carlo von lynX wrote: > You can't diffie-hellman yourself out of a MITM. If the fundamental link > is unsafe, you can make all the ephemeral keys you like - the observer can > trace them all.
Tony Arcieri wrote: > You should take a look at how ZRTP actually works, particularly Matt > Green's analysis: > http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/11/lets-talk-about-zrtp.html > ... Once this has been done successfully once, ZRTP stores some "continuity > data" so the next time you authenticate to the same person, the previous > authentication will ensure future connections are secured. Patrick Schleizer wrote: > The latter, the "continuity data" is implementation specific. > I wonder how my voip clients actually support this. This is an old thread, but this ietf draft is apropos: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-johnston-rtcweb-zrtp-00 It describes how you could use authenticate WebRTC streams using ZRTP implemented in javascript, even with existing browsers that use DTLS-SRTP. -elijah -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected].
