There is not much in the way of support for Syria; as you noted, only more regulation/export controls, the act codifies GHRAVITY in §411, and expounds on the principles more deeply on §703(b)(2)(D) and §704.
On Mon, Jul 30, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Andrew Lewis <[email protected]> wrote: > Looking at the whole document revels that Syria is included, but only to > add more sanctions. Does anyone on list know of any movement to add > exceptions similar to the ones for Iran that will allow anti-censorship > technologies or aid to go towards Syria? > > Or am I mistaken and those roadblocks have been already overcome? I am > genuinely not up to date on what the sanctions on Syria entail at this > point in time. > > -Andrew > > > On Jul 30, 2012, at 10:46 PM, Collin Anderson wrote: > > Libtech, > > Foreign Policy released a copy of the compromise version of the > upcoming Johnson/Ros-Lehtinen sanctions bill; expected to be legislatively > passed in the next week. In true Congressional form, quite a portion of the > mandates involve 'Internet Freedom' agenda items -- namely export > regulation on sensitive technology, expanding content availability, > International Broadcasting, and satellite jamming. > * > * > *This is important.* The State and Treasury Department will be tasked > with addressing issues of 'dual use technologies' and digital security. > While I appreciate the addition of §414(7)(B) for clarifying sanctions > regulations, Congress has a part to play in ensuring clarity on the > political boundaries of such exports. > > [PDF] > http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/120730_MRW12361.pdf > > *(Introduction)* > > It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling Iran to abandon >> efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and other threatening >> activities can be effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy >> ... [a]mong the economic measures to be taken are— >> > (4) a focus on countering Iran’s efforts to evade sanctions, including— > > (A) the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and satellite service >> providers, in and outside of Iran, to ensure that such providers are not >> participating in or facilitating, directly or indirectly, the evasion of >> the sanctions regime with respect to Iran or violations of the human rights >> of the people of Iran; > > > *SEC. 412. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR PURPOSES OF > PROCUREMENT BAN UNDER COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND > DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010. * > > >> The Secretary of State shall— > > > (1) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, >> issue guidelines to further describe the technologies that may be >> considered ‘‘sensitive technology’’ for purposes of section 106 of the >> Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 >> (22 U.S.C. 8515), with special attention to new forms of sophisticated >> jamming, monitoring, and surveillance technology relating to mobile >> telecommunications and the Internet, and publish those guidelines in the >> Federal Register; > > (2) determine the types of technologies that enable any indigenous >> capabilities that Iran has to disrupt and monitor information and >> communications in that country, and consider adding descriptions of those >> items to the guidelines; and > > (3) periodically review, but in no case less than once each year, the >> guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines on the basis of >> technological developments and new information regarding transfers of >> technologies to Iran and the development of Iran’s indigenous capabilities >> to disrupt and monitor information and communications in Iran. > > > *SEC. 414. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM AND ACCESS > TO INFORMATION IN IRAN. * > > Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the >> Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and >> the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the >> appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy to— > > (1) assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and share information >> freely and safely via the Internet, including in Farsi and regional >> languages; > > (2) support the development of counter-censorship technologies that enable >> the citizens of Iran to undertake Internet activities without >> interference from the Government of Iran; > > (3) increase the capabilities and availability of secure mobile and other >> communications through connective technology among human rights and >> democracy activists in Iran; > > (4) provide resources for digital safety training for media and academic >> and civil society organizations in Iran; > > (5) provide accurate and substantive Internet content in local languages >> in Iran; > > (6) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable human rights >> advocates seeking to organize, share information, and support human >> rights in Iran; > > (7) expand surrogate radio, television, live stream, and social network >> communications inside Iran, including— > > (A) by expanding Voice of America’s Persian News Network and Radio Free >> Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Farda to provide hourly live news update >> programming and breaking news coverage capability 24 hours a day and 7 days >> a week; and > > (B) by assisting telecommunications and software companies that are >> United States persons to comply with the export licensing requirements of >> the United States for the purpose of expanding such communications inside >> Iran; > > (8) expand activities to safely assist and train human rights, civil >> society, and democracy activists in Iran to operate effectively and >> securely; > > (9) identify and utilize all available resources to overcome attempts by >> the Government of Iran to jam or otherwise deny international satellite >> broadcasting signals; > > (10) expand worldwide United States embassy and consulate programming for >> and outreach to Iranian dissident communities; > > (11) expand access to proxy servers for democacy activists in Iran; and > > (12) discourage telecommunications and software companies from >> facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of Iran. > > > Cordially, > Collin > > -- > *Collin David Anderson* > averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. > > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > [email protected] > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech > > > -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
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