*Oh Scot* * * *Your ignorance is showing or is it that the pole from the caber toss hit you in the head too many times at the Highland games... [?]* * * *Rojo Rojito* * * *Cort*
On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 2:56 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Who, pray tell, is Shrooms, much less who is this person (or organization) > working for? > > And why does this sound like I'm reading something on the PNAC site? > > Scott > > "Therefore strategies for dealing with, and opposing, the Muslim > Brotherhood should be fundamentally different from our approach to > militant-Jihadi groups" > > > > *Remembering Sabra and Shatila massacre 16-18 September 1982 > > #Lebanon<http://twitter.com/search?q=%23Lebanon> > > * > > > > > > > http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/09/12/syria-the-rise-of-al-qaeda-in-syria-separating-fact-from-mythology/ > > > > ← SYRIA/PALESTINE: Palestinians and the Syrian Revolution: Lessons from > > the > > fight against > > fascism< > http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/09/12/syriapalestine-palestinians-and-the-syrian-revolution-lessons-from-the-fight-against-fascism/ > > > > →< > http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/uk-anti-fascist-network-statement-on-saturday-7th-september-edl-demonstration/ > > > > SYRIA: The Rise of Al Qaeda in Syria: Separating Fact from Mythology > > > > SEP > > 12< > http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/09/12/syria-the-rise-of-al-qaeda-in-syria-separating-fact-from-mythology/ > > > > > > Posted by tahriricn <http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/author/tahriricn/> > > > > By Leila Shrooms for Tahrir-ICN[image: > > ED-AR204_obagy_D_20130830164816]< > http://tahriricn.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/ed-ar204_obagy_d_20130830164816.jpg > > > > > > One of the most worrying developments during the trajectory of Syria’s > > revolution has been the rise of militant Jihadi groups. The danger that > > the > > increasing strength of such groups poses to both Syria and the region > > should not be underestimated. Yet a lot of misunderstandings exist about > > the nature and dominance of such groups which this article attempts to > > address. Only when fact is separated from mythology are we able to move > > forward collectively towards a strategy that addresses the threat of > > counter-revolutionary forces and have a better understanding of who is > > working for the original goals of the revolution so that they can be > given > > the solidarity they deserve. > > > > *Al Qaeda ideology* > > Al Qaeda or militant Jihadi groups[1] have an internationalist > perspective > > and want to establish a global Islamic caliphate based on a strict > > interpretation of Sharia law. The ideology of Al Qaeda groups is closely > > related to Salafi/Wahabi ideology (the totalitarian political doctrine > > which is practiced in Saudi Arabia). Whilst Salafism is an extremely > > repressive, puritanical ideology which follows a literal interpretation > of > > the Quran, it is important to note that not all Salafists believe in > > violent means to establish their goals and that some Salafists are > > prepared > > to work within a democratic system. By contrast, militant Jihadi groups > > reject the concept of democracy holding that their interpretation of > Islam > > is mandated by God. They believe that it is a religious duty to defend > the > > Muslim community against enemies of Islam and are prepared to die as > > martyrs for that cause. They regard anyone who does not subscribe to > their > > ideology (including liberal Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims) as > > heretics/Kafir. Some, known as Takfiris, believe that they have the right > > to kill heretics. Al Qaeda affiliated groups in the region include > > Egyptian > > Islamic Jihad, Al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula in Yemen and Saudi > > Arabia, > > Jund Ansar Allah in Palestine, Fatah Al Islam in Lebanon and Al Qaeda in > > the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria and Morocco. [2]These groups do not have a > > broad popular support base, primarily due to their use of terrorist means > > targeting civilians in countries in which they operate and their > following > > of an interpretation of Islam which is alien to almost everyone. > > > > *Mainstream political Islam* > > It is important not to confuse militant Jihadis with mainstream political > > Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Whilst the Muslim > > Brotherhood is undoubtably conservative and reactionary, they have broad > > based popular support across the Middle East and North Africa and have > won > > democratic elections in Palestine, Tunisia and Egypt. They gained > > prominence during the Islamic revival of the 1970s, as a direct response > > to > > western imperialism. They work to reinstate Islamic laws and believe in > > the > > concept of Islamic unity and the return of the caliphate abolished by > > Ataturk in 1924 although they primarily struggle on the national level. > > They advocate that political Islam is compatible with the establishment > of > > a modern, democratic, multi-party state that respects human rights, > > including the rights of religious minorities.