So, as I read this National Security Leak, from a Senator, good think for him his name isn't Manning or Snowden, Obama suspended military Aid to the Egyptian Military regime running Egypt presently.
Usually they increase shipments of Tear Gas and Pepper Gas of varieties to strong to use on American Citizens. (Thank you past Secretary of State and future US President, Hillary Clinton, for not being to secret about those shipments). So this means to me, the Muslim Brotherhood was/is doing what the Corporate World wanted them to do as witnessed by the actions of the worlds police dog and controller of others economies, the United States Government, doesn't feel certain they can get the Military to do as they want, and the Muslim Brotherhood will, so money/military aid is withheld from one, which also shows support for the deposed Muslim Brotherhood Democratically elected leader, which makes me wonder about their elections as much as ours. It's always interesting who is exempt from leaking State Secrets too, isn't it, since it is done to control US Public opinion in favor of the Elitists, but any data that makes a whole picture can get you killed, or at very least imprisoned for most of your life. Scott > Senator: Obama Administration Secretly Suspended Military Aid to Egypt > > http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/19/senator-obama-administration-secretly-suspended-military-aid-to-egypt.html > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Excluding the Exclusionary? > The Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood > by MICHAEL GASPER and MOHAMED YOUSRY > > In the immediate aftermath of the coup that deposed president Muhammad > Morsi on July 3, 2013, it looked as though the Muslim Brothers had decided > to embrace all options including violence. In the heat of the moment, some > members of the Muslim Brothers and a number of their supporters waved > flags > associated with militant Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda, and issued > rampant threats against the deposed presidents opponents. After a quick > recalibration however, the Muslim Brothers wrapped themselves in Egyptian > flags and brought women and children with them to demonstrations > proclaiming that their resistance to the military backed government would > be non-violent. > > To many, this seemed to be a welcome departure for the Muslim Brothers who > had not shied away from espousing violence to achieve their ends through > much of their history. However, a closer look at the Brothers strategy > offers insight into the extent that the groups past continues to weigh > heavily on its decision making in the present. The groups history is a > burden that severely handicaps their ability to reach a political > settlement that would secure a legal place for the movement in Egypts > political future. > > Indeed, the parallels between the past and the present are striking. For > example, just as they have always done, the Brothers fundamentally > overestimated their support among the general population while > underestimating the strength of their opponents. In 1953, Muslim Brothers > luminaries Sayyed Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi confidently declared that the > Brothers would destroy their opponents (the Free Officers, the military > régime that had ousted the monarchy in 1952). There are echoes of that now > as many leaders of todays Brothers confidently declared their ability to > defeat the opposition and to reinstate Morsi within a few short days. In > both instances the Brothers seem oblivious to the range of forces allayed > in support of the new régime. > > This inability to grasp the political significance of the moment might be > traced to a second factor that has marked the Brothers self-perception > since they became a significant player in Egyptian Politics in 1930s. The > group continues to represent its discourse as synonymous with Islam and as > such distances themselves from any other political movement or trend. > Indeed, the Brothers continue to portray their political struggle not as > competition for political power but as martyrdom in the path of God. This > is not new, in 1965, Qutb and those in his immediate circle (these include > the current leader of the Brothers, Muhammad Badie) declared themselves > al-Usba al-Muminah (Faithful Core). That was enough to justify their > view > of the 1960s as a battle against the infidel régime of president Nasser > whom they saw as a lackey of the West conspiring with the Jews and the > Soviet Union to destroy Islam. Similarly, we now hear echoes of this dusty > rhetoric from many Brothers who stridently assert that their group > represents the only vision of Islam and that their struggle is not so much > about the future of Egypt, but the future of Islam writ large. To them, > their enemies are criminals determined to extinguish Gods light on earth. > > Third, as in the past, the Brothers continue to depict themselves as > victims protected by angels facing off against non-believers. Long time > Brotherhood activist, Zayneb al-Ghazali claimed that while imprisoned in > the 1960s, Gods angels appeared in her cell to feed, clothe and protect > her. Then over the past weeks, a number of Brotherhood speakers claimed to > have seen the angel Gabriel at their on-going encampment in Raba > al-Adawiyya that was so brutally attacked on the morning of August 14, > 2013. Among them are some that have gone so far as to claim that they have > received divine visions claiming that the Prophet of Islam requested that > president Morsi lead *him* in prayers. In fact, even during Morsis > presidency, Fahmy