OKAY! I just came back from a long, incredibly intense dinner with Jacob, Ian Goldberg and a few other people. Believe it or not, we have actually managed to agree on a conversation model that both answers the concerns of people like Jacob while remaining easy to use and accessible! Hard to believe, but we actually came to it.
*A non-technical, one paragraph summary: *There will be no logins. Instead, you will enter a chat room just like the current Cryptocat. Inside the room, you can either have a group conversation (via mpOTR) or start private conversations with individual members (via OTR.) Clicking on each chat member opens a separate tab in which a conversation may be maintained. As I hope you'll agree, this model is indeed simple, and yet the inner workings are actually very interesting, innovative and promise some cool security properties. Jacob and I are in the process of writing a formal description that we hope to post soon. Issues such as browser plugins/web versions were comparatively barely discussed. But this is still an excellent issue to be resolved. A lot of progress was made today! I also want to say that I strongly appreciate the conversation being had here. My personal view is that browser plugins should definitely be the main form of delivery for Cryptocat 2. I believe the debate is still open on whether a "demonstration" web version should exist. If it does, however, I must stress that it will be very minimal, and chock-full of blaring, inescapable warnings everywhere. NK On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 10:19 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Hey guys, > > I appreciate the importance and depth of this discussion. But I also wish > to underscore that most of the people who are at risk are not using any > tools whether they be CrytoCat, PGP, GChat or others for the simple reason > that they either cannot figure them out, or don't have time to figure them > out, or both. And I am talking about people at risk in many different > nations. > > No doubt the functional security of tools is an indispensable, essential > concern. Ignoring any vulnerabilities is dangerous, indeed. But the > usability of the same tools and making them accessible to non-technologists > is just as big a concern, in my view. I know you guys think that many such > users including Western journalists are simply lazy. But many, if not most > of the available tools are simply not intuitive, or not as much as most > technologists who already know how to use them seem to think. > > How many people on this list have spent time asking non-technologists and > other users who have tried, but have since given up even trying to use > tools like PGP? Or have examined how new users interact with such tools? I > have a great deal of respect for this community. But to be honest it seems > to me that neither the technologists nor the donors have spent much time > asking such questions. > > If a novice user make a mistake in PGP, for example, it's over. Options > are not intuitive if you don't already know them. And if you hit the wrong > button, you can end up at a deadend with no guidance how to get back on > track. Trust me. I know. And I am not trashing PGP. I know well and fully > appreciate it's value and I have used it and continue to use it hostile > environments. And I also know that users and only users can make crucial > choices during use for their own security. I get that, too. But most > digital security tools still do not do a good job of laying out, let alone > explaining the options. And I say that with respect for the value of the > tools and options themselves. > > Cryptocat is one of the most user-friendly tools out there, and I think > Nadim deserves credit for the effort. Of course, the vulnerabilities must > be fixed before anyone should use it in a hostile environment. Although the > level of vulnerability might also depend on the nature of the threat in any > particular environment. But I also think we need to spend as much time > making tools accessible as we do making them secure if we are going to > reach the people who really need them. And right now few if any of these > tools are having the reach that we all agree is needed. And that is an > issue largely of usability. > > I think with more constructive collaboration we would achieve both. We > need to. Thanks. > > Best, Frank > > Frank Smyth > Executive Director > Global Journalist Security > [email protected] > Tel. + 1 202 244 0717 > Cell + 1 202 352 1736 > Twitter: @JournoSecurity > Website: www.journalistsecurity.net > PGP Public Key <http://www.journalistsecurity.net/franks-pgp-public-key> > > > Please consider our Earth before printing this email. > > Confidentiality Notice: This email and any files transmitted with it are > confidential. If you have received this email in error, please notify the > sender and delete this message and any copies. If you are not the intended > recipient, you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or > taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is > strictly prohibited. > > > > -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat > From: Moxie Marlinspike <[email protected]> > Date: Mon, August 06, 2012 10:29 pm > To: [email protected] > > > > > On 08/06/2012 06:59 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote: > > Except that with your harm mitigation, you push many potential users > > back to plaintext, where they are guaranteed to be owned. What > > percentage of potential cryptocat users would the plugin version have to > > stop from using the tool for you to accept that there was a place for > > the non-plugin version? > > Let's stop using the word "plaintext," because my understanding is that > none of the chat services we're speaking of transmit data in the clear. > As I see it, there are currently three possible vectors for attack with > "existing" web-based chat services: > > 1) SSL interception. > 2) Server compromise. > 3) Server operator. > > The technology in CryptoCat v1 does not address any of these three > vectors, and all of them remain possible. My position is that it's > actually more susceptible to attack via #1 and #2 than existing > web-based chat solutions. I believe your position is that it improves > on vector #3 by virtue of being not-Facebook. (I'm curious how you > measure #3 in comparison to GChat.) > > If we postulate that CryptoCat does improve vector #3 by virtue of being > not-Facebook, it isn't a result of the technology, but simply that we've > agreed Nadim has a better monitoring/interception track record than > Facebook. If that's something you think is valuable, it actually seems > like it'd potentially be better served by having someone like the EFF or > Riseup host a web-based and SSL-protected chat service, without brining > any additional cryptography confusion into the mix. A trust project, > not a cryptography project. > > Unfortunately for me, I'd rather depend on cryptography than people. > But I believe that CryptoCat is actually well positioned to drive > changes in the ecosystem that will allow them to really improve on those > three vectors in time. I think it's difficult to experiment in public > with security tools, however, and that it's a sage decision to make a > secure solution available (CryptoCat v2) and work on reducing friction > while maintaining security from there. > > - moxie > > -- > http://www.thoughtcrime.org > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > [email protected] > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. 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