*Grande Error - *
*
*
*This week the Venezuelan Chargé d'Affaires to the United States Calixto
Ortega is supposed to have a meeting with the US Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to plan a new era in relations.

"She ranks second in the diplomatic area for Latin America after President
Barack Obama and John Kerry. We have planned a meeting to draft an agenda
for this new era in the US-Venezuela relations in areas such as finance,
energy, culture, and all aspects the two countries can harmoniously (agree
on) regardless of the ideological positions."*
*-------------------------------------------------
*
*
*
*P.S. I guess someone forgot that the US government has tried to overthrow
the Bolivarian revolution from day one and that plan is still on it's
agenda and we gone from the Bourgeois **diplomacy like any other capitalist
countries foreign policy of the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" to now "my
enemy is my friend". Whatever happen to proletarian internationalism?*
*
*
*Cort*

*Diplomacy is only cynicism turned into an art form.*
*
*
*Lenin on diplomacy "promises are like pie crusts-made to be broken".*
*
*
What justification is there that a character such as Temir Porras, a
corrupt bureaucrat in the foreign policy of the government for the last
seven years, is now a key assessor of the foreign policy apparatus? How is
it possible that Berruecos - a member of the so-called "Bolivarian
bourgeoisie" - begins to have weight? Thus, the bourgeoisie as a class have
indirect representation through the enriched bureaucracy, and that includes
some military officers and many civilian figures.*
*
Venezuela and Maduro Today: The Heart of Darkness

Jun 16th 2013, by Andrés Figueroa Cornejo, Modesto Emilio Guerrero
[image: Modesto Gurrero (Aporrea.org)]

Modesto Gurrero (Aporrea.org)

*Chavismo without Chavez is the title of the latest book just launched in
April 2013 by journalist, writer, poet, activist, and Venezuelan residing
in Argentina, Modesto Emilio Guerrero. His condition as a revolutionary and
honest analyst who came out of the Venezuelan people's conflicts makes him
an obligatory source to consult for those who see Latin America as a boat
which, with its movement, will throw capitalism over the cliff.*

*The program Canto Libre, broadcast by the independent Radio
Sur<http://www.radiosur.org.ar/>,
interviewed Guerrero.*

*Radio Sur: First, the most urgent issue, what is the recent request by
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos to join NATO about?*

Modesto Guerrero: The announcement that Santos made was a device to test
reactions and relationships of different forces in Latin America. Santos
could have said from the start, "We can't go to NATO for statutory reasons,
but we want to have a different type of relationship with her", which would
be the status of associated state of NATO, conceded to Argentina in 1991.

If there hadn't been any observed reaction in Latin America, the test would
have been passed and Colombia's entrance into NATO, with status or without
it, would be a reality. The Colombian vice-president - the ex-communist
Angelino Garzon - gave an even duller explanation than Santos because he
tried to legitimise the move, saying that "this has to do with our national
interest". Later the minister for defence, Juan Carlos Pinzon appeared,
declaring more or less the same thing, affirming that "a storm in a teacup
is being created".  For them it might just be a teacup, but for us it's
about very turbulent waters.

*What does it mean for Colombia to become an associated state of NATO when
its new status is approved?*

The condition of associated state corresponds to a special status that was
approved in 1989 for countries outside NATO. Argentina was the first
associated state, and still hasn't withdrawn from that. Chile was
associated by de facto at the start of the 80s, during the Falklands War.
The special status still didn't exist then, but it was used as a
nation-state for the satellite and non-satellite launches in the south.

*These associations with Chile and Argentina happened over two or three
decades ago...*

With Colombia, we're facing a situation that is more serious than what
happened with Chile, and of course a hundred times more serious than
Argentina, because it is part of a continent that is different to what it
was then. We're in a different historical time now, with different local
and international power relations. That is the secret.

One of the geopolitical elements that has shifted with this new relation
[with NATO] is the dialogue in the process for peace, sponsored by Norway
and Venezuela, and carried out through Cuban management, with one of the
three Colombian guerrilla groups. The first thing that can be concluded is
that the fresh link between Colombia and NATO is exploding in UNASUR (Union
of South American Nations).

*Why?*

Colombia can't belong to the defence council of UNASUR at the same time
that it is in NATO, which is another defence council. The one in UNASUR is
politically and militarily autonomous, and diametrically opposed to NATO.
According to political logic, there should be pressure from Brazil and
Argentina towards Colombia, along with valiant responses from Venezuela,
Ecuador and Bolivia. Actually, Bolivia demanded an urgent meeting of UNASUR
to critically consider the Colombian state for what it was doing with NATO.
Brazil, which maintains regional hegemony, and Argentina, which is the
second country in this articulation of power, have very close links with
Colombia. Brazil sends Colombia planes and a large part of its military
supplies. All of that is now in play. [Former Brazilian President] Lula,
[current President] Dilma or her emissary, should have asked the Colombian
government where they were going with this, because if they associate with
NATO they will have to leave UNASUR, just like Paraguay and Honduras did.