Howeidy, the Islamist writer, characterized Morsis > opponents as Pharaohs and non-believers and the Brothers and president > Morsi as Moses and his Godly people. > > And finally, the Muslim Brothers continue to do what it does best, muddy > the facts. For example, Umar al-Tilmissani (a former head of the > Brothers) > declared that the movements founder, Hassan al-Banna, was the true > initiator and the real architect of the 1952 coup that toppled Egypts > monarchy and brought Nasser to power. This complete rewriting of reality > is > parallel in the way the current leadership claims [image: > gasper]<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0804758883/counterpunchmaga>that > not only did Morsi challenge American/Israeli hegemony in the region (a > powerful populist position that is not supported by facts) but also that > he > had agreed to hold early presidential elections after the militarys > ultimatum of June 30, 2013. Again this is not supported by facts. > Moreover, > the Brothers also continue to argue that the deposed president included > the > opposition in all his decision-making processes. Regardless of ones view > of the military intervention on July 3, 2013, no serious observer could > reasonably assert that Morsis government was inclusive. > > If history is any indication, the current strategies like those the > Brothers adopted during previous moments of political upheaval will fail > to > achieve the movements goals. One need look no further than their 1954 > misreading of the political situation that caused their defeat as Nasser > detained thousands of Brotherhood members. Eventually, more than 1500 > hundred were sentenced to long prison terms and six were hanged.This > inability to fully grasp the ramifications of their actions greatly > weakened the movement at a time when it was facing increasing repression > from the Egyptian state. Was the historical analog to this lesson the > frightful violence perpetrated by the security forces against the two > encampments of Morsi supporters this week? > > With all of this in their history it is perplexing that the current > leadership has not learned from the past. Even more inextricable is that > despite the caution from a prominent and ardent supporter, Hazem Salah Abu > Ismael, a Salafi preacher, many weeks ago on June 27, 2013, that the > Brothers had lost much of their ability to mobilize the masses, they still > dont have a realistic view of the present. Indeed it is quite clear that > their support, even among Islamists, is dwindling and their popularity > among ordinary citizens is very low. This explains at least in part the so > far muted response among Egyptians about the violence of August 14. > > At the same time, no one can question the fact that the Brothers enjoy > enthusiastic support from among their followers and that they are a > disciplined and organized force. But, facts on the ground indicate that > the > movements current strategy, its attempt to mobilize the street against > the military-backed government, has not worked. The Brothers have failed > to > attract support from outside their ranks. In fact the movement had been > reduced to what might be called a Hail Mary strategy. Every three or so > days, the Brothers organized small marches in an effort to attract others > to join them. The strategy produced the opposite effect. Ordinary citizens > seemed to grow impatient towards what they saw as disruptive tactics. > Indeed, so far, despite a large number of fatalities of Brothers > supporters, there seems to be scant evidence of sympathy for the > Brotherhood. One could see this in especially sharp relief among the > residents of the Raba vicinity who made no secret of their desire for the > Brothers to end their encampment and depart their neighborhood. It is > possible the events of Wednesday August 14th may change that, but it seems > unlikely. > > One incident sums up much of the sentiment on the street. On July 9, 2013, > under the leadership of long time Brotherhood activist Mohammed Abdel > Qudus, a handful of Brothers attempted to organize a protest against the > death of the Brothers photographer (who was killed during the first > massacre perpetrated by the Egyptian army in the wake of the July 3rd > Coup). > Almost instantaneously, dozens of ordinary Egyptians harangued them, > calling them traitors and in turn blaming the Brothers for the events at > the Republican Guards Club that resulted in the death of 51 people. One > wonders if the same will now happen on an even larger scale after the > violence of August 14, 2013. > > This decline in the movements popularity is due to several factors. While > some of this may be inherited from the era of the deposed president Hosni > Mubarak, much of the anti-Brotherhood sentiment can be traced to their use > of divisive and doctrinaire tactics during the movements unsuccessful > one-year in power. Upon taking the reins of government after the elections > of 2012, instead of offering immediate plans to ease the sufferings of > Egypts poor or its struggling middle class, the Brothers engaged in what > many believed to be avoidable battles with Egypts entrenched institutions > (such as the judiciary or the media) and with secular forces and > minorities. While the Brothers claimed these battles were aimed at > fighting > corruption, many ordinary Egyptians perceived them as an effort of > Brotherization, a process to assure the Brothers control over every > aspect of state and society. > > The massive anti-Brotherhood demonstrations of June 30 and July 26 give > some indication that many Egyptians pin the Brotherhoods failure