I absolutely agree with your point...cleverness alone doesn't go very far
against ruthless adversaries.
To paraphrase a prior post that's quite relevant to this discussion:
"...the members of this list are uniquely qualified to influence that
policy debate in terms of shaping both hard and soft policy in far more
substantial ways.
We can shape soft policy by expanding the selectorate willing to influence
the political leadership to better circumscribe domestic surveillance
capabilities. It's important to keep the focus on capabilities rather than
intentions and assurances. And on the long range danger of having these
surveillance databases in existence and their inevitable use to warp the
political process in dark and dangerous ways.
Hard policy is shaped by changing the technological landscape...by altering
the very ground surveillance agencies stand on through the support of more
and better privacy and encryption projects. It happened during the Crypto
Wars of the 1990's and it can happen again."
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Matt Johnson <railm...@gmail.com> wrote:
> All of the sneaky signs, email headers and web page badges assume the
> FBI, or whoever the adversary is are incompetent or inept. That does
> not see like a safe assumption to me. The only prudent approach is to
> assume your adversary is intelligent and competent.
>
> My guess is that the only defense against NSL's and the like is
> through policy. I realize that may be blasphemy on this list, but
> there it is.
>
> --
> Matt Johnson
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 1:26 PM, LISTS <li...@robertwgehl.org> wrote:
> > What are the legal precedents in terms of "wink, wink, nudge, nudge,
> > djaknowhatimean?"
> >
> > - Rob Gehl
> >
> >
> > On 09/09/2013 02:24 PM, Shava Nerad wrote:
> >
> > You are awesome,clever, and full of tricks. :) Should I credit you with
> > this?
> >
> > yrs,
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 3:40 PM, Case Black <casebl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> There's a more subtle variant to this idea...
> >>
> >> Regularly state ("put up a sign") that you HAVE in fact received an
> >> NSL...with the public understanding that it must be a lie (there's no
> law
> >> against falsely making such a claim...yet!).
> >>
> >> When actually served with an NSL, you would now be bound by law to
> remove
> >> any such notification...thereby signaling the event.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> Case
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 1:24 PM, LISTS <li...@robertwgehl.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I wonder if there's a false analogy here. Hypothetically, the
> >>> librarian's sign could fall down (maybe the wind blew it over) whereas
> a
> >>> notice on a site would have to be removed via coding. There would be
> >>> little other explanation, even in the case where one does not
> >>> affirmatively renew the "dead man's notice" (the countdown that
> Doctorow
> >>> suggests in the article). Such an affirmative act might lead a court to
> >>> believe that one has indeed informed the public about an NSL.
> >>>
> >>> - Rob Gehl
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 09/09/2013 12:18 PM, Dan Staples wrote:
> >>> > Presumably, if this type of approach became widely adopted, it would
> be
> >>> > a useful service for an independent group to monitor the status of
> >>> > these
> >>> > notices and periodically publish a report of which companies had
> >>> > removed
> >>> > their notice.
> >>> >
> >>> > On 09/09/2013 12:52 PM, Scott Arciszewski wrote:
> >>> >> Forgot the URL:
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/09/nsa-sabotage-dead-mans-switch
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Scott Arciszewski
> >>> >> <kobrasre...@gmail.com <mailto:kobrasre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Hello,
> >>> >>
> >>> >> I saw this article on The Guardian[1] and it mentioned a
> librarian
> >>> >> who posted a sign that looked like this:
> >>> >> http://www.librarian.net/pics/antipat4.gif and would remove it
> if
> >>> >> visited by the FBI. So a naive question comes to mind: If I
> >>> >> operated
> >>> >> an internet service, and I posted a thing that says "We have not
> >>> >> received a request to spy on our users. Watch closely for the
> >>> >> removal of this text," what legal risk would be incurred?
> >>> >>
> >>> >> If the answer is "None" or "Very little", what's stopping people
> >>> >> from doing this?
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Thanks,
> >>> >> Scott
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on
> Google.
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> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google.
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> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Shava Nerad
> > shav...@gmail.com
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google.
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