[3] Pursuing social justice > > and particularly reducing the gap between rich and poor has been a key > > tenet of their ideology and to this end they established a vast network > of > > social services which gained them the support of the urban and rural > > poor.[4] Although they have been known to use violent means to achieve > > their goals, the Muslim Brotherhood officially rejects the use of > > violence.[5] > > > > The experience of countries that have been governed by the Muslim > > Brotherhood show a wide gap between their rhetoric and reality. Highly > > authoritarian and repressive regimes have been established where they > have > > come to power. Yet we should not regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a > > violent > > terrorist organization or overlook the support the organization has > > amongst > > broad sections of a religiously conservative population. Therefore > > strategies for dealing with, and opposing, the Muslim Brotherhood should > > be > > fundamentally different from our approach to militant-Jihadi groups. The > > Muslim Brotherhood is prominent in the Syrian National Coalition (the > > bourgeois opposition in exile which is backed by the West, Gulf States > and > > Turkey and influenced by foreign agendas). The Syrian National Coalition > > also includes secular and leftist opposition groups (including Christian > > and Kurdish parties), the Free Syrian Army, grass-roots opposition groups > > and independents. It advocates establishing a civil, democratic Syria.[6] > > > > Between the ‘moderate’ political Islamists and Al Qaeda there exists a > > broad spectrum of other Salafist groups which subscribe to puritanical > > versions of Islam some of which are militant. They include Al Nour party > > in > > Egypt, Islamic Jihad and Jaysh al Islam in Palestine, and Ansar Al Islam > > and Ahrar Al Sham in Syria. Further, although the overwhelming majority > of > > people in the region are Muslim, many are also secularists, including the > > vast majority of Syria’s grassroots civil opposition. Socialist and > > anti-authoritarian/anarchist currents also exist within Islam with roots > > that can be traced back to the ninth century.[7] > > > > *Al Qaeda groups in Syria* > > The two Al Qaeda affiliated groups operating in Syria are Jabhat Al Nusra > > (Al Nusra Front – JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). > > Both > > can be traced back to groups established to fight against the American > > occupation of Iraq and grew in strength due to the sponsorship of the > > Syrian government. This is important to note because whilst the origins > of > > Al Qaeda globally go back to Afghanistan, where they were supported by > the > > CIA to fight against the Soviets in the 70s and 80s, this is not the > > experience of Al Qaeda groups operating in Syria or Iraq today which > fight > > against US imperialism, Zionism and all western influence. > > > > Some of JAN’s members are Syrians that returned from fighting in Iraq > > when > > the uprising broke out in 2011, but many foreigners also joined their > > ranks. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed that > > JAN was its branch in Syria. However, JAN’s leader, Abu Mohammed Al > > Golani, > > has rejected this claim whilst simultaneously pledging allegiance to Al > > Qaeda globally. ISIS is a part of the Al Qaeda network and the majority > of > > its members are foreigners. Whilst exact numbers are not known it is > > estimated that together JAN and ISIS have around10,000 members, less than > > 10 per cent of estimated armed opposition fighters.[8] Both aim to > > overthrow the government of Bashar Al Assad, establish and Islamic > > caliphate and a strict interpretation of Islamic law, are opposed to > > Western intervention and are opposed to the US and Israel. > > > > The numbers of JAN and ISIS are relatively small, yet they have a > > disproportionate strength compared to other armed opposition groups. They > > have battle-experience from Iraq and have received a lot of military > > support from Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which > > aim > > to destabilize Syria through sectarian conflict in order to prevent a > > popular revolution from succeeding. By contrast other armed groups are > > still mainly dependent on light weapons and what they can seize from > > Syrian > > army bases they have captured. JAN and ISIS are concentrated in the north > > of the country, along the Turkish border in Aleppo and Idlib > governorates, > > in Al Raqqa governorate, and in the east in