Yet another map of Tor nodes (updated every hour): https://tormap.void.gr/
code is here: https://github.com/kargig/tormap and is based on: https://github.com/moba/tormap On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 3:29 AM, Ali-Reza Anghaie <[email protected]>wrote: > Jacob also shared his map tool (updated every 5m): > > http://freehaven.net/~ioerror/maps/v3-tormap.html > > -Ali > > > > On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Sun, 10 Mar 2013 11:32:20 -0700 >> Yosem Companys <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > http://hackertarget.com/tor-exit-node-visualization/ >> > >> > Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped >> >> Tor includes a Network Map which also maps nodes across a Mercator >> projection of the globe. I don't understand this fetish with Google >> mapping everything (why not openstreetmap? why not doing lat/long >> coordinate mapping on your own map?). However, it apparently exists. Ok, >> moving on. >> >> The usage of blutmagie is an interesting choice, when >> https://metrics.torproject.org/ and https://compass.torproject.org/ and >> https://atlas.torproject.org/ all exist with gobs more data, including >> the raw source data on which all of those sites are built. Freegeoip.net >> uses the same MaxMind GeoList database we do. Google has it's own GeoIP >> database as well. I wonder which one is most accurate. >> >> What's more valuable to me is the list of exit relays by ISP. >> Intuitively, it makes sense. Cheap, well-connected server providers are >> going to be attractive to those running Tor relays (exits or not). I >> take this list to mean, "this is the list of ISPs who care about >> Internet freedom". It sure seems small. >> >> The other implication here is that Tor exits can be monitored. Yes, we >> know. We've been saying this for a decade. Here's one blog post about >> it, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/plaintext-over-tor-still-plaintext. >> It's part of the reason the EFF and Tor write HTTPS Everywhere for >> Chrome and Firefox, https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere. >> >> Your ISP can watch your traffic too, and inject ads or redirect DNS. In >> fact, there's a billion dollar market for traffic management at ISPs. >> I'm assuming this means the providers are looking to manage Tor traffic >> as well. >> >> For me, the visualization is a cool map, a product pitch for >> hackertarget llc, and just raises some implications for operational >> security. >> >> Larger questions it raises in my mind are about AS-aware routing, >> what does it mean to have a large concentration of exit relays in >> pro-freedom ISPs, and what about legal jurisdictions and MLATs? >> >> There is some on-going work on the AS-awareness question, see >> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09 and >> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#oakland2012-lastor and >> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#ndss13-lira >> >> As for some measurement of anonymity and risk modulo concentration of >> exit relays? Who knows. Sounds like a fine project. >> >> And I know of at least one group working on the MLAT and legal >> arbitrage question as it relates to tor circuits and relays. >> >> I look forward to more analysis and proposed research theories to >> improve the Tor network in the future. >> >> -- >> Andrew >> http://tpo.is/contact >> pgp 0x6B4D6475 >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- Καργιωτάκης Γιώργος
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