On 4 August 2014 14:39, Seth David Schoen <[email protected]> wrote: > One thing I think is especially important if you're going to try to > propagate every message to every potential recipient is forward secrecy, > because with something like PGP, only someone who was proactively > eavesdropping on you or your network infrastrucure has your old messages, > whereas with a flooding design, _all_ network participants potentially > have, and might be archiving, all old messages. So any private key > compromise at any point results in quite a wide audience that can go > back and read old traffic. Someone who thinks they might want to read > your traffic some day might simply join the network legitimately and > start archiving ciphertext, hoping that they get some opportunity to get > ahold of your key one way or another, maybe a few years down the line.
Quite. https://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm.html Not that that's an iron-clad argument against broadcast entirely, but more an argument to be very careful about exposing any sort of metadata in the messages and to try and build in PFS. > The implementation modifies the > Rijndael key schedule (to create a quasi-4096 bit symmetric cipher), Whaaaat? What's the reasoning behind this? In general, going only from the webpage: Very cool putting time and effort attempting to go after metadata instead of content. Also very cool writing code instead of publishing a paper and leaving the implementation to someone else. Thanks! Some initial, non-comprehensive thoughts: Looks like you're going the broadcast route: have you done any calculations what amount of bandwidth a regular user is going to be using when the network grows to.. 100 active users? 1000? 10000? Any thought into DoS prevention? That's been a pain of broadcast messaging schemes before. -tom -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected].
