http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/legal_theory_le.html


      *Legal Theory Lexicon 048: Libertarian Theories of Law*

      *Introduction*

      The dominant approaches to normative legal theory in the American
      legal academy converge on fairly robust role for the state and
      government subject to the constraints imposed by an equally robust
      set of individual rights. Normative legal theorists of all
      stripes--conservatives and liberals, welfarists and
      deontologists­tend to agree that the institution of law is
      fundamentally legitimate and that the legal regulation has a large
      role to play. There is, however, a counter-tradition in legal
      theory that challenges the legitimacy of law and contends that the
      role of law should be narrowly confined. This entry in the /Legal
      Theory Lexicon/ will examine libertarian theories of law. As
      always, the /Lexicon/ is aimed at law students­especially first
      year law students­with an interest in legal theory.
      The /libertarian/ tradition of social, political, and legal
      thought is rich and varied, no brief summary can do it justice. So
      the usual caveats apply. This is a brief introduction to
      libertarian thought with an emphasis on its role in normative
      legal theory. Debates about the /true/ meaning of the term
      "libertarian" will largely be ignored, and will disputes over the
      advantages of "liberalism," "classical liberalism," and
      "libertarianism" as the best label for libertarian ideas. /Enough
      with the caveats, here we go!

      / *Historical Roots of Contemporary Libertarianism*
      One good way to approach contemporary libertarian legal theory is
      /via/ its historical roots. A good place to begin is with John
      Locke's conception of the social contract.

            *John Locke and the Social Contract*
            The idea of a "social contract," by which individuals in a
            state of nature contract with each other (or with a
            sovereign) to enter a "civil society" is one of the most
            important in all of political philosophy. Hobbes, Rousseau,
            and Locke all have distinctive theories of the social
            contract, but Locke's version has been especially
            salient­both to libertarian theory and American
            constitutionalism. For the purposes of this discussion, the
            crucial point is that a legitimate (or perhaps just) civil
            society has authority that is limited to those powers that
            the citizens-to-be would agree to delegate to the government
            in a social contract. Locke himself argued that the
            inconveniences of the state of nature would motivate a
            social contract that delegated to the government the power
            to protect property­understood in a broad sense that
            encompasses personal security and liberty ­and the power to
            resolve disputes. But the Lockean social contract would not
            authorize government to restrict fundamental liberties or to
            take property from one citizen and transfer it to another.
            /Of course, there is much more to say about Locke, but we
            are concerned here only with getting the gist of those
            Lockean ideas that are historically important to libertarian
            theory./

            *Kant and Spheres of Autonomy*
            Kant also made an important contribution to libertarian
            theory /via/ his ideas of autonomy. There is no good way to
            summarize Kant's theory of autonomy in a sentence or two,
            but the gist of his notion is the humans, as rational
            beings, have an interest in being autonomous in the sense of
            "self governing." The role of law is to protect individual
            "spheres of autonomy" or "zones of liberty" in which
            individuals can act without interference from others.
            Suppose then, that our theory of proper legislation was that
            the laws should create maximum equal liberties for each,
            consistent with the same liberty for all. These two Kantian
            ideas  -- ­autonomy and maximum equal liberty -- ­have
            played an important role in libertarian thinking about law.

            *John Stuart Mill and the Harm Principle*
            John Stuart Mill was a liberal utilitarian, and so, in a
            sense, it is odd that he is also the author of one of the
            most important works in the libertarian tradition, /On
            Liberty/, a rich, complex, and easily misunderstood work. I
            am afraid I may be contributing to the misunderstanding by
            emphasizing just one idea from /On Liberty/--the so-called
            "harm principle." Here is how Mill states the principle:

                  . . . the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
                  individually or collectively, in interfering with the
                  liberty of action of any of their number, is
                  self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
                  can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
                  civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
                  harm to others. His own good, either physical or
                  moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
                  be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
                  better for him to do so, because it will make him
                  happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so
                  would be wise, or even right...The only part of the
                  conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to
                  society, is that which concerns others. In the part
                  which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
                  right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
                  mind, the individual is sovereign.

            The harm principle is almost as controversial as it famous.
            In particular, there is a persistent worry about the problem
            of the /baseline/ against which "harm" as opposed to "lack
            of advantage" might be measured.

            Locke, Kant, and Mill are not the only historical
            influences--there is, for example, a rich tradition of
            anarchist thought.  Another figure worth mentioning Herbert
            Spencer, whose " Social Statics
            
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/LFBooks/Spencer0236/SocialStatics/0331_Bk.html>"
            famously drew Justice Holmes's fire in the famous Lochner
            dissent.

      *Theoretical Foundations of Libertarianism*
      This very brief introduction to the historical roots of
      /libertarianism/ in Locke, Kant, and Mill prepares the way for a
      discussion of the theoretical roots of libertarian legal theory.
      Libertarianism operates at the level of political theory: it is a
      view about questions like "What is the proper role of government?"
      and "When is coercive legislation legitimate?" Theories at this
      level of abstraction need foundations of some sort, either deep
      foundations in comprehensive moral theories like utilitarianism or
      shallow foundations that explain why deeper foundations are
      unnecessary. Let's take a look at both sorts of foundations for
      libertarian legal theories.

            *Consequentialist Foundations*
            The consequentialist case for libertarianism is
            contingent­it depends on empirical and theoretical questions
            about the effects that various legal regimes have.
            Consequentialist libertarians believe that minimum
            government interference with individual liberty and free
            markets produces better consequences that extensive
            government regulation or redistribution of income.
            Historically, both John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith are
            associated with both libertarianism and consequentialism.
            There are many different flavors of consequentialism, but in
            the legal academy, the most prominent strands of
            consequentialist thinking are associated with law and
            economics and assume a preference-satisfaction (or
            "welfarist") notion of utility. Even among theorists who
            accept welfarism, there are major disagreements about how
            much and when government should regulate. But the general
            idea behind the consequentialist case for libertarianism is
            that markets are more efficient than regulation. This
            conclusion follows from fairly straightforward ideas in
            neoclassical microeconomics. Markets facilitate
            Pareto-efficient (welfare enhancing) transactions;
            regulations thwart such transactions.

            Markets may lead to substantial disparities in wealth and
            income, but from the consequentialist perspective, such
            inequalities may not justify legislation that redistributes
            wealth and income. First, for a strict utilitarian, the
            distribution of utility itself is of no moral significance:
            classical utilitarians believe that the sum of utilities
            should be maximized, even if that means that some will be
            very well off and others very poor. Of course, there is a
            well-known utilitarian argument for the redistribution of
            wealth and income based on the idea of diminishing marginal
            utility, but this argument might be outweighed by the
            massive utility losses caused by redistributive
            programs­providing a utilitarian argument against
            government-mandated redistribution of wealth and income.
            Second, even consequentialists who believe in some form of
            egalitarianism might believe that the worst off members of
            society will be better served by a libertarian regime than
            by a social-welfare state. We are already on a tangent, so
            I'm going to leave the topic of redistribution -- ­noting
            that this is an issue upon which consequentialists
            themselves many differ in a variety of ways.
            In contemporary legal theory, Richard Epstein is the
            "libertarian" thinker who is most strongly associated with
            consequentialist foundations. Because he is a
            consequentialist, Epstein may not be a /pure/ libertarian,
            but on a variety of issues (e.g. antidiscrimination laws),
            Epstein takes strongly libertarian positions.

            *Deontological Foundations*
            Although some libertarians are consequentialists, many
            others look to deontological moral theory for the
            foundations of their libertarianism. There are many
            different strategies for arguing for libertarianism based on
            deontological premises. One method starts with the idea of
            self-ownership or autonomy. Each of us has a moral right to
            control our own bodies, free of wrongful interference by
            others. This might imply that each individual has a right
            against theft, battery, false-imprisonment, enslavement, and
            so forth. Of course, these rights might justify a certain
            kind of government­one that protects us against invasions of
            our rights. But when government goes beyond the protection
            of these rights, then government itself operates through
            force or threats of force. For example, the redistribution
            of income might be accomplished by taxing income to finance
            a welfare system. Taxes are not voluntary; tax payments are
            "coerced" /via/ threats of violence and imprisonment.
            Without consent, it might be argued, these threats are
            wrongful actions.

            In my mind, the deontological approach to the foundations of
            libertarian political theory is most strongly associated
            with the late Robert Nozick and his magnificent book,
            /Anarchy, State, and Utopia/ (see reference below).

