I can't even- Frank sent me this article about 15 minutes ago and I answered with the notion that Cryptocat has been a browser-plugin only app for more than a month, and that his article is just incredibly ignorant and frustrating as a result of it ignoring that.
Relevant links: https://blog.crypto.cat/2012/08/moving-to-a-browser-app-model/ https://blog.crypto.cat/2012/09/cryptocat-2-demo-video-posted/ Excuse me while I now go waterboard myself, NK On 9/11/2012 1:07 PM, [email protected] wrote: > Hi everybody, > > Below is my CPJ blog on the Cryptocat debate. It makes some of the same > points that I already made here a few weeks ago. And please know that my > intent is to help work toward a solution in terms of bridging invention > and usability. I know there are different views, and I have already > heard some. Please feel free to respond. (If you wish you may wish to > copy me at [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> to avoid me missing your note > among others.) > > Thank you! Best, Frank > > http://www.cpj.org/security/2012/09/in-cryptocat-lessons-for-technologists-and-journal.php > > > > *In Cryptocat, lessons for technologists and journalists* > > By Frank Smyth/Senior Adviser for Journalist Security > <http://www.cpj.org/blog/author/frank-smyth> > /Alhamdulillah! /Finally, a technologist designed a security tool that > everyone could use. A Lebanese-born, Montreal-based computer scientist, > college student, and activist named Nadim Kobeissi had developed a > cryptography tool, Cryptocat <https://crypto.cat/>, for the Internet > that seemed as easy to use as Facebook Chat but was presumably far more > secure. > Encrypted communications are hardly a new idea. Technologists wary of > government surveillance have been designing free encryption software > since the early 1990s <http://www.pgpi.org/doc/overview/>. Of course, no > tool is completely safe, and much depends on the capabilities of the > eavesdropper. But for decades digital safety tools have been so hard to > use that few human rights defenders and even fewer journalists (my best > guess is one in a 100) employ them. > Activist technologists often complain that journalists and human rights > defenders are either too lazy or foolish to not consistently use digital > safety tools when they are operating in hostile environments. > Journalists and many human rights activists, for their part, complain > that digital safety tools are too difficult or time-consuming to > operate, and, even if one tried to learn them, they often don't work as > expected. > Cryptocat promised > <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/crypto-cat-encryption-for-all/all> > to finally bridge these two distinct cultures. Kobeissi was profiled > <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/nyregion/nadim-kobeissi-creator-of-a-secure-chat-program-has-freedom-in-mind.html> > in /The New York Times/; /Forbes/ > <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/07/19/5-essential-privacy-tools-for-the-next-crypto-war/> > and especially /Wired/ > <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/crypto-cat-encryption-for-all/all> > each praised the tool. But Cryptocat's sheen faded fast. Within three > months of winning a prize associated with /The Wall Street Journal/ > <http://datatransparency.wsj.com/>, Cryptocat ended up like a cat caught > in storm--wet, dirty, and a little worse for wear. Analyst Christopher > Soghoian--who wrote a /Times/ op-ed last fall > <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/opinion/without-computer-security-sources-secrets-arent-safe-with-journalists.html> > saying that journalists must learn digital safety skills to protect > sources--blogged that Cryptocat had far too many structural flaws > <http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2012/07/tech-journalists-stop-hyping-unproven.html?utm_source=Contextly&utm_medium=RelatedLinks&utm_campaign=AroundWeb> > for safe use in a repressive environment. > An expert writing in /Wired/ agreed. Responding to another /Wired/ piece > just weeks before, Patrick Ball said the prior author's admiration of > Cryptocat was "inaccurate, misleading andpotentially dangerous > <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/08/wired_opinion_patrick_ball/2/>." > Ball is one of the Silicon Valley-based nonprofit Benetech > <http://www.benetech.org/> developers ofMartus > <http://www.benetech.org/human_rights/martus.shtml>, an encrypted > database used by groups to secure information like witness testimony of > human rights abuses. > But unlike Martus, which uses its own software, Cryptocat is a > "host-based security" application that relies on servers to log in to > its software. And this kind of application makes Cryptocat potentially > vulnerable > <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/08/wired_opinion_patrick_ball/all/> > to manipulation through theft of login information--as everyone, > including Kobeissi, now seems to agree. > So we are back to where we started, to a degree. Other, older digital > safety tools are "a little harder to use, but their security is real," > Ball added in /Wired/. Yet, in the real world, fromMexico > <http://www.cpj.org/blog/2011/09/mexican-murder-may-mark-grim-watershed-for-social.php> > to Ethiopia > <http://www.cpj.org/2012/07/ethiopia-sentences-eskinder-six-others-on-terror-c.php>, > from Syria > <http://www.cpj.org/security/2012/05/dont-get-your-sources-in-syria-killed.php> > to Bahrain > <http://www.cpj.org/2012/09/bahrain-should-scrap-life-sentence-of-blogger-alsi.php>, > how many human rights activists, journalists, and others actually use > them? "The tools are just too hard to learn. They take too long to > learn. And no one's going to learn them," a journalist for a major U.S. > news organization recently told me. > Who will help bridge the gap? Information-freedom technologists clearly > don't build free, open-source tools to get rich. They're motivated by > the recognition one gets from building an exciting, important new tool. > (Kind of like journalists breaking a story.) Training people in the use > of security tools or making those tools easier to use doesn't bring the > same sort of credit. > Or financial support. Donors--in good part, U.S. government agencies > <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41120.pdf>--tend to back the > development of new tools rather than ongoing usability training and > development. But in doing so, technologists and donors are avoiding a > crucial question: Why aren't more people using security tools? These > days--20 years into what we now know as the Internet--usability testing > is key to every successful commercial online venture. Yet it is rarely > practiced in the Internet freedom community. > That may be changing. The anti-censorship circumvention tool Tor has > grown progressively easier to use, and donors and technologists are now > working to make it easier and faster still. Other tools, like Pretty > Good Privacy <http://www.pgpi.org/> or its slightly improved German > alternative <http://www.gnupg.org/>, still seem needlessly difficult to > operate. Partly because the emphasis is on open technology built by > volunteers, users are rarely if ever redirected how to get back on track > if they make a mistake or reach a dead end. This would be nearly > inconceivable today with any commercial application designed to help > users purchase a service or product. > Which brings us back to Cryptocat, the ever-so-easy tool that was not as > secure as it was once thought to be. For a time, the online debate among > technologists degenerated into thekind of vitriol > <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/08/security-researchers/all/> one > might expect to hear among, say, U.S. presidential campaigns. But wounds > have since healed and some critics are now working with Kobeissi to help > clean up and secure Cryptocat. > Life and death, prison and torture remain real outcomes > <http://www.cpj.org/reports/2011/12/journalist-imprisonments-jump-worldwide-and-iran-i.php> > for many users, and, as Ball noted in/Wired/, there are no security > shortcuts in hostile environments. But if tools remain too difficult for > people to use in real-life circumstances in which they are under duress, > then that is a security problem in itself. > The lesson of Cryptocat is that more learning and collaboration are > needed. Donors, journalists, and technologists can work together more > closely to bridge the gap between invention and use. > Frank Smyth is CPJ's senior adviser for journalist security. He has > reported on armed conflicts, organized crime, and human rights from > nations including El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Cuba, Rwanda, > Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Jordan, and Iraq. Follow him on > Twitter @JournoSecurity <https://twitter.com/#!/JournoSecurity>. > > > *Tags:* > > * Cryptocat <http://www.cpj.org/tags/cryptocat>, > * Hacked <http://www.cpj.org/tags/hacked>, > * Internet <http://www.cpj.org/tags/internet>, > * Martus <http://www.cpj.org/tags/martus>, > * Nadim Kobeissi <http://www.cpj.org/tags/nadim-kobeissi>, > * Patrick Ball <http://www.cpj.org/tags/patrick-ball>, > * Pretty Good Privacy <http://www.cpj.org/tags/pretty-good-privacy>, > * Tor <http://www.cpj.org/tags/tor> > > September 11, 2012 12:12 PM ET > > Frank Smyth > Executive Director > Global Journalist Security > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Tel. + 1 202 244 0717 > Cell + 1 202 352 1736 > Twitter: @JournoSecurity > Website: www.journalistsecurity.net <http://www.journalistsecurity.net> > PGP Public Key <http://www.journalistsecurity.net/franks-pgp-public-key> > > > Please consider our Earth before printing this email. > > Confidentiality Notice: This email and any files transmitted with it are > confidential. 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