on its > archaic ideology, outdated policies and its seeming lack of interest in > social and economic justice. To further complicate this, after a > particularly virulent anti-Brothers media campaign many Egyptians are now > questioning the groups loyalty to Egypt. According to this view, the > Brothers only consider control of Egypt as a stepping-stone towards the > establishment of a new Muslim Caliphate. > > That brings us back to the present moment. Now, the leaders of the Muslim > Brothers have a choice, either to continue on the same path as they have > throughout their history or to initiate painful but necessary reforms in > order to begin a new future within Egypts diverse political landscape. > Unfortunately, early indications are that powerful voices of the Brothers > past (like that of shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential Qatar-based > Egyptian cleric, who recently called on Muslims from every part of the > Arab > and Muslim World to join the struggle of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt in > order to obtain martyrdom) will prevail. > > What might reforms look like? There may already be some indications. Many > young Brothers recently formed three separate trends within the > movement, *Ikhwan > Bila Unf* (Brothers Without Violence), *Shabab al-Ikhwan* (Youth of The > Brotherhood) and *Ahrar al-Ikhwan *(The Free Brothers) and are calling for > a comprehensive review of the movements ideas and practices. These young > activists appear to have realized that the Brothers old strategies are > outmoded and belong to a different era. This is happening at the same time > that some leftist and liberal activists are also calling upon the Brothers > leadership to join with their younger members and to abandon the > discordant > ways of their violent past in order to secure a place in Egypts future. > > What is clear is that the Brothers must recognize that their old ideas are > not suitable for todays diverse political landscape. They must > acknowledge > and put into practice the idea that for any Islamist (or indeed any > political) project to succeed it must be inclusive, Christians, Jews, > Shia > and other minorities must be treated equally under the law. The movement > must abandon the notion that it represents Gods faithful core; abandon > secrecy, deception and violence. It must also entertain the possibility > that the Muslim Brothers were banned and imprisoned precisely because of > their intolerance and their tendency to express this intolerance with acts > of violence against those who oppose their maximalist vision of an > Islamist > Egypt. > > Sadly however, even if the movement adapts all of these changes it still > might not be enough to include the Brothers as a legal political force in > Egypts future. Many liberal and leftist activists are demanding the > dismantling of the Brothers Freedom and Justice party (and all other > religious party for that matter). Their argument is simple. They argue > that > those whose foundational beliefs and practices are built on excluding the > others cannot be included in a reconciliatory political process. It is > hard > to tell, but it seems as if this argument is gaining popular momentum. > > To avoid further marginalization, the Brothers leaders must stop looking > backward. They must make a courageous decision and agree to join the > current political process or risk returning to the margins as an > underground group. Most importantly, if the Brothers think that this > crisis > is similar to others in their troubled history, they are badly mistaken. > This time is different. The movement is not only facing the wrath of a > military régime; it is also facing the anger and distrust of a large > segment of the population. For the Brothers to have any voice in Egypts > political future, the movement must abandon their past and look for a new > path forward before its too late. > > *Michael Gasper is Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern History at > Occidental College in Los Angeles CA, and is author of The Power of > Representation: Peasants, Publics and Islam in > Egypt<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0804758883/counterpunchmaga> > . > * > > *Mohamed Yousry is a former expert witness and interpreter for shaykh > Umar > Abdel Rahmans defense team. Currently a PhD candidate in the Department > of > Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University and is writing > his dissertation on the Islamist politics in Egypt from the 1950s to the > present.* > > * > http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/08/19/the-political-future-of-the-muslim-brotherhood/ > * > > --------------------------------- > > http://enpassant.com.au/2013/08/19/a-letter-to-comrades-from-the-revolutionary-socialists-of-egypt-15-august-2013/ > A Letter to Comrades from the Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt, 15 August > 2013 > > *Posted* by John <http://enpassant.com.au/author/john/>, August 19th, 2013 > - under Egypt <http://enpassant.com.au/category/egypt/>, Egyptian > revolution<http://enpassant.com.au/category/egyptian-revolution/> > ,Revolutionary Socialists of > Egypt<http://enpassant.com.au/category/revolutionary-socialists-of-egypt/> > . > > *Down with military rule no to the return of the old regime no to the > return of the Brotherhood* > > http://revsoc.me/letters-to-comrades/ysqt-hkm-lskr-l-lwd-lflwl-l-lwd-lkhwn > > Terrible massacres and violent repression a huge escalation in attacks > on > Egyptian Christians and churches the consolidation of the repressive > military state continues apace. These are the momentous political > developments we have experienced during the last few weeks. They pose > enormous challenges to the revolution, but they also contain opportunities > to prepare for the coming waves of the revolution, which the Revolutionary > Socialists can use effectively to build the movement, provided that we > develop tactics capable of dealing with changing circumstances. > > In order to build and develop our political tactics, the Political Bureau > of the Revolutionary Socialists Movement presents this document to > comrades > in order to build a position for the movement around which we can unite, > through a process of deep, collective and comradely discussion, and so > that > we can develop specific tactics for the coming period on the basis of this > position. > > *Revolution or military coup?