Ominous Similarities Between Syria and Iraq
History Lessons the West Refuses to Learn
by PATRICK COCKBURN
In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain and France 
famously created the modern Middle East by carving up what had been the 
Ottoman Empire. The borders of new states such as Iraq and Syria were 
determined in keeping with British and French needs and interests. The 
wishes of local inhabitants were largely ignored.
Now, for the first time in over 90 years, the whole postwar settlement 
in the region is coming unstuck. External frontiers are no longer the 
impassable barriers they were until recently, while internal dividing 
lines are becoming as complicated to cross as international frontiers.
In Syria, the government no longer controls many crossing points into Turkey 
and Iraq. Syrian rebels advance and retreat without hindrance 
across their country’s international borders, while Shia and Sunni 
fighters from Lebanon increasingly fight on opposing sides in Syria. The 
Israelis bomb Syria at will. Of course, the movements of guerrilla 
bands in the midst of a civil war do not necessarily mean that the state is 
finally disintegrating. But the permeability of its borders suggests that 
whoever comes out as the winner of the Syrian civil war will rule a weak state 
scarcely capable of defending itself.
The same process is at work in Iraq. The so-called trigger line 
dividing Kurdish-controlled territory in the north from the rest of Iraq is 
more and more like a frontier defended on both sides by armed force. Baghdad 
infuriated the Kurds last year by setting up the Dijla (Tigris) Operations 
Command, which threatened to enforce central military 
control over areas disputed between Kurds and Arabs.
Dividing lines got more complicated in Iraq after the Hawaijah 
massacre on 23 April left at least 44 Sunni Arab protesters dead. This 
came after four months of massive but peaceful Sunni protests against 
discrimination and persecution. The result of this ever-deeper rift 
between the Sunni and the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad is that 
Iraqi troops in Sunni-majority areas behave like an occupation army. At 
night, they abandon isolated outposts so they can concentrate forces in 
defensible positions. Iraqi government control in the northern half of 
the country is becoming ever more tenuous.
Does it really matter to the rest of the world who fights whom in the 
impoverished country towns of the Syrian interior or in the plains and 
mountains of Kurdistan? The lesson of the last few thousand years is 
that it matters a great deal. The region between Syria’s Mediterranean 
coast and the western frontier of Iran has traditionally been a zone 
where empires collide. Maps of the area are littered with the names of 
battlefields where Romans fought against Parthians, Ottomans against 
Safavids, and British against Turks.
It is interesting but chilling to see the carelessness with which the British 
and French divided up this area under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The 
British were to control the provinces of Baghdad and Basra and have influence 
further north. The French were to hold south-east 
Turkey and northern Syria and the province of Mosul, believed to contain oil. 
It turned out, however, that British generosity over Mosul was due to Britain 
having promised eastern Turkey to Tsarist Russia and 
thinking it would be useful to have a French cordon sanitaire between 
themselves and the Russian army.
Sykes-Picot reflected wartime priorities and was never implemented as such. The 
British promise to give Mosul to France became void with the 
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the Bolsheviks’ unsporting publication 
of Russia’s secret agreements with its former French and British allies. But in 
negotiations in 1918-19 leading up to the Treaty of Versailles, 
only the most perfunctory attention was given to the long-term effect of the 
distribution of the spoils.
Discussing Mesopotamia and Palestine with David Lloyd George, Georges 
Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, who was not very interested in 
the Middle East, said: “Tell me what you want.” Lloyd George: “I want 
Mosul.” Clemenceau: “You shall have it. Anything else?” Lloyd George: 
“Yes, I want Jerusalem too.” Clemenceau agreed with alacrity to this as 
well, though he warned there might be trouble over Mosul, which even 
then was suspected to contain oil.
Those negotiations have a fascination because so many of the issues 
supposedly settled then are still in dispute. Worse, agreements reached 
then laid the basis for so many future disputes and wars that still 
continue, or are yet to come. Arguments made at that time are still 
being made.
Not surprisingly, the leaders of the 30 million Kurds are the most 
jubilant at the discrediting of agreements of which they, along with the 
Palestinians, were to be the greatest victims. After being divided 
between Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria, they sense their moment has 
finally come. In Iraq, they enjoy autonomy close to independence, and in Syria 
they have seized control of their own towns and villages. In 
Turkey, as the PKK Turkish Kurd guerrillas begin to trek back to the 
Qandil mountains in northern Iraq under a peace deal, the Kurds have 
shown that, in 30 years of war, the Turkish state has failed to crush 
them.
But as the 20th century settlement of the Middle East collapses, the 
outcome is unlikely to be peace and prosperity. It is easy to see what 
is wrong with the governments in present-day Iraq and Syria, but not 
what would replace them. Look at the almost unanimous applause among 
foreign politicians and media at the fall of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011, 
then look at Libya now, its government permanently besieged or on the 
run from militia gunmen.
If President Bashar al-Assad did fall in Syria, who would replace 
him? Does anybody really think that peace would automatically follow? Is it not 
far more likely that there would be continued and even 
intensified war, as happened in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003? 
The Syrian rebels and their supporters downplay the similarities 
between the crises in Iraq and Syria, but they have ominous 
similarities. Saddam may have been unpopular in Iraq, but those who 
supported him or worked for him could not be excluded from power and 
turned into second-class citizens without a fight.
US, British and French recipes for Syria’s future seem as fraught 
with potential for disaster as their plans in 1916 or 2003. In saying 
that Assad can play no role in a future Syrian government, the US 
Secretary of State, John Kerry, speaks of the leader of a government 
that has still only lost one provincial capital to the rebels. Such 
terms can only be imposed on the defeated or those near defeat. This 
will only happen in Syria if Western powers intervene militarily on 
behalf of the insurgents, as they did in Libya, but the long-term 
results might be equally dismal.
PATRICK COCKBURN is the author of “Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, 
and the Struggle for Iraq.

http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/05/13/history-lessons-the-west-refuses-to-learn/


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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