TOR and I2P provide algorithms for anonymizing traffic. My suggestion is that the approaches they take may be better adapted to the problem of protecting chat than Echo / Flood / BAR approaches.
So I'm not saying 'pump XMPP through TOR or I2P' but i'm saying ECHO/AE/Flood might be the wrong approaches - why not derive from algorithms that I2P / TOR use? Once key federation is addressed then message encryption itself is very easy.... The metadata problem is what ECHO/AE/Flooding/BAR attempts to address. -Travis On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 12:14 PM, Randolph <[email protected]> wrote: > 2014-08-20 16:24 GMT+02:00 Travis Biehn <[email protected]>: > > I'm not sure why Echo / AE would be used in lieu of onion > > routing... TOR based would show that Bob was transmitting something. I2P > > would show no metadata about transmission or reception. > > > > Am I missing something? > > > > sure, the talk was about encrypted messaging and not a comparison > about a browsing proxy chain. the chat can be done over any proxy. so > both could be stuck together and that adds another layer. I think that > should be analysed in one year further, in case TorChat is based on > encryption and the endpoint of Tor or I2P is getting only ciphertext. > Regards. > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > [email protected]. > > -- Twitter <https://twitter.com/tbiehn> | LinkedIn <http://www.linkedin.com/in/travisbiehn> | GitHub <http://github.com/tbiehn> | TravisBiehn.com <http://www.travisbiehn.com> | Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/+TravisBiehn>
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