* > > After millions took to the streets to topple Mohamed Morsi and Al-Sisi > made > his declaration removing him from the presidency, there has been > widespread > debate about how to characterise these events. Was this a revolution of > the > masses, or a military coup aimed at removing the president in order to > establish a military dictatorship? The answer to the question revolution > or coup? lies in its importance to the development of a strategy for the > months, and perhaps the years to come of the Egyptian revolution. > > Whoever dismisses the intervention of the gigantic mass movement which > launched the new wave of the Egyptian revolution is fleeing from dealing > with its inherent contradictions, and thus from both the new challenges in > front of the Egyptian revolution, and the opportunities that the future > holds. Unsurprisingly, the revolutionaries who dismiss the value of the > intervention of the masses or at least consider the masses to be simply > the object of a counter-revolutionary game are suffering today from deep > frustration as a result of what they call the retreat or end of the > Egyptian revolution, and their denial of the available opportunities. > > Nor are they alone in dismissing the direct intervention of the masses in > Morsis downfall, and the downfall of the legitimacy of the ballot box > with > him. Almost all the forces intervening in the political situation today, > including the international forces, dismiss the role of the masses. > > The exception here is the military establishment, which was burnt by the > fire of the mass movement previously, and thus was unable to ignore or > overlook it. Rather, the prospects and development of the mass movement > are > the principal factor determining its policies and interventions. The > military establishment represents the mainstay of the ruling class, the > regime and the state. It is the spearhead of the counter-revolution which > imposes itself on the mass movement as a *fait accompli*, even while it > sows panic about the possibility of the development of the mass movement > and strives by every possible means to either contain it within a specific > framework which does not threaten its class interests, or by direct > repression as happened in the past. > > The army certainly wants to contain the gigantic mass movement demanding > Morsis downfall within the limits it sets and the steps it calculates. It > wants to prevent the movement from escaping from the framework of Morsis > downfall to become a deeper challenge to the regime in its entirety. The > primary goal of the military was return of the millions who filled and > controlled the streets to their homes in the shortest time possible, and > to > stop the movement at the limit of overthrowing the head of the regime and > getting rid of him. This goal was compatible with the aspirations of the > military after Morsis failure to abort the revolution in face of the > confusion which had gripped the ruling class in the face of the revolution > throughout his year in office. > > For after Morsis rise to power last year, with the blessing of the US, > the > military establishment, and a large section of the business elite, he > failed to achieve the objectives of the ruling class in aborting the > Egyptian revolution. Morsi was initially a better option for the majority > of the ruling class, as he adopted the neo-liberal project and aligned > himself with the interests of business. He had no qualms about alliance > with the US and was careful not to disturb the Zionist state, in addition > to being the first elected president after the revolution. Most > importantly, he had a base in the largest mass organisation in Egypt, an > organisation which works on the ground with hundreds of thousands of > members, sympathisers and supporters. They would be able to absorb the > anger of the people and convince the masses of the neo-liberal project and > the cruel plans for austerity which accompany it, sparing the ruling class > the danger of a mass uprising during its attempts to deal with the > economic > crisis or at least to mitigate its effects at their expense. > > Instead, the economic crisis and the failure of Morsi to implement the > demands of the revolution (or more accurately his explicit challenge to > these demands and objectives) led to a decline in his popularity and the > popularity of his organisation to the extent that the ruling class and its > institutions could no longer rely on them in the face of the masses. > > When it became clear that popular anger had risen enough to overthrow > Morsi, it became necessary for the most powerful and cohesive institution > in the ruling class the military to intervene quickly to contain the > anger of the masses and implement their demand. It was necessary to get > out > of a losing bet on