On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Aymeric Vitte <[email protected]> wrote: > ... including your focus on elementary mitm > issue, your arguments and judgement are so basic that I am wondering why I > am answering it, you should do some reading, and if you can trivially defeat > Peersm, then just show us how
problems with js crypto: - side channels / non constant run time - lack of access to robust entropy sources - unless delivered over pinned HTTPS with CSP vulnerable to mitm attack - unless an extension, vulnerable to code injection or malicious servers - even as extension, keeps keys in address space of browser with rich attack surface. (this is true for SSL/TLS as well) contrast this with a configuration where key material is kept isolated from the rich browser attack surface through low level protections, e.g. Qubes throwaway browser app vm talking to hidden service. A separate Tor VM would contain keys for your client on the network and accessing hidden sites, while the vulnerability rich browser speaks over this transparent channel managed outside its purview. for advanced threats, isolation and defense in depth are paramount. peersm is inherently limited in this regard, not matter how many other pitfalls it successfully avoids. unfortunately strong isolation and defense in depth are even more difficult to make easy to use, once again highlighting the complexities of usability and security in privacy enhancing technologies. best regards, -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected].