Deir Al Zour governorate > along > > the border with Iraq. They have attempted to set up Islamic emirates in > > areas under their control, established Sharia courts and placed > > restrictions on the rights of women and minorities. > > > > Both groups have been responsible for carrying out attacks against > > civilians, including suicide bombings, the arrest of opposition > activists, > > the torture and extrajudicial killing of Syrian army soldiers they have > > captured, and sectarian killings. Most recently they have been > responsible > > for atrocities carried out against the Kurdish population, causing over > > 20,000 Kurds to flee to Iraq in August. The extremism and violence > > practiced by such groups is an increasing trend and major cause for > > concern. Yet, it must be borne in mind that the overwhelming majority of > > the estimated 120,000 deaths and vast majority of cases of torture and > > brutality in Syria over the past 2.5 years have been carried out by the > > Syrian regime.[9] > > > > Al Qaeda affiliated groups have the potential to cause chaos and violence > > in Syria and the region for many years to come. However, their ability to > > impose their vision on a future Syria is grossly over-estimated. They are > > small in number, they do not have a popular support base, and the > majority > > of their ranks are foreigners. After 10 years of causing turmoil in Iraq, > > including the massacre of thousands of civilians, they did not manage to > > win the support of the local population or create an Islamic state. > > According to a Syrian rebel from a secular brigade in Salamiyah; “Al > > Qaida > > is the one thing that will unite Syrian people after the revolution, > > because all of the Syrians will want them out – those who are now with > > the > > regime and those who are against the regime. Nobody likes these people … > > After the regime falls there will have to be a new military formation to > > confront these radical movements.”[10] > > > > *Relationship of militant Jihadi groups to the Free Syrian Army (FSA)* > > The Free Syrian Army is the main, and by far the largest, armed > opposition > > group in Syria. It’s leadership is linked to the SNC. The FSA is > > comprised > > of officers and soldiers that have defected from the regime as well as > > anti-regime elements of the civilian population. It is committed to the > > overthrow of Assad and the establishment of a plural, civil, democratic > > Syria. The FSA is comprised of many battalions. The leader of the FSA, > > Salmin Idriss has stated he is committed to secularism, yet some > > battalions > > are Islamist (mainly Muslim Brotherhood affiliated), some are secular and > > some are comprised of Christians, Kurds and Alawites. There are even > women > > only brigades. > > > > Whilst serious human rights abuses have been carried out by elements of > > the > > FSA, these appear to be mainly isolated incidents rather than wide-spread > > and systematic attacks on civilians and civilian areas. Human Rights > Watch > > has noted that “many of the antigovernment groups reported to be > > carrying > > out abuses do not appear to belong to an organized command structure or > to > > be following Syrian National Council orders”.[11] When such incidents > > have > > come to light the SNC and FSA have condemned them and called for the > > arrest > > and prosecution of those responsible, something that has never been seen > > from the Assad regime.[12] The FSA is generally held in high regard by > the > > civilian population and seen as protector and defender of the people.[13] > > > > ISIS and JAN operate outside of the FSA chain of command and reject the > > leadership of the SNC. Yet, due to their advanced military capacity and > > military successes against the Assad regime, some FSA battalions have > > cooperated with them. The majority refuse to do so, and as militant > Jihadi > > groups have grown in strength and carried out increasing attacks on > > civilians, particularly sectarian violence, the FSA leadership has sought > > to distance themselves and condemned their actions.[14] The FSA has also > > been engaged in fierce battles with JAN and ISIS (as was seen recently in > > Bustan Al Qasr) and militant Jihadi groups have expelled FSA battalions > > from some areas under their control and even assassinated FSA > leaders.[15] > > It is also interesting to note, that increasingly JAN and ISIS have > > refused > > to fight against the government on front lines and instead focused on > > consolidating their power in areas under their control.[16] This is a > > clear > > testimony that they are not working for the goals of the revolution but > > rather to further their own extremist religious agenda. > > > > There are other battalions that operate outside of the FSA chain of > > command > > and are openly critical of the SNC and FSA leadership abroad.[17] These > > include both secularists and Islamists. One of the largest Islamist > > coalitions is The Syrian Islamic Front, comprised mainly of Salafist > > battalions such as Ahrar Al Sham. Their aim is to establish an Islamic > > state governed by Sharia Law although they are Syrian nationalists and > not > > working for a global caliphate or linked to Al Qaeda.[18] They reject > > western notions of democracy.[19] > > > > *Syrian government strategy towards militant Jihadis* > > When the peaceful popular uprising began in Syria in early 2011, the > > Syrian > > government falsely claimed it was fighting Sunni Islamic militant > > terrorists. This was an attempt to discredit the legitimate demands of > the > > Syrian people for freedom, social justice and dignity and justify its > > terrifying crackdown. As we have seen, to some extent it was to turn into > > a > > self-fulfilling prophecy. The government sent Shabiha (armed Alawite > > militias) to arrest and shoot protesters and terrorize the civilian > > population, thereby introducing sectarianism into the uprising, despite > > minority groups such as Alawite, Christians and Kurds playing an active > > role in the opposition. In the first five months alone, when protests > were > > still peaceful, the UN estimates that hundreds of people were killed.[20] > > Many more were imprisoned and brutally tortured. Assad also released a > > large number of militant Jihadi prisoners from jail in the early days of > > the revolution.[21] The Assad regime has made deals with Jabhat Al Nusra, > > such as paying them 150 million Syrian Lira [$1.15 million] monthly to > > keep > > oil flowing through two major pipelines in Banias and Latakia.[22] It is > > also clear that the vast majority of attacks carried out by the regime > > have > > not been on JAN or ISIS strongholds but rather in areas where secular or > > ‘moderate’ Islamist brigades are concentrated such as Homs, Deraa and > > FSA > > controlled parts of Aleppo. All these factors point to a concerted > > strategy > > by the Syrian regime to allow the uprising to be taken over by Islamic > > extremism and sectarianism which would allow the regime to gain more > > popular support. > > > > *Opposition to militant-Jihadism in Syria* > > Whilst the focus of this article has been armed groups operating in > Syria, > > it is important to note that the grass roots civilian resistance in Syria > > remains dynamic and strong and stands against both the Assad regime and > > counter-revolutionary militant Jihadi groups (and is often highly > critical > > of the SNC leadership in exile). The overwhelming majority of the civil > > resistance movements are secular, none-affiliated to traditional > political > > ideologies and motivated by desires for freedom, social justice and > > dignity. Major grass roots opposition groupings such as the Local > > Coordination Committees have released statements condemning the actions > of > > JAN and ISIS and have stressed that they are committed to a “civil, > > democratic and pluralist state” that respects the rights of all citizens > > regardless of religious or ethnic identity.[23] > > > > There have been increasing protests against JAN and ISIS particularly in > > areas where they are dominant, rejecting their authoritarian practices > and > > condemning their sectarian ideology and abuses.[24] For example, in Al > > Raqqa, the first provincial capital to be liberated from the regime, > > militant Jihadi groups took over the civilian local council. Where they > > tried to put up the black Jihadi flag, local activists pulled it down and > > replaced it with the revolutionary flag. ISIS also tried to impose > fasting > > on the population during the month of Ramadan and have arrested many > > civilians from the city. The people of Al Raqqa have been holding > > continuous protests against ISIS and the Islamic court they established, > > calling on them to leave.[25] Likewise protesters in Idlib and Aleppo > have > > held demonstrations against the Sharia Committee and extremist/Takfiri > > killings.[26] As sectarianism has increased, there have been protests > > calling for national unity in which different religious and ethnic groups > > have participated.[27] On 1 August in Aleppo a joint protest was held by > > Arabs and Kurds in which hundreds took part, condemning recent atrocities > > carried out against the Kurdish population by militant Jihadi groups.[28] > > > > Civil society organizations such as Nabd have been established to promote > > co-existence and an end to sectarianism.[29] Likewise, non-violent > > organizations such as the Freedom Days coalition, which comprises a large > > number of groups, promote peaceful struggle and coexistence across ethnic > > and religious lines.[30] In recent days a campaign called Goodbye Da3esh > > has been established to oppose the wide-spread arrests of civilians, > > including opposition activists, carried out by ISIS.