the head of the regime and to rearrange and unify the > ruling class around new leaders who would appear as heroes, carrying out > the peoples demands and uniting with the people in one rank. > > The army was really caught between two fires. The first was the fire of > the > mass movement, and the possibility of it breaking through its limits in > the > event of Morsi continuing in power. The second was the fire of the > Brotherhood and the Islamists in the streets, and with the opening of > complex fronts in Sinai to a greater extent and some areas of Upper Egypt > to a lesser extent, in the event of Morsis overthrow. Not to mention the > differences which would develop with the US administration and the threat > of what they call the democratic path. > > The Army chose to avoid the fire of the mass movement, despite the > consequences. It decided to knock out Morsi, while absorbing the masses > and > stopping the development of their movement, and face the fire from the > Brotherhood which was less threatening than that of the masses. As for the > US administration, and the EU to a lesser extent, they have long-term > strategic relations with the Egyptian military establishment which are > capable of absorbing any tensions caused by the overthrow of Morsi. Thus > the military panicked about the possibility about the development of the > mass movement and its escape from its leash. The other option was fraught > with danger, for if the army did not overthrow Morsi, and the movement > developed in a more radical and deeper direction, the confidence of wide > sections of the masses in the army a confidence which was born out of > the > absence of any other alternative which could deal decisively with Morsi > would be shaken. This was a factor which could push the movement off its > tracks. > > In order to complete the work of containing the mass movement, the > military > appointed an interim president and a new government as a civilian face. > The > aim was to preserve firstly all its powers and privileges and its > interventionist role in violent repression when necessary. Secondly, it > aimed to complete the project of counter-revolution at both a political > and > economic level. This did not mean a retreat of the military from power, > but > rather the opposite. For in spite of the militarys retreat behind the > civilian cloak of the new government, it still manages everything just as > it did during the year and a half of the Military Council under the > leadership of [Field-Marshal] Tantawi and [General] Anan. > > So we have witnessed the mass wave of protest on 30 June and the few days > which followed, and seen the military riding on the revolution after 3 > July > in order to cut the road to the development of the mass movement. The mass > movement could have developed greater and more radical dimensions, in > particular with the beginning of partial strikes in the Public Transport > Authority, the railways, in Mahalla, and among the civil servants at the > Cabinet Offices and many others. We are also seeing the return of the > ruling class with its military symbols and old leaders in full force, > after > the expulsion of the Brotherhood from the state, in order for the military > to lead the ruling class and the forces of counter-revolution to achieve > what Morsi failed to do. That is, to abort the revolution and a hugely > confident mass movement, which was however full of contradictions in > consciousness and organisation. Inevitably, we have to deal with the > movement including its contradictions and exploit the possibilities > inherent in it to prepare for the stronger waves of the Egyptian > revolution > to come. > >>From this angle, 11 February does not exactly resemble 3 July 2013, and >> is > in fact completely unlike it in many aspects. In the first case, the > ruling > class was forced to get rid of the head of state and open the door to > greater confusion among its own ranks. The state was in a condition of > much > greater weakness than it appears today, after the collapse of the Interior > Ministry and the extreme hostility to Mubaraks cronies. In the second > case, however, the ruling class got rid of the head of the regime in order > to unite its own ranks, shuffle the cards in its hand, and mend the cracks > in order to prepare for attacks on all revolutionary movements. But this > does not mean that the political and economic crisis of the ruling class > has ended. > > In the face of Morsis overthrow, the Brotherhood and their Islamist > allies > sought to escalate their mobilisation on the ground with sit-ins and > marches in order to restore the legitimacy overthrown by the masses > along > with their failed project hostile to the goals of the revolution. In the > process they have committed heinous crimes which cannot be forgiven in > many > areas and provinces, as well as their sectarian rhetoric and their > incitement against Christians, by pouring their anger out on them and > attacking churches. As Revolutionary Socialists we must stand firmly > against this aggression and any attack on the Christians of Egypt: this is > a matter of principle for us. > > We are well aware that for the Brotherhood this is a battle for survival > and they will not easily surrender. In parallel to the Brotherhoods > attacks and crimes they themselves are facing violent repression at the > hands of the military and the Interior Ministry, beginning with the > massacre at the Republican Guards HQ, and ending with the barbaric > breaking > up of the protest camps in al-Nahda Square and Rabaa al-Adwiyya, not to > mention the killing of three of their women members in