PROMETHEUS TRAP (12): Inject more water into the reactor
* Previous ArticleHigh radiation bars decommissioning of Fukushima plant
* Next ArticleSurvey: No nuclear plants meet new safety standards
February 22, 2013
By HIROYOSHI ITABASHI/ Staff Writer
Editor's note: This is the 12th part of a series that has
run in the past under the overall title of The Prometheus Trap. This
series deals with the different responses between Japan and the United
States in dealing with the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011 following
the Great East Japan Earthquake. The series will appear on Mondays,
Wednesdays and Fridays.
* * *
At 11:40 a.m. on March 17, shortly after the Ground
Self-Defense Force’s 1st Helicopter Brigade completed the mission to
spray water on a crippled nuclear reactor that was dangerously
overheating, Charles Casto of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) met with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa at the minister’s
office in Tokyo.
Casto was chief of the team of experts the NRC had sent to
Japan immediately after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami to help deal with
the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
Before his meeting with Kitazawa, Casto had visited Tokyo
Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the operator of the disaster-stricken
nuclear plant, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the
now-defunct body then responsible for regulating and supervising the
nuclear power industry, and other organizations concerned, but had not
got the detailed information he needed. It was not even clear which
organization he should contact in the first place.
After several days of frustrating attempts to get what he wanted, Casto ended
up visiting the defense chief.
The American nuclear energy expert immediately got down to
business. The effects of the GSDF brigade’s work to cool the reactor
would be limited, Casto said. The amount of water that had been poured
into the reactor was insufficient, he added, urging additional
injections of water.
Casto didn’t give much value to the dangerous mission that
had just been accomplished by the GSDF in terms of its contribution to
the efforts to contain the fast-moving nuclear crisis.
Kitazawa nodded as he listened to Casto’s opinion. He and
other top Japanese defense officials were fully aware that the volume of
seawater that had been dropped on the reactor was insufficient.
Casto then demanded detailed information about the condition of the disabled
reactors.
Defense Counselor Hideo Suzuki, who was present at the
meeting, conveyed to the American official the information that had been
provided by the NISA.
It was the kind of information Casto should have asked the
agency to give him. But he opted to request the information from the
Defense Ministry for a reason.
Three days earlier, on March 14, U.S. Ambassador to Japan
John Roos asked the prime minister’s office to allow NRC experts to be
permanently stationed at the office to cooperate with the Japanese
government in handling the crisis. But his request was politely
declined.
That, along with the Japanese government’s reluctance toward
information disclosure, provoked the criticism within the U.S.
government that Japan was hiding some vital information.
Concerned about the straining of Tokyo’s ties with Washington at this crucial
moment, Prime Minister Naoto Kan asked Kitazawa to do
whatever he could do to keep the bilateral relationship from
deteriorating further. Accordingly, the defense chief arranged his
meeting with Casto.
The NRC official switched the subject to the No. 4 reactor, the main source of
concern for the United States.
The Defense Ministry informed him that the GSDF’s helicopter
crew actually saw water in the spent fuel pool for the No. 4 reactor.
If so, Casto said, he wanted to know the temperature and the level of radiation
being released from the reactor.
Kitazawa ordered an immediate survey to get these data.
The task was assigned again to the GSDF’s 1st Helicopter
Brigade. A few days later, a helicopter of the brigade flew above the
nuclear power plant to do the survey.
It was then decided that the NRC and the Japanese ministries
and agencies concerned would hold regular meetings, starting on March
18, to share information and discuss efforts to deal with the nuclear
crisis.
On the Japanese side, officials from the NISA, TEPCO, the Foreign Ministry and
the Defense Ministry would attend the meetings.
The United States wished to work with Japan to put the situation at the
Fukushima plant under control.
But the Japanese ministries and agencies were in disarray,
not ready to make concerted and well-coordinated responses to the
crisis.
The United States was in for serious conflict with its close ally in tackling
the formidable safety challenge facing Japan.
* * *
The previous installments of this series are available at:
(1) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201301280006
(2) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201301300006
(3) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302010004
(4) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302040001
(5) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302060007
(6) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302080003
(7) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302110006
(8) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302130005
(9) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302150001
(10) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302180005
(11) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201302200001
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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