the struggle against the sabotage of oil production in late 2002, and developed nothing but admiration for the protagonism of the masses that the Chavez era has been all about. For this reason, I translated to English an article published only yesterday (see original in Spanish: http://po.org.ar/blog/2013/03/07/hugo-chavez-2/ ) entitled simply "Hugo Chavez". Here is the full text of the article:
HUGO CHAVEZ By Jorge Altamira Hugo Chavez' death has triggered, predictably, a huge popular emotional upswell in Venezuela. It has also been extremely moving for international public opinion. This is the natural consequence of the attention attracted in world politics during most of his political career. The same has happened in the past with the leaders of other countries of median development, with India's Ghandi, with Peron, with Egypt's Nasser and Indonesia's Sukarno and also with Fidel Castro during the second half of the last century. This exceptional place is explained by the universal nature of the historical problems that have been exposed. It is the expression of the world-wide global character of national conflict. The birth of Chavez came at the end of February 1989, when a popular rebellion the Caracazo against the International Monetary Fund inspired program put into place by the government that had just come into office, under the presidency of Carlos Andres Perez, was massacred by army enforced repression. It was the end of the historical cycle of petty bourgeois civic nationalism, incarnate in the Democratic Action Party (partido Acción Democrática) for fifty years. Three years later, from the very ranks of the armed forces, there emerged a reaction against the oppressors of the Caracazo, in the form of a revolt by low-ranking officers led by Hugo Chavez, with the brandishing of a nationalist banner. The uprising took the people back into the streets, albeit incipiently, and converted that particular military coup (against the government and the military commanders) into a semi-popular uprising. The idea became lodged In the consciousness of the people that they could count on the national arms as being in their favor. Chavism was not born out of a parliamentary gambit or back-room agreement among party cliques, but of the conjunction of uniformed nationalism with the masses. The Caracazo and the uprising of '92 was the ringing of bells anticipating the collapse of the process of privatization and debt that had characterized the neoliberal stage. Interestingly, Menemism was to debut when in Venezuela it was already becoming clear that it was doomed to end in semi-revolutionary crises. Nationalism Chavista military nationalism fits into the history of its own country and that of all Latin America. This is the case of Perón, and that of military nationalism, for example, in Peru (Velazco Alvarado) and Bolivia (Juan José Torres), in the late '60s, which nationalized foreign oil companies and sugar plantations in some cases without compensation. All these movements, as did Chavism after them, flaunted some attribute of exceptional character, especially in regard to its leader. Caudillo-ism reflects the low social differentiation of the mass movement, and the desire on the part of nationalism to present the people as a block united exclusively by national interests. It distorts, with this procedure, the historical reasons for its emergence: the protagonist role of the masses, which, with repeated actions and sacrifices, have highlighted the impasse of existing social relations; ultimately, the connection of the social and political crisis in a country with the historical decline of the dominant national system as a whole. The claim to represent the nation, or the slogan of national unity, are aimed at justifying the political subjugation of the working class to what would come to be known as "the organized community." It is the ideological justification for the ham-stringing of the trade unions at the hands of a bureaucracy that had become an integral part the State. The national movement civil or military is an expression of the bear-trap that dependency on international financial capital signifies for the development of the productive forces in the countries located in the capitalist periphery. It is the expression of a struggle to defend the portion of national income in the resources generated by the world economy as a whole. Chavism did not limit itself to using Venezuela's oil revenue for the development of large-scale social programs; before that, it clashed openly with international capital and its internal agents to avoid the internationalization of PDVSA, the state oil company, at the hands of foreign stock exchanges. This crisis was the reason behind the military coup that overturned Chavez, in April 2002, and the oil production sabotage later that year. At that time, the price of oil was still just over ten dollars a barrel, so it is not true that in the crisis a determining role was played by the capture of extraordinary mining income, that was to emerge later, due to rising international prices. The popular mobilization that defeated the coup of April and the oil sabotage constituted Chavez' October 17th, already previewed by the uprising of 1992. An irony: Hugo Chavez dispatched the masses that had mobilized to free him from the fascistoid coup with a call to "go back to your homes". Chavism and property relations The defeat of the 'civil-military' coup turned the armed forces into Chavistas, with a consistency that made it pass the test of the oil production sabotage. Chavez' political arbitration found in the Chavez-ization of the military a solid foundation. This marriage was strengthened when, in a confrontation, Chavez decided in favor of General Baduel, the paratrooper who rescued him in 2002 and then became the highest authority of the army. Another important thing to bear in mind is that, even at the height of the oil production sabotage, international banks never stopped financing Venezuela, and nor did Chavez stop paying the debt. So the nationalization of some banks a key measure for any social transformation and industrialization was not to take place until very recently, when ironically Banco Santander managed to be purchased by the state in order to deal with the international banking crisis with funds obtained from a very juicy compensation. Even during the toughest moments of their mutual clashes, international finance capital understood very clearly that Chavez had no interest in breaking with the stock exchanges, nor was he even less an enemy of private property. Generously compensated nationalizations lose their anti-capitalist content, where the state exchanges fiscal revenue for capital, and the capital is exchanged for private funds. Anti-Chavez propaganda, especially that of Zionism, charges Chavez with having sinister interest in its alliance with Iran. This is actually about something else: the Venezuela-Iran axis is essential to counter the pressure