Mansoura, and so > on. > > The crimes of the Brotherhood have led most factions of the left to take > an > extremely opportunistic stance and to ally themselves with the military > and > support the repressive state, even repeating the same lies of the > bourgeois > and feloul media, and completely abandoning any revolutionary or class > position. This perspective is built on a catastrophic analysis which > considers the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies to be the greatest danger > to the Egyptian Revolution, while in reality, if the Brotherhood poses a > danger to a certain extent, the institutions of the state which monopolize > the means of violence represent a far greater danger to the revolution. > This is manifested in the return of the repressive state in all its > brutality, in the dictatorial Constitutional Declaration, in the > appointments of provincial governors from military and police generals and > the old regime and the attack on the Suez Steel strikers and so on. > > In addition to the opportunistic and treacherous position of so-called > liberals and leftists in support of the military (led by those who > participated in Al-Sisis government), there are many who see the battle > between the Brotherhood and the new/old regime as a battle which means > nothing to the revolution and the revolution has no stake in its outcome. >>From this perspective, revolutionaries must take a neutral position, as >> if > the two parties to the conflict are of equal strength and represent the > same danger to the revolution. These views are extremely short-sighted. > They do not see the real meaning of the current regimes actions, and the > grin on the militarys face in the face of the Islamists as they crush the > sit-ins at Rabaaal-Adawiyya and al-Nahda. These massacres are a dress > rehearsal for crushing the Egyptian Revolution, and will be repeated > tomorrow against any genuine opposition force which appears on the scene, > particularly the labour movement. This is what we saw a glimpse of in the > attack on the Suez Steel strike. The massacres against the Islamists are > only the first steps along the road map towards counter-revolution, and we > must expose this in sharp and principled attacks on them. > > <http://iamrev.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/iar3.jpg?w=538&h=404> > > Revolutionary socialists during a demonstration in Cairo > > Today we are exposed to a great deal of attacks on our position for > condemning the violence of the institutions of repression against the > Islamists, and for our attacks on Al-Sisi as the leader of the > counter-revolution. But this will not lead us to dilute our position by > creating a kind of balance in our attacks on the military and the > Islamists as if there was equality between them in terms of the danger > they > represent tithe revolution. We are in the process of a comprehensive and > sweeping counter-revolution and the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhoods > sit-ins and protests is only the first step. We will not waver in our firm > position against the military and its fierce repression. Balance between > the two sides would only reflect hesitancy and indecision instead of > taking > clear and bold position against the repressive state. We cannot be silent > about the militarys massacres which have killed dozens of Islamists and > we > cannot support the state in crushing their sit-ins. Nor can we stop > recalling the militarys crimes, and warning about the Interior Ministry > and demanding the prosecution of their criminals at every opportunity. > Likewise we must warn of the return of Mubaraks state and its repressive > institutions in full force, and direct our attacks against it. > > Nor must we be driven behind the attempts of the supporters of the old > regime and their thugs to harass the Islamists and kill them in the > streets. There is a vast difference between the self-defence of the masses > even if by violent means in the face of attacks by the Brotherhood as > we > saw in Manial and Bayn al-Sayarat and Giza a few weeks ago, and the > violence of the institutions of repression and the thugs of the old regime > against the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter is not violence defending > demonstrators and the revolution, but rather an attempt to stabilise > things > in the hands of the new regime without opposition from any quarter. The > army, police and old regime elements did not intervene, not even once, > during the last few weeks, to protect local people or protesters in any of > the clashes. It is in this context that Tamarod Rebel movement and the > left which is stuck to the militarys boots, is calling for popular > committees to protect the state and the institutions of repression and to > help them crush the Islamists. These are fascist calls and we cannot > accept > them or repeat them. > > We must confront the lies the media which give political cover to pinning > all the crimes of the military and the old regime on the Muslim > Brotherhood. We must challenge the obnoxious narrative which seeks to > erase > the revolution of 25 January and replace it with the 30 June revolution, > in > which all classes participated, which was not about burning police > stations and attacking institutions. This narrative presents the > January > Revolution as a pure conspiracy by the Brotherhood, which required a > revolution against them and not a revolution against the ruling class and > its state and repressive institutions. In addition, we hear hateful racist > rhetoric against the Palestinians and the Syrians. > > The state is mobilising