*Maduro is governoing a process of transition*

*It's barely been two months since Nicolas Maduro was sworn in as president
of Venezuela. At the risk of making hasty evaluations, what do you consider
his strengths and weaknesses to be?*

We're talking about a government and president that are being tested.
Maduro still isn't a national leader. He's a relative leader, and at the
same time a legitimate president because of the Chavista people. The small
vote [in comparison with Chavez in October 2012] that he received doesn't
mean that he isn't legitimate for the Chavista population. What he was
lacking was translated into abstention, but not into people who want to get
rid of him. Rather it's about a punishment vote.

So we're talking about a president being tested with very little
governability. In political science it's estimated that a 10 point lead
over the next candidate is the optimum amount to define sustainable
governability. In this case, Maduro has only 20% of those 10 points. That
is, we're facing a very low rate in electoral terms. That contributes an
element of high sensitivity to a transition.

*But political-electoral fatigue is daily bread* ...

If Chavez or Maduro had got this result in an election for a second term,
after having won a first election by 10 points, it wouldn't mean the same
risk. But a government that is going through the loss of its most important
leader, one who offered national unity and stopped people in their tracks
with his presence, his political initiatives and with the power of his
personality...many of the attacks against Venezuela have become somewhat
uncovered.

*What are you referring to when you talk about a transition government?*

Maduro is governing a process of transition from one regime to another. The
regime that existed with Hugo Chavez died with him. It was a deeply
progressive regime, but extremely personality based. Now, and for a few
months, a government based on an association between the PSUV (United
Socialist Party of Venezuela) and the armed forces, as well as some of the
minor lobbies that are part of the power structures, is being built. That
is the new government. Its main characteristic is that it doesn't contain
members of the bourgeoisie, the same as the Chavez one from 2002 until he
died. That's the factor of continuity here. What is the risk? That the new
regime that is coming together could sustain a relationship with the
bourgeoisie that didn't exist before, and could even contain some indirect
representative of the bourgeoisie in the government. If that happened, we'd
be in the presence of a set-back, of institutional regression.

*The rentier state and low rate of governability *

*Imperialism and its native extensions in Venezuela permanently attack the
government for the current economic problems. Are all of them caused by the
enemies of the people?*

It's a combination. The enemies possess the main levers of the economy and
are the "receipt holders" of the greater part of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), or a large part of it for the last seven years. Between the two
sectors of the economy - state and private - it was private that grew most
[in that period]. This contradiction, absurd in politic terms, is expressed
economically, because they control an important fraction of the import
market, investment contracts, the bank sector, and retail trade.

*The banking sector?*

The Bolivarian government bought and nationalised powerful banks such as
Vizcaya and others. But the bourgeoisie continues to hold a relevant amount
of competitive financial power. And competitive means that it's important.

*What is the core of the historical formation and the actual economic state
of the country?*

The bourgeoisie has the ability to compete in a weak economy like
Venezuela's. And it's not weak because it lacks money - it's got enough of
that! The oil barrel is at USD102, 3,200,000 barrels are produced a day,
and there are proven reserves for the next 140 years. But this money isn't
wealth, it's a structural economic stronghold. The key issue is how the
money coming from petroleum has been used over the last 85 years, and how
over the 13 years of the Chavez government it hasn't been possible to
change the primary, exporting, and rentier model. The inability to overcome
this model impedes the organic development of Venezuela.

*For example?*

The total number of companies that are under worker control, including
those that are social-production companies, are a little more than a
thousand. Among these companies there are the largest metal and cement
plants, as well as the electricity industry, but they don't surpass 4.8% of
the GDP. These weaknesses become cracks that the enemies take advantage of
in order to create inflation, because they create the prices from below.
And this permanent inflation is what leads to devaluation, weakening the
currency in relation to the international market.  It's on this that the
great Chavista economist, Victor Alvarez, bases his references to a
structural fracturing, together with another Chavista, a leftwing one,
called Manuel Sutherland. If this isn't resolved, we simply can't talk
about socialism of the 21st century, because Nicolas Maduro's government
won't be sustainable. Russia is the number one exporter of petroleum in the
world, but it sustains itself on the industry that the Soviet Union left
behind, which is value-added to its production. This is the contradiction
of the economy and of politics, which is the economy concentrated towards
the benefit of others.

*How fast is time running out for Maduro?*

Time in politics is as valuable as political programs or ministers. The
time the Maduro government has to overcome a rentier economy, at least
partially, and triumph over his low governability, is very short. Six
years. Half way through, in the third year, should the low governability
continue, the rightwing, with strong international support, could call a
recall referendum. Because if things continue as they are, in three years
we will face a scenario of great social discontent, pressure from strikes
and other labour demands, and more demands from the sectors who are the
latecomers to the sharing out.

