I don't know where we are along the scale between "crypto works" (as Snowden says<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/17/edward-snowden-nsa-files-whistleblower#block-51bf3588e4b082a2ed2f5fc5>) and the "NSA can break everything" trend on the list and the net in general, but I still believe cracking - say - a gpg key [>1024 bit :)] or compromising the end point has a cost, uses limited resources, etc.
If their resources are limited, there's safety in numbers<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YeTkxy-sid8>, and everything that makes people encrypt more (even an SSL KITTEH GALRY<https://swatwt.com/pix/kitteh>) reduces the signal to noise ratio and increases privacy in the world (or am I being naive?). Which brings us [again] to TipWire <https://swatwt.com/tipwire/>. Thanks for your criticism<https://github.com/thedod/whatmail/wiki/tipwire#criticism-so-far>so far. I [believe I] did the necessary coding and/or word-weaving to address it. I think I'm ready for some more. The most important question is - of course - whether there's a basic flaw in the concept. If there is one - there's no point discussing the rest of the questions, but just in case: - Are there problems in the implementation? - How can we make it easier [for an end user] to use? (gui, text) - How can we make it easier [for an admin] to install? (docs, packaging) - What else can it be used *for*?(*) - Would you [or people/orgs you know] install one? If not, is there something that could be changed in order to make you reconsider? - Anything else you have in mind Thanks in advance, The Dod (*) Tip: if you give it a vanity url like https://dubiousdod.org/give-nsa-the-finger it can be mightier than a bling in some circles ;)
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