almost all political forces and (formerly) > revolutionary forces behind it, and large sections of the masses, in order > to confront the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist alliance around them. > In what they call the war on terror, they are whipping up a disgusting > nationalistic atmosphere, claiming that there is no sound louder than the > sound of battle in order to suppress and garble the demands of the > revolution. > > As for the talk of exclusion [from the political process] and > reconciliation, the Revolutionary Socialists cannot build their position > on this issue in isolation from the moods of the masses and their > orientations in spite of their strong internal contradictions. These > masses will not accept reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. As one > of the statements of our movement stated, beating the drum for > reconciliation suggests equality between murderer and victim, which is > completely unacceptable, without bringing the killers of the martyrs, all > the martyrs, and the instigators of violence, to a fair trial. If the > masses, under the influence of the media and bourgeois propaganda, want to > exclude the Brotherhood, while ignoring the old regime elements and the > military, we must also attack the return of the old regime supporters and > the return of Mubaraks state under Al-Sisis flag. All of them are > enemies > of the Egyptian Revolution and its future prospects, and Al-Sisi is much > more dangerous than [Muslim Brotherhood leader] Muhammed al-Beltagi by any > measure. > > In these circumstances, we must directly and boldly and clearly and > without > any hesitation raise the slogan Down with military rule no to the return > of the feloul no to the return of the Muslim Brotherhood. > > *Are we afraid of isolation?* > > There is no doubt that the tactics of Revolutionary Socialism depend > fundamentally on determining the level of development of the consciousness > of the masses and of the working class at their heart and their vanguard > on > the one hand, while assessing the possibilities and opportunities for the > development and deepening of the mass movement during the course of the > revolution, on the other. > > The mass movement today suffers from great contradictions within it, and > faces great challenges, and perhaps the greatest of these is the apparent > reconciliation between a section of the masses with the institutions of > the > state, and particularly the military and the Interior Ministry the head > and heart of the counter revolution. Yet despite the massive frustration > which affects large sections of revolutionaries who fought against the > Military Council during a year and a half of the revolution, and who > continued their struggle against Morsis regime, there is no other way to > carry out a living role within a mass movement, except to deal with it as > it is and to understand its contradictions without either overlooking or > exaggerating its current potential. > > The alliance of the old regime elements and liberal media, with the > security services, military and Interior Ministry has succeeded to a large > extent in swaying the masses by projecting a false image of the neutrality > of the military and the Interior Ministry who they portray as being > aligned > with the people against Morsi, the Brotherhood and their Islamist allies, > in an attempt to also erase the crimes of the state in murder and torture > from the memory of the masses. Many political forces, most notably the > opportunistic National Salvation Front, the Tamarod campaign, and the > Popular Current, have played the most opportunistic and dirty roles in > burnishing this image through calls for unity in the ranks. They praise > the national role of the army and the state institutions in meeting the > demands of the people to finish with the Brotherhood regime, which they > considered to be the biggest and only danger to the Egyptian revolution. > However, this perspective only represents a thin crust around the > consciousness of the masses. True, it is a solid crust, and almost all > parties are working to harden it further, but underneath lies a genuine > consciousness of the demands of the revolution and its goals of bread, > freedom and social justice. > > We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in the midst of these > contradictions > in consciousness, large sections of the masses have great self-confidence, > despite all the distractions and the fog of the war on terror. The > masses > have genuinely imposed their will and overthrown two presidents and four > governments since the beginning of the revolution. This confidence which > lies under the crust of contradictory consciousness is what prompted the > masses to rise up against Morsi in the first place, and it is this which > allows some to prepare gradually to complete the struggle against the new > government, as its economic and political policies opposed to the demands > of the masses becomes progressively clear. This is despite the partial > hope > among some sectors of the masses that the government will meet the demands > of the revolution. > > At this stage we have to find every way possible to reach the genuine core > of the poor and working masses consciousness, in whose fundamental > interests it is to continue the revolution and implement its demands. We > must continue to emphasize the giant capabilities that the masses > exhibited > in the wave of 30 June and the previous waves of the revolution by > spreading the genuine demands of the Egyptian revolution, and mobilising > for them in every province and every