On 23 August 2013 16:29, Nicolai <nicolai-liberationt...@chocolatine.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 01:53:59AM -0700, DC wrote:
>
>> My plan is to make make your email the hash of your public key.
>> For example, my address is *nqkgpx6bqscsl...@scramble.io*
>> (I borrowed this idea from Tor Hidden Services.)
>
> Cool idea.  This is also similar to CurveCP and DNSCurve.  For example:
>
> $ dig ns chocolatine.org +short
> uz5qry75vfy162c239jgx7v2knkwb01g3d04qd4379s6mtcx2f0828.ns.chocolatine.org.
> uz5cjwzs6zndm3gtcgzt1j74d0jrjnkm15wv681w6np9t1wy8s91g3.ns.chocolatine.org.


I feel compelled to point out the precedence here.  This is a problem
known as Zooko's Triangle:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko's_triangle  Briefly it says, when
giving names to members of a network: Secure, Decentralized,
Memorable, pick 2.  (Another good page on it seems to be
http://shoestringfoundation.org/~bauerm/names/distnames.html )

SSL is Secure and Memorable, but highly centralized.  (It is secure
because you have to prove ownership of a name to get a certificate for
it.)
This technique is Secure and Decentralized - but not memorable.

Off the top of my head, other techniques that make the same tradeoff are:
 - Tor Hidden Services, as you mentioned
 - SSH & OpenPGP fingerprints (here's my fingerprint, no matter where
you find it, that's my identifier)
 - YURLs http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/httpsy/
 - From the above URL: Freenet's CHKs, Mnet's mnetids, Chord's keys,
Freenet's SSKs, SPKI's certificates


For very technical audiences, I've thought these things are all right,
because we tend to be fine copy/pasting around opaque strings of
gibberish; but for 'normal' people it just felt too weird.  I kind of
wonder with the advent and integration of QR scanners, these scheme
might gain more traction.  It'd be worth trialing one of these and
seeing how it goes.

-tom
-- 
Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. 
Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, 
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at 
compa...@stanford.edu.

Reply via email to