Credevate che il problema del bioterrorismo fosse ormai lontano? vi
sentivate sicuri dopo che in iraq non sono state trovate armi di
distruzione di massa? beh, e' tempo di ricredersi....
Un editoriale di science, di fronte al crollo di popolarità di Bush, e
al declinante sostegno alla guerra al terrorismo, ritorna a battere la
lingua sul tamburo. Non sia mai che si pensi che si possano spendere i
soldi in sanità piuttosto che in lettere alla'antrace....
m
Science 31 March 2006:
Vol. 311. no. 5769, p. 1835
DOI: 10.1126/science.1127725
Editorial
In Search of Biosecurity
David A. Relman1, Eileen Choffnes2, Stanley M. Lemon3
The changing nature of biological threats, both natural and human-made,
has made these challenging and unsettling times. As progress in life
sciences research accelerates, it expands the scope of potential
biological weapons, whose use for political purposes seems increasingly
likely in a post-9/11 world. A recent report from the U.S. National
Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Globalization, Biosecurity,
and the Future of the Life Sciences
(http://fermat.nap.edu/books/0309100321/html),* concludes that the
breadth of potential biological threats is far wider than is commonly
appreciated and will continue to expand in the future.
In the face of these challenges, the United States has made efforts to
control, contain, and regulate research that involves certain biological
agents and toxins that pose a special threat to public health and
safety: the so-called "select agents." Proposals by several federal
agencies call for more stringent measures, such as strict interpretation
of the "deemed export" rule. These efforts are intended to limit the
risk of research by restricting the involvement of foreign nationals and
the communication of scientific information. However, they are
impractical, counterproductive, and even dangerous.
Research on select agents now requires rigorous security safeguards,
including background checks of personnel by the Department of Justice,
restricted access to laboratories, and even armed guards at some
institutions. Regardless of their merits, such measures segregate
scientists from their peers and complicate efforts to recruit the best
and brightest to important research. More troublesome is the mandate to
extend such rules to collaborating labs abroad that receive U.S. federal
funds. In such foreign settings, the select agents that these rules seek
to control may be endemic and otherwise readily available, making these
measures impractical and politically unpalatable. The result is an
unfortunate loss of foreign collaboration in critically needed
surveillance of newly emerging infectious diseases.
Of even greater concern are potential constraints on the flow of
scientific information stemming from fundamental research on dangerous
pathogens. In a world concerned with the threat of terrorism, it is
understandable that politicians and their constituents might feel safer
if pathogens were locked up, tight regulations imposed on research, and
strict controls placed on the dissemination of research results.
Unfortunately, such measures won't reduce risks and may cause a false
illusion of security. The risk of malevolent dual use goes far beyond
infectious agents, let alone a select subset, and extends into virtually
every aspect of the life sciences. Moreover, U.S. regulations will have
no effect on a large and increasingly successful global life science
enterprise. Stricter regulations will simply make it more difficult to
exploit the benefits of the life sciences, threaten the vitality of
biodefense research, and ultimately weaken our national security.
Society has gained from the open exchange of scientific advances, and
this tradition should not be lost.
In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration sought to restrict
scientific communication in some fields. In the face of subsequent
controversy, Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189
(NSDD-89). The directive states that "no restrictions may be placed upon
the conduct or reporting of fundamental research that has not received
national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S.
statutes." Where restriction is deemed necessary in the interest of
national security, the proper control mechanism is classification.
Although NSDD-189 remains in effect today, it is now being eroded by
pervasive efforts to promote a class of information called "sensitive
but unclassified."
The societal concerns that are driving these changes cannot be ignored.
The risk that knowledge emerging from life sciences research could be
misused, either intentionally or otherwise, needs responsible attention.
Some life scientists argue that the benefits of dual-use research always
outweigh the risks; others don't stop to consider the issue. Neither
position is in the public interest. The scientific community needs to
show that it can assume greater responsibility for research that
presents potential security concerns. Those working in the life sciences
must gain a greater awareness of the potential threats and learn to
recognize, discourage, and report misuse or irresponsible behavior.
Unless we adopt a shared culture of awareness and responsibility, we
will face increasing restrictions on research and stricter controls on
information. In this undesirable scenario, we will have gained little
protection but done great harm to the research enterprise and threatened
scientific progress.
10.1126/science.1127725
David A. Relman is associate professor of Microbiology and Immunology
and of Medicine at Stanford University, Stanford, CA. His research
interests include human microbial ecology and pathogen biology.
Eileen Choffnes is director of the Forum on Microbial Threats at the
U.S. Institute of Medicine, Washington, DC.
Stanley M. Lemon is director of the Institute for Human Infections and
Immunity at the University of Texas, Galveston, TX, and chair of the
Forum on Microbial Threats at the U.S. Institute of Medicine,
Washington, DC.
*The authors participated in the U.S. National Research
Council/Institute of Medicine study described here.
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