[31] > > > > Such initiatives and struggles need to be highlighted and supported. It > is > > too easy to adopt the simplistic binary narrative promoted by states and > > blanket thinkers that the choice the Syrian people face is between a > > secular fascist dictatorship or Al Qaeda. As Spanish revolutionaries in > > the > > 1930s fought on two fronts against both the fascists and the communists, > > Syrian revolutionaries have to fight against both the Assad regime and > > counter-revolutionary militant Jihadi groups. It is clear that militant > > Jihadism is gaining a foothold in Syria and that as the struggle > continues > > without resolution they will continue to grow in strength. The answer is > > not to support a regime that holds responsibility for creating this > > problem > > in the first place. The answer is to stand in solidarity with those who > > struggle against it, in the hope that their voices will not be lost for > > ever. > > > > *Endnotes:* > > > > 1 I emphasis the word militant because the concept of Jihad is often > > misunderstood. Jihad is a religious duty for Muslims and means > > “struggle”. > > This can be interpreted as a struggle against oppression or the internal > > struggles of ones own personal life. In the contemporary use Jihad(i) > > refers to those who find it a religious obligation to defend Muslim land > > against the Kafir (non believer). > > > > 2 For some reports on militant Jihadi groups in the region see, > > International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Gaza, (2011), > > > http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.ashx > , > > < > http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.ashx,%C2%A0 > >Institute > > for the Study of War, Jihad in Syria, (2012), > > > http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf > , > > Omayma Abdel-Latif, ‘Cedar Jihadis’[Lebanon] Al Ahram, > > http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/895/re2.htm > > > > 3 For the pledge and charter of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (2012) see: > > http://www.memri.org/report/en/print6250.htm > > > > 4 For an excellent introduction to the Islamic revival (from an Arab > > feminist perspective) see: Leila Ahmed, A Quiet Revolution: The Veil’s > > Resurgence, from the Middle East to America, (2011) > > > > 5 See ‘A Declaration to the People’ (2011) > > http://asharqalarabi.org.uk/english/at-3.htm & ‘The pledge and charter > > of > > the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’ (2012) > > http://www.memri.org/report/en/print6250.htm > > > > 6 See ‘Syrian Coalition Principles’, > > > http://www.etilaf.org/en/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=35&Itemid=584 > > > > 7 See for example, Mohammed Jean Veneuse, Anarca Islam, (2009) > > http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/07/05/anarca-islam/ and David Baker, > > Ninth-Century Muslim Anarchists, (2011) > > > http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2012/12/17/ninth-century-muslim-anarchists/ > > > > 8 See Aljazeera ‘Interactive: Mapping Syria’s rebellion’, > > > http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/07/20137188552345899.html > . > > Whilst these figures vary according to reports from usually from > > 6,000-10,000, Syrian grass-roots opposition groups repeatedly affirm that > > militant Jihadi groups have a small presence amongst opposition armed > > groups. For example see ‘Our Revolution: A popular revolution for > > freedom, > > equality and social justice and against every kind of absolutism’, > > (August > > 2013) > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/08/04/our-revolution-a-popular-revolution-for-freedom-equality-and-social-justice-and-against-every-kind-of-absolutism/ > > > > 9 See for example: Amnesty International, ‘Annual Report 2013: Syria’ > > (2013) http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/syria/report-2013 Human Rights > > Watch ‘Syria: Government Likely Culprit in Chemical Attack’, > > (September > > 2013) > > > http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/10/syria-government-likely-culprit-chemical-attack > > and > > The Revolting Syrian ‘Does this not outrage you?’ > > > http://www.therevoltingsyrian.com/post/50495350134/does-this-not-outrage-you > > [WARNING: > > the videos in the last link are extremely graphic] > > > > 10 Cited in Syria Deeply, ‘The State of a Secular Rebel Fighting > > Force’, > > (September 2013) > > > http://beta.syriadeeply.org/2013/09/state-secular-rebel-fighting-force/#.UjF5pmQ-u2p > > > > 11 Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing > > Abuses’, > > (March 2012) > > > http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/20/syria-armed-opposition-groups-committing-abuses > > > > 12 See for example: ‘Statement by the General Staff of the Free Syrian > > Army’ (May 2013) > > > https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=482097828528873&set=a.458923474179642.1073741828.458106567594666&type=1 > > and > > ‘Joint Statement from the FSA and Kurdish Front’ (July 2013) > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/07/22/translation-of-the-joint-statement-from-the-fsa-and-the-kurdish-front/ > > > > 13 This is evident in chants of support for the FSA seen at weekly > > protests > > across Syria and also based on my own discussion with Syrian refugees in > > camps across Lebanon and Jordan. > > > > 14 ‘Joint Statement from the FSA and Kurdish Front’ (July 2013) > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/07/22/translation-of-the-joint-statement-from-the-fsa-and-the-kurdish-front/ > > > > 15 Martin Chulov, ‘Free Syrian Army clashes with jihadists in wake of > > commander’s assassination’, (July 2013) > > > http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/14/free-syrian-army-jihadists-clashes-aleppo > > & > > Syria Freedom Forever, ‘Syria: the Kurdish question, the Islamists and > > the > > FSA’, (July 2013) > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/07/22/syria-the-kurdish-question-the-islamists-and-the-fsa/ > > > > 16 Syrian Freedom Forever, ‘You can jail a revolutionary but you can’t > > jail > > the revolution’, (August 2013) > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/08/24/you-can-jail-revolutionaries-but-you-cannot-kill-the-revolution-the-syrian-people-will-not-kneel/ > > > > 17 For an overview of Syria’s armed opposition see: > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_armed_groups_in_the_Syrian_civil_war > > > > 18 See the Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front (2013) > > > http://abujamajem.wordpress.com/2013/01/29/the-charter-of-the-syrian-islamic-front/ > > > > 19 Aron Lund, ‘Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian > > Islamic > > Front’, (2012) http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf > > > > 20 United Nations, ‘Syria: Security Council condemns rights abuses and > > use > > of force against civilians’, (August 2011) > > http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=39229&cr1=#.UjHzH2Q-u2p > > > > 21 ‘Bashar released Al Qaeda prisoners to cover his crimes’, Al Ahram, > > (March 2013) > > > http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/66953/World/Region/Bashar-released-AlQaeda-prisoners-to-cover-his-cri.aspx > > & > > Misbah Al Ali, ‘Rival Islamists loom large over Syria’, The Daily Star > > (March 2013) > > > http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Mar-19/210649-rival-islamists-loom-large-over-syria.ashx#axzz2egSa7ZD9 > > > > 22 Syrian Freedom Forever, ‘Syria or elsewhere, there are no pure > > revolutions, just revolutions,’ > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/06/07/syriaor-elsewhere-there-are-no-pure-revolutions-just-revolutions/ > > also > > Yasser Munif ‘The revolution and the war’, > > http://socialistworker.org/2013/09/11/the-revolution-and-the-war. The > > conversion is based on exchange rate of 11 September 2013. > > > > 23 LCC statement (April 2013) > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/04/11/condemnation-of-zawahris-statements-regarding-his-intervention-in-the-internal-affairs-of-syria/ > > > > 24 See, Syrian Freedom Forever, ‘Self Organization of the popular > > struggles > > in Syria against the regime and Islamist groups? Yes, it exists!’ > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/09/08/self-organization-of-the-popular-struggles-in-syria-against-the-regime-and-islamist-groups-yes-it-exists/ > > and > > Bassam Haddad, ‘The Growing Challenge to the Syrian regime and the > > Syrian > > Uprising’, Jadaliyya, (June 2013) > > > http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12556/the-growing-challenge-to-the-syrian-regime-and-the > > > > 25 For example see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9hOsyH7zasw&sns=em > > > > 26 For example see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8edfgXT61A (Idlib) > and > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5WqJ6Y2eQ8 (Aleppo) > > > > 27 For example see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaDFddXsJ3w (English > > subtitles) > > > > 28 See, Syrian Freedom Forever, ‘Self Organization of the popular > > struggles > > in Syria against the regime and Islamist groups? Yes, it exists!’ > > > http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/09/08/self-organization-of-the-popular-struggles-in-syria-against-the-regime-and-islamist-groups-yes-it-exists/ > > > > 29 See their facebook page here: > > > https://www.facebook.com/pages/Nabd-Gathering-for-Syrian-Civil-Youth/361274777254185 > > > > 30 See their facebook page here: > > https://en-gb.facebook.com/Freedom.Days.Syria > > > > 31 See their facebook page here: https://www.facebook.com/goodbyeda3esh > > > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:[email protected]?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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