On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 11:13 PM, Richard Brooks <r...@g.clemson.edu> wrote: > https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget > Sounds like hype to me. Anyone else have an opinion?
Well, if we estimate total guard node bandwidth at 4GB/s [1], several controlled guard nodes with two gigabit links allow control of ~6% of Tor traffic, enabling a fair share of opportunistic deanonymization attacks on hidden services and their clients. I would approach this by constantly connecting to all known hidden services using a distinct per-service traffic pattern, and this way determine location of hidden services that eventually pick a controlled guard node. Simultaneously, I would inject arbitrary delays into all client connections to controlled guard nodes, and watch for similar delays on suspected hidden service nodes. All in all, sounds feasible to me, and I can't wait for some actual Tor hidden services statistics that are not some boring wishful thinking from “Users of Tor” page [2], but actual data. [1] https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html [2] https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.