I would actually argue against that, at least with Iranian users, rely on one particular tool. From what we have seen from our many communications with users, they rely and use any number of tools they can get their hands on and their choice is dependent on which one works better on a given day. And their choice mainly centers around which one is faster.
Here is one example of an Iranian Android user's list of tools https://twitter.com/2iitter/status/435499775971328001 I don't think its an user education issue. Users are very quick at finding ways of going around censorship and have a lot of local resources (VPN sellers) to help them. Based on my experience communicating with a lot of users, for many of them access is the first priority. But now that they have more options, faster and reliable access is what they care the most about, not security and privacy. On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 4:18 PM, Griffin Boyce <[email protected]>wrote: > Adam Pritchard wrote: > >> I would advise against getting too comfortable/confident/hubristic... >> One might not want to suggest that one is unblockable. >> > > I like Tor a lot, but obviously nothing is "unblockable." Iran's > targeting of Tor around the attempted revolution is but one data point -- > every kind of circumvention tool is targeted by oppressive regimes. What > is more {important|telling} is how well a software community can respond > and bounce back from various blocking events. > > Part of the issue (as I see it) is that users tend to regard one > circumvention method as a panacea. People rely on Tor or Lantern or > Psiphon or that really fast VPN on a weird port. And then when their > method of choice gets blocked, they are forced to find a replacement. This > feels like a user education issue. Users need to know that there are > multiple options -- eg when Psiphon works but Lantern doesn't, or when Tor > with a bridge doesn't usually work, but with flashproxy does. People need > to be prepared to pivot quickly. > > ~Griffin > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/ > mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change > password by emailing moderator at [email protected]. > -- Fereidoon Bashar [email protected] https://asl19.org/en -- PGP: BE4A 4A81 7A3E 5725 8591 05A2 2A3C 56D4 5450 F790 (key<https://asl19.org/keys/fereidoon.txt> )
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