workplace. But this cannot and should > not push us to hide or delay some of our policies and principles in order > to enjoy the temporary, close support of the masses behind our rhetoric > and > our slogans. > > On the contrary, concealing some of our slogans or our policies in order > to > achieve short-term political goals will only lead to opportunism. This is > not the way that the Revolutionary Socialists work, and we have completely > avoided opportunism as we have built our organisational project in the > midst of the masses and for the victory of the Egyptian revolution. For > example, we cannot slacken in our attacks on the lies presented by the > media of the old regime and the bourgeois liberals, or stop our attacks on > the rehearsals for counter-revolution which the military and the Interior > Ministry are carrying out today. We cannot stop recalling the criminal > history of the Military Council and Mubaraks cronies, and demanding that > they be put on trial side-by-side with the Brotherhoods leaders who have > excelled during the last few weeks in incitement to violence and killing, > and the unleashing of disgusting sectarianism. We cannot, in any event, > slacken in directing political attacks against the old regime elements and > the opportunists in Beblawis government, the clear liberal tendencies of > this government, and the consolidation of the repressive state by the > appointment of new provincial governors. We cannot relent in our attacks > on > the huge powers and privileges which the military enjoys according to the > constitution, and its control of around 25 percent of the Egyptian > economy, > and on the continuation of the humiliating Camp David agreement and so on. > We have to deal with these things in a strictly principled manner. > > Belittling the return of Mubaraks state and the military repression is > extremely dangerous. The state of Mubarak, which it is true did not > disappear from the scene since the beginning of the revolution, returns > today with its full powers, free of internal crises, and with the support > of wide sections of the masses. It is this situation which forces us to go > onto the attack, immediately against this state, and its symbols, which > will not wait long before launching attacks on all who call for the > demands > of the revolution. > > Our principled position may result in our temporary isolation in the midst > of the masses. Our message will not generally find a wide reception in the > masses, despite all the efforts we will expend in work and activity in the > workplaces, the university campuses and the local neighbourhoods. This > isolation had already begun in reality before 30 June, as a result of our > principled position against the military, the old regime and the > Brotherhood. But we must not allow ourselves to give into any degree of > frustration, for as long as contradictions continue in the consciousness > and capacity of the masses to organise themselves, the mass movement will > remain a vehicle which can be affected by many intersecting factors, which > force it to proceed along winding roads and not constantly along a > straight > and rising path. The real content of the repressive regime now in power > will be revealed before the eyes of the masses who will gradually will > begin the struggle against it. > > This does not mean complete isolation and separation from the masses, as > there are tens of thousands of revolutionary youths who fought fiercely > against military rule in the waves of the Egyptian revolution, and who > completed the struggle against Morsis regime. Their memories are still > rooted in revolutionary principles, they have fewer contradictions in > their > consciousness, and they are not betting on the institutions of the state, > particularly not on the military, the backbone of the counter-revolution. > These will find the principled position of the Revolutionary Socialists > attractive, in the light of the wholesale drift of the political forces to > the side of the military and the new government it has appointed. From > this > angle, the situation is better than it was after February 11 2011, when > for > months, only the Revolutionary Socialists and few individual activists > would speak out against the Military Council. > > In the weeks and months to come, we have the opportunity to attract and > win > some of these revolutionaries to strengthen our ranks, in order play a > more > vibrant and stable role in the coming waves of the revolution. But at the > same time we also want to integrate workers and the poor who made the > revolution and participated in the last wave of 30 June for the goals of > the revolution which were never realised. Here it is of the utmost > importance to revive the project of the Revolutionary Front with > principled > parties which do not drift into the arms of the state and the new > government, neither are they allied with the Islamists against the state > and which adopt a programme of the demands of the revolution and its > goals. > > 15 August 2013 > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] > > > > ------------------------------------ > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Unsubscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Subscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Digest: <mailto:[email protected]> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Help: <mailto:[email protected]?subject=laamn> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Post: <mailto:[email protected]> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Yahoo! 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