Perhaps there should be a 'TripAdvsor' for digital security tools ...
On 29/10/2012, at 12:58 PM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: > Hm. I'm frustrated by Eric's reply to the point where I'm going to do a > complete audit of OkayFreedom and post any vulnerabilities and exploits > I may find in public on my blog, including detailed instructions on how > to break everything. > > Expect something within weeks. > NK > > On 10/28/2012 9:46 PM, Eric S Johnson wrote: >>> misremember the entire discussion; it happens to all of us! >> >> I imagine we each remember what best supports our own point of view. I'm >> sure it happens to all of us! >> >>> open at the moment for those in the US is if we will have some kind of >>> justice for this spying on all of us. It sure seems bleak. >> >> Yes, it does. I hope all the Amcits on this list have voted (or will do so)! >> >>> to make their own choices, to show data and stories about lessons we've >>> learned the hard way, and when we are able, to offer solidarity where it >>> is possible and welcome. >>> What matters is that users must be protected against serious >>> attackers. >> >> Agreed. >> >>> I personally feel like it is often suggested >>> that the burden to show something is unsafe is on us. >> >> You assume everything is unsafe. Saying "telephones are dangerous. VPNs are >> dangerous. Anything Microsoft is dangerous. Everything's dangerous"--well, >> okay, sure, so is walking across the street (let alone just breathing, >> especially for those of us who live in China). But if you have only ten >> minutes to get this journo in Gyanja, Gomel, or Gonder to do something >> different, even you (let alone the rest of us relative neophytes) aren't >> going to be able to get him using TAILS. So, we have to prioritise. >> One way to prioritise is to assign various levels of likelihood to >> the possible threats. And one way to do that, in turn, is to assess what we >> do know about the threats which have proven problematic in the past. Sure, >> we don't know what we don't know: epistemology and all that. But we can >> tally up what we have learned, and use that as a basis, however imperfect, >> for saying to the activist from Gweru: if we only have ten minutes, the goal >> is to move toward mitigating problem X (and we'll only be able to provide >> the simple solution which takes partial care of the problem--not a solution >> which would keep the NSA off Jake's back, but a solution which is likely to >> make this particular person safer). If we have an hour, we should be able to >> help mitigate X, Y, and Z. Ideally, we'll have three days, and then we can >> help mitigate all 15 top problems. >> To "there's no point in anything less than perfection"--well, yes, >> we'll have to agree to disagree on that. I think there's huge value in >> getting someone to use a solution which is "more secure" in their particular >> context (ideally we get that knowledge from on-the-ground research in >> addition to reports in Western media), even if it's not a perfect solution. >> >> What I don't get is why you work so hard to discredit folks rather than >> educating them. All of us on this list know you're a God (despite your >> sarcastic "perhaps I'm just dense"). We all understand you know more about >> cybersecurity and cybersurveillance (never mind that you hate certain words) >> than the rest of us combined. Everyone loves gaining from your experience >> (e.g. (just to name the most recent examples) your teardown of OkayFreedom, >> the VPN security paper to which you referred a couple days ago, etc.). >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -------------------------------- Sam de Silva skype: samonthenet [email protected] +61 412 238 041 -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