of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates, instigated by the Anglo-French-Yankee oil companies, to reduce OPEC oil prices. Chavez and the ayatollahs defend their countries portion of the global economic income even if that hurts non-oil producing countries in the periphery. In return, Chavez has given several of them preferential prices, so that has strengthened the authority of Venezuela in the energy dispute. Chavism proclaims "Socialism of the XXI century", but this is socialism as a partial distribution of social wealth, not the transformation of capital into public property, or the State as collective leadership of the masses. The so-called "income redistribution" has improved considerably from initial miserable levels, but that income is still income from oil. Chavez has undertaken numerous nationalizations, most of them in exchange for generous compensation for big business: Verizon, the U.S. telecommunications company; Sidor, Techint's steel company, paid with extreme generosity, as was the Mexican Slim in return for his cement companies. In the case of farmland, the same did not occur because it was found that the title deeds to the expropriated land were fraudulent. These nationalizations did not respond to a plan; they were improvised by the crisis itself. Planning requires the conscious concourse of the proletariat, its class and political independence. For example, when there was no cement for the housing construction plans or when the government failed to reconcile Techint's clashes with Sidor workers, cement and steel were nationalized, but as a result the production of neither underwent any substantial change, simply their importation. Big capital was not an obstacle when they came to the conclusion that they were not interested in the prevailing economic scenario. But Venezuela is not transformed into an industrial country; but rather remains a mono-producer of fuel. The redistribution of income was financed with the funds of PDVSA, which finds itself heavily indebted and with a strong economic imbalance due to the freezing of the value of the Bolivar in an inflationary environment. PDVSA limitations are manifest in the leading role of foreign capital (with the sole exception of Exxon) in the exploitation of the Orinoco Belt. PDVSA's crisis is the main reason for the recent decision to devalue the Strong Bolivar (Bolivar Fuerte) (give more national currency per dollar exported). As was the case with past nationalist experiences, that of Venezuela has failed in its aim of ensuring autonomous national development. This is not possible in the stage of decline of world capitalism. But likewise, Venezuela emerges from this experience with a more centralized State, with the relative decline of the most parasitic sectors of national capital and, above all, with a more active presence of the masses. Any change on the economic front will include these factors as working tools. Perspectives Chavism has fought the development of free trade unionism. The Labour Code introduces significant gains for contract workers, but imposes compulsory arbitration and the President's power to decide the legality of any strike. Collective bargaining is not called as agreements expire, wages in the industry have not improved much. There is nationalization of the unions. Chavez's death blocks the possibility that the masses of Venezuela exhaust their own political experience with his nationalist policies. Criticism or disappointment with the new leadership will safely leave intact this historical experience taken as a whole. From the point of view of the development of class consciousness, the death of Chavez represents a blockage. Chavez's death creates, objectively, a crisis of political regime, that of personal power. Successors must find an alternative solution. Much of the current ruling circle represent what the Chavista people itself calls the "domestic right". An alternative is that, after the next elections, the political system 'Kirchnerizes' (ironic when K is accused of 'Chavista-izing'). This would consist of a certain parliamentarization of the system to the detriment of the current top-down structure, and of entities existing in parallel to the official organizations, such as community councils. Chavism is not bound by a program, nor is it socially homogeneous; although criticism seethes within it, it serves as a state and even parastatal apparatus. The new government will have to face, without the authority of Chavez, a growing economic destabilization and even greater devaluation of its currency. It would be an adjustment without anesthetics, in the midst of a regime change. The last devaluation was presented by the current circle as a decision that Chavez had taken in Havana. There is strong internal criticism of the distorted administration of information on Chavez' disease, which was interpreted as favoring that circle in charge. After the new presidential elections, municipal elections must be held, which have been postponed several times. Here, the right-wing opposition could increase their representation. The division on the right, as recently observed by Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Assembly and presumed leader of the 'domestic right'-"you are more divided than we are." It's true. Spurred by Colombia's Uribe, the U.S. Republicans and Venezuelan financial circles, an active minority is driving destabilization. The mayor of Caracas, Ledezma, seems to be heading that up. Capriles would be the conciliatory fraction. In this overall crisis, the armed forces constitute the trump card to block political disintegration. There has been endless talk ad nauseum of Chavez' continental leadership. When you look more carefully, the leadership that has operated, at least in recent years, in the shadow of the initiatives of Brazilian miners and contractors, is that which has imposed its agenda through the 'workers' government' of Lula and Dilma Rousseff. UNASUR is a satellite of Brazilian diplomacy. From the 'reforms' in Cuba to talks with the FARC or agreements with Iran, the key operator is Brazil, not Chavez; that is, San Paulo Stock Exchange (a shrine of the big investment banks). It is no coincidence that the Banco del Sur has been killed off by the interests of the BNDES Bank, Brazil's development bank (which will fund the hydroelectric works of Brazilian contractors in CFK's (Cristina Kirchner's) hometown. A new situation has been created in Latin America. The main challenge it represents is for the left, which is marginal in this process. However, it should be the main historical protagonist. A debate should be opened all over the continent to characterize this new situation and derive from it all revolutionary conclusions. see original in Spanish: http://po.org.ar/blog/2013/03/07/hugo-chavez-2/ ) ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:[email protected]?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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