            *Pluralist Foundations*
            There is an obvious problem with locating the foundations of
            a political theory, like libertarianism, in a deeper moral
            theory, such as some form of deontology or consequentialism.
            In a pluralist society, it seems very unlikely that any one
            view about morality will ever become the dominant view.
            Instead, modern pluralist societies are usually
            characterized by persistent disagreements about deep moral
            questions. If a particular form of libertarianism rests on
            deep moral foundations, then most of us will reject that
            form of libertarianism, because we reject the foundations. 
            One alternative would be to try to argue for libertarianism
            on the basis of all of the different moral theories, but
            that would obviously be a very time-consuming and difficult
            task.  Another approach would be to articulate shallow
            foundations for libertarianism -- ­foundations that are
            "modular" in the sense that they could be incorporated into
            many different comprehensive theories of morality. This
            general strategy was pioneered by the liberal political
            philosopher, John Rawls­himself, of course, no libertarian.
            One contemporary libertarian legal theorist who has pursued
            the pluralist strategy is Randy Barnett. In his book, /The
            Structure of Liberty/, Barnett argues that anyone who wishes
            to pursue their own interests­whatever those might be-- has
            good reasons to affirm a generally libertarian framework for
            government. Barnett's case for libertarianism is complex,
            but his basic idea is that human nature and circumstances
            are such that the law must establish and protect property
            rights and liberty of contract. The key to Barnett's
            argument is his identification of what he calls the problems
            of knowledge, interest, and power. For example, the problems
            of knowledge include the fact that each individual has
            knowledge of his or her circumstances that are relevant to
            how resources can best be utilized. This fact, combined with
            others, make decentralized control of resources through a
            private property regime superior to a centralized command
            and control system. /For our purposes, it is not the details
            for Barnett's argument, but his general strategy that is
            important: Barnett attempts to create a case for
            libertarianism that does not depend on either
            consequentialist or deontological moral theory.

            / *Libertarian Agendas for Legal Reform (or Revolution!)*
      Even thought this is "Legal _Theory_ Blog," we should say
      something about the practical agendas of various libertarian legal
      theories. Let's begin with modest libertarianism and proceed to
      its most radical (/anarchist/) forms.

            *Modest Libertarian Reforms: Deregulation, Privatization,
            and Legalization*
            At the very least, libertarians favor /less/ government­as
            measured against the baseline of the current legal order in
            the United States. So, libertarians are likely to be in
            favor of more reliance on markets and less reliance on
            government. Hence, libertarians are likely to support
            programs of deregulation and privatization. Deregulation
            might include measures like abolition of consumer product
            safety regulations and the elimination of rent control laws.
            Privatization might include the federal government selling
            off the national park system or the Tennessee Valley Authority.
            A libertarian reform agenda might also include the
            legalization of various forms of conduct that are currently
            prohibited. Examples of this kind of reform might include
            the legalization of recreational drugs, the end of
            prohibitions on various consensual sexual activities, and
            the elimination of restrictions on gambling and prostitution.

            *Comprehensive Libertarian Reform: The Night-Watchman State*
            A more ambitious libertarian agenda might be the
            establishment of what has been called the /night-watchman
            state/. The idea is that government would limit its role to
            the protection of individual liberty. Government would
            continue to provide police protection, national defense, and
            a court system for the vindication of private rights
            (property, tort, and contract rights, for example), but
            nothing else. In other words, the function of law would be
            limited to those activities that are necessary for the
            protection of private property and liberty.
            The difference between the advocacy of modest and
            comprehensive libertarian reform may be more a matter of
            tactics than of principle. One might believe that there is
            no realistic chance of a transition to a night-watchman
            state. Those who advocate such comprehensive reform may
            undermine their own political effectiveness by sounding
            "radical." So as a matter of practical politics, it may be
            that libertarians are most effective when they advocate
            marginal reforms that move the system incremental in
            libertarian directions.

            *Libertarian Revolutions: Anarchy and Polycentric
            Constitutional Orders*
            Some libertarians advocate an agenda that is even more
            radical than the night-watchman state. One might question
            whether there is a need for the nation state at all. One
            version of this more radical approach is pure anarchism­the
            view that no government is necessary because individuals can
            coexist and cooperate without any need for state action.
            Another variation of this idea is sometimes called a
            "polycentric constitutional order." The idea is that
            individuals could subscribe to "competitive legal systems
            and law enforcement agencies" that would provide the police
            and adjudication functions of the night watchman state. Such
            a society would have entities that functioned like
            governments in some ways­with the important exception that
            individuals would enter into voluntary agreements for their
            services.

