Thanks, Kurtis. That's my sense too. So do we all on the list agree that Signal is the gold standard right now?
If so, I'll start recommending Signal (except in those states where it's blocked due to the Google issue): https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/2/16841292/iran-telegram-block-encryption-protest-google-signal. Speaking of which, is the issue still relevant? Thanks, Yosem On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 4:25 PM Kurtis Heimerl <kheim...@cs.washington.edu> wrote: > This is interesting. I had a discussion with an activist in the past who > mentioned that telegram offers state actors access to telegram groups if > threatened with in-country blocks of some kind. While this should be taken > with a grain of salt, being hearsay and all, it makes sense to me as > (afaik) the group functions are only client/server encrypted and would be > pretty easy to share if they wanted. As far as the URLs, my guess is that > is some sort of local DNS blocking? > > Though this isn't my current area of focus, I understood that Signal was > the best of the messaging apps, providing complete end-to-end encryption of > all communications. If other people on the list agree, that might be the > direction to go. > > On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 11:30 PM Yosem Companys <ycompa...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Here's a follow-up email with additional details/questions: >> >> Nowadays, Telegram is the main channel for us to coordinate and hold >>> pro-democracy rallies and protests. We like Telegram because it provides >>> private messaging. We don't know how, but the regime appears to be hacking >>> into, censoring, and filtering Telegram. To circumvent the censors, we use >>> a variety of proxies and VPNs. The regime even created a fake "approved, >>> fast, sanitized, and safe version" of Telegram that tricked some of our >>> supporters to moved to it. Beyond that, when our supporters click on the >>> URLs of our sites on Telegram, they're unable to access them. Is there >>> anything else we can do beyond telling our supporters not to use fake >>> versions of Telegram? Are there more secure social media apps than Telegram >>> that the regime won't be able to hack, filter, and censor? For example, >>> would Wickr be any better? >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 10:43 PM Yosem Companys <ycompa...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> A pro-democracy activist would like me to inform you of the following: >>> >>> Telegram is supposed to be encrypted. Yet the regime appears capable of >>>> attacking the privacy of our group members, disrupting the ability of our >>>> members to access news or communicate with each other. For example, one of >>>> our largest Telegram news groups recently experienced a dramatic decrease >>>> in membership. It was almost as though members had “left” the group en >>>> masse overnight. When we contacted some of the members outside Telegram, we >>>> were told that they could no longer find our news group when they searched >>>> for it. Such disruptions are undermining our ability to engage in effective >>>> collective action. >>> >>> >>> Thoughts? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Yosem >>> >> -- >> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable from any major >> commercial search engine. Violations of list guidelines will get you >> moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. >> Unsubscribe, change to digest mode, or change password by emailing >> liberationtech-ow...@lists.stanford.edu. > > > > -- > Public Key: https://flowcrypt.com/pub/kheim...@cs.washington.edu > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable from any major > commercial search engine. Violations of list guidelines will get you > moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest mode, or change password by emailing > liberationtech-ow...@lists.stanford.edu.
-- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable from any major commercial search engine. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest mode, or change password by emailing liberationtech-ow...@lists.stanford.edu.