On 07-08-13 20:47, Jonathan Wilkes wrote: > > Anyone outside of the VPS and the attacker cannot know whether that > relay/exit node has been patched. Now just work with the NSA's > equivalent in the country of the exit node to make sure the VPS > remains unaware of any shenanigans (and why wouldn't they?). If they > do see something weird happening from the patch and make some noise > about it then just gag them as the Guardian reports show they are > quite good at doing.
No need to gag, thank the VPS provider publicly for spotting the hacked node. Then run a Freenet/bittorrent/I2P/etc node on it to hide the spooks traffic and sniff that with their fiber taps. > > Roger-- how exactly would you check to make sure something like this > scenario isn't happening? Hmm, That would be easy. Place some false flag mails about terrorist attacks and check for raised alerts... :-) Guido. PS. The best thing is to discourage plaintext protocols. Encrypt everything. Then the spooks have *only* the metadata if they manage to trace the Tor paths end to end. -- Liberationtech list is public and archives are searchable on Google. Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
