On Thu, May 29, 2014 at 09:10:08AM +0100, Security First wrote: > While the jury is still out on how this TrueCrypt issue plays out.
Hmmm.. > What are the best alternatives to TrueCrypt for the people we work > with and train? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_disk_encryption_software dm-crypt/LUKS and freeOTFE do provide an alternative, but not exactly as easy to use. That page is missing an upcoming relevant player there.. Dyne's Tomb: http://www.dyne.org/software/tomb/ But for now it can only be used from command line. As jaromil suggests, there is no true cryptographic safety on Windows machines, so you might as well stop trying to do that on such a computer. Still, I don't get these periodic DoT*-attacks against Truecrypt. Last year there was this rumour going around about Truecrypt not having been properly audited, and then the code that turned out not having been audited for years was openssl. Now there is again fear of backdoors in downloadables from some well-intended website. But who thinks *he can download binaries via the web and expect them to be free of backdoors? The whole approach is broken. The web is not trustworthy. You need someone to get the source codes, look over it, make sure it is the correct one, generate binaries and distribute them over safe channels. I have been using truecrypt built from sources for a decade now, the only trouble it gives me is performance when dealing with legacy file systems such as NTFS. Please get your paranoia properly structured and oriented to the things that are well worth being paranoid about. *) denial of trust -- http://youbroketheinternet.org ircs://psyced.org/youbroketheinternet -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected].