      *The Rivals of Libertarian Legal Theory*
      Libertarian theory can be criticized in a variety of ways.
      Sometimes the disagreement is mostly empirical: libertarians
      believe that life without the state would be better, and
      anti-libertarians believe it would be worse. But sometimes the
      critics of libertarianism have a radically different vision of the
      fundamental purposes of government. One such rival is
      egalitarianism -- ­the view the distributive justice requires that
      goods (let's leave the definition of good at the abstract level)
      should be divided equally, and that the creation of social
      equality is the primary aim of government. Some libertarians might
      accept this goal, but argue that maximum liberty is the best way
      to achieve it. Other libertarians might argue that /liberty/ is
      the good that should be equally divided. But many libertarians see
      equality as the wrong goal for government. That is, sometimes
      libertarians and egalitarians differ fundamentally over the
      purpose of government.
      Another rival to libertarianism is the view that legislation
      should aim at the promotion of virtue in the citizenry. If one
      believes that the aim of government is to make humans into better
      people, then one is likely to see a variety of restricts of
      liberty as justified. (Let's call views that see virtue as the end
      of government "aretaic political theories.")

      Aretaic political theorists are likely to disagree with
      libertarians over what might be called "moral legislation." For
      instance, one might believe that legal prohibitions on gambling,
      drugs, and prostitution are justified because they help promote a
      moral climate where most citizens don't want to engage in these
      activities. Many libertarians would say it is simply not the
      business of government to decide that a taste for gambling is a
      bad thing; whereas many virtue theorists are likely to say that
      this is precisely the sort of work that governments should be doing.

      *Conclusion*
      Libertarian legal theory is interesting on the merits­as one of
      the most significant normative theories of law. But there is
      another important reason for legal theorists to be interested in
      libertarianism even if they ultimately reject it. Libertarian
      legal theories call into question the very purpose of law and
      government. A really careful evaluation of libertarianism requires
      that one form views about the function of law and the purposes of
      government, and to confront a variety of criticisms of
      conventional views about those topics. For that reason, thinking
      about libertarian legal theory is an excellent way of thinking
      about the most fundamental questions in normative legal theory.

      Once again, this entry is bit too long, but I hope that I've
      provide a good starting point for your investigations of
      libertarianism. I've provided a very brief set of references for
      further exploration.

      *References

      *
            Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the
            Rule of Law
            <http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/%E2%80%9D>
            (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
            Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom : A Modern Case
            for Classical Liberalism
            
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/%E2%80%9Dhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0226213048/ref=pd_sbs_b_1/104-4236392-1467918?%5Fencoding=UTF8&v=glance%E2%80%9D>
            (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
            Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia
            
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/%E2%80%9Dhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0465097200/qid=1119832892/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/104-4236392-1467918?v=glance&s=books&n=507846%E2%80%9D>
            (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 

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      *Comments*

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    *Lexicon Table of Contents*

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 001: Ex Ante/Ex Post
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/09/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 002: The Coase Theorem
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/09/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 003: Hypotheticals
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/09/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 004: The Reasonable Person
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 005: Holdings
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 006: The Veil of Ignorance
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 007: The Prisoners' Dilemma
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 008: Utilitarianism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le_4.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 009: Public Reason
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 010: Deontology
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 011: Second Best
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 012: Virtue Ethics
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 013: Conduct Rules and Decision Rules
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 014: Fact and Value
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 015: Transparency
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 016: Positive and Normative Legal Theory
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 017: The Rule of Law
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 018: Justice
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 020: Causation
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 021: Speech Acts
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_4.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 022: Intention
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 023: Procedural Justice
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 024: Balancing Tests
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 025: Social Welfare Functions
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, and Principles
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 027: Personhood
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 028: Concepts and Conceptions
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 029: Public and Private Goods
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 030: Textualism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 031: Virtue Jurisprudence
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 032: Fit and Justification
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 033: Holism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 034: Hohfeld
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le_4.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 035: Strict Construction and Judicial
      Activism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 036: Indeterminacy
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 037: Overlapping Consensus & Incompletely
      Theorized Agreements
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 038: The Internal Point of View
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/05/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 039: Primary and Secondary Rules
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 040: Functional Explanation in Legal Theory
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 041: Metaethics
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 042: Consent
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/11/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and Instrumentalism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/05/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 044: Legal Theory, Jurisprudence, and the
      Philosophy of Law
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/05/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 045: The Attitudinal Model and the New
      Institutionalism
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/legal_theory_le_3.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 046: Legitimacy
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/legal_theory_le_2.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 047: The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/legal_theory_le_1.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 048: Libertarian Theories of Law
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/06/legal_theory_le.html>

    * Legal Theory Lexicon 049: Distributive Jus
      
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2005/07/legal_theory_le.html>




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