*What role is Henrique Capriles fulfilling in the middle of this complex
Venezuelan reality, considering him as the ex-candidate of imperialism?*

He was the candidate of imperialism, but in very relative terms. The true
candidates of imperialism are other people. Capriles was the candidate who
managed to be, we might say, 'the ugliest at the party'. They chose him
because they didn't have any way of agreeing on anyone else. Capriles has a
policy of winning through elections, and of taking advantage of violence
and murdering of Chavistas to weaken the government he wants to beat
electorally. That is his strategy - not coups, nor war. If something like
that were to come about, he could take advantage of it, but the eventual
coup plotters wouldn't accept him as leader. Capriles, until now, is still
alleging the illegitimacy of the Maduro government, exactly as they are
doing in the US. However, the three large groups in the Venezuelan economy
did legitimise and legalise Maduro as president two weeks ago when they met
with him.  That is, they put down the US and Capriles with their behaviour.

Other contradictions that Capriles shows, for example, are with the
Democratic Action (AD) party, which despite being small, includes many
experienced political cadres, but which at the same time is in opposition
to Maduro and is also anti-Capriles. Then he [Capriles] has competition
from Maria Corina Machado (ultra-liberal politician) who wants to be head
of the opposition. So the enemies of the government are together just
because Chavismo is strong. Hate maintains them united transitionally.

*Damn bureaucracy*

*What's the situation with sectors that support the government, but
maintain critical positions and that advocate an acceleration of the
revolutionary process, due to which they are not well regarded by the
government?*

That occurred in 2001, 2003, 2005, and since 2007. The difference in
opinions and conduct has always existed between the strong left-wing, which
there has been in Venezuela before and during Chavismo, and a bureaucratic
layer which installed itself in the state apparatus and has kidnapped it.
As with every privileged fringe, this bureaucratic layer flees from
political democracy, from liberty and the debate of ideas. This is because
that layer lacks arguments to debate and only counts upon holding power
through force.

* How is this difference expressed?*

 In January 2011 the Venezuelan government took the Colombian (FARC member)
Julian Conrado prisoner <http://www.aporrea.org/ddhh/a167596.htm>, and then
deported 11 or 12 [Colombian] insurgents and handed them over to [Colombian
president Juan Manuel] Santos. Thus the government showed themselves
against the left in that it denied to accept all the terms of the Pact of
Santa 
Maria<http://www.telesurtv.net/articulos/2013/05/30/presidente-nicolas-maduro-exige-a-colombia-respeto-para-venezuela-4223.html>,
and handed over [left-wing] guerrilla fighters to the reactionary
government of Colombia. Some [Venezuelan] community media outlets were
vetoed [by the Venezuelan government]; publicity was taken down from the
webpage Aporrea.org (with 2.4 million daily visits) by the Ministry of
Communications at that point. These conflicts existed with Chavez and after
him. What there is now is a qualitative intensification of this mode of
coexistence - not in contradiction, always complementary - where different
methodologies and some programmatic differences can be appreciated. It's
true, we all confess to believe in the Plan of the Nation, 2013 - 2019, the
Coup at the Helm [a critical speech by Hugo Chavez in October 2012], and
other documents. But we don't all profess belief in the political machinery
of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), and less in a part of
the bureaucratic machinery that functions at the service of corruption.

*For example...*

What justification is there that a character such as Temir Porras, a
corrupt bureaucrat in the foreign policy of the government for the last
seven years, is now a key assessor of the foreign policy apparatus? How is
it possible that Berruecos - a member of the so-called "Bolivarian
bourgeoisie" - begins to have weight? Thus, the bourgeoisie as a class have
indirect representation through the enriched bureaucracy, and that includes
some military officers and many civilian figures.

*Again you refer to the "bureaucratic layer"...*

This bureaucratic layer has its own interests. Until the "Temir Porras'" of
the Venezuelan government don't leave the structures of power, there will
be a permanent contradiction between those, in and out of the government,
who want to deepen the Bolivarian transition toward the socialist path,
versus those who want to conserve that's been conquered as a platform for
self-enrichment, privilege and personal security. In this framework many
new criticisms have emerged.

*Translation by Venezuelanalysis.com*
 ------------------------------
*Source URL (retrieved on 17/06/2013 - 9:31am):*
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9715
*
*
*-------*
*
*
*"Unity is a great thing and a great slogan. But what the workers' cause
needs is the unity of Marxists, not unity between Marxists, and opponents
and distorters of Marxism." *
*
-- Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin<http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/104630.Vladimir_Ilyich_Lenin>
*


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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