To: [email protected]
Subject: Cato's TechKnowledge: Government-Run Cyber Security? No, Thanks
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2009 08:07:33 -0700
From: [email protected]





Government-Run Cyber Security? No, Thanks

Issue #123, March 13, 2009

by Jim Harper


Most people assume, and it's probably true, that our nation�s networks and 
databases aren't secure enough. The risks range from corporate espionage to 
data breach and identity fraud to "cyber warfare." The White House is taking on 
this problem—it's conducting a 60-day cyber security review. The review should 
explicitly deny federal responsibility for securing private infrastructure.

The president regards his budget as a "blueprint for America's future." His 
opponent in the recent election wanted to be commander-in-chief of the United 
States. So it wouldn't be surprising if the review set the stage for a federal 
takeover of communications networks in the name of cyber security. But owning 
cyber security may be an
unappealing prospect even for federal authorities with an expansive view of 
their roles. The surveillance needed for government-run cyber security would 
create prohibitive threats to civil liberties and privacy. And government folks 
seem aware that they don't know how to do cyber security any
better than anyone else.

How do you improve security without exploding government power? How do you do 
it without giving the government de facto surveillance over the Internet? And, 
most importantly, how do you actually figure out how to do it?

The economic statement of the problem is this: Network operators, data owners, 
and users sometimes create externalities—risks to others that don't affect 
their own bottom lines. Getting them to internalize those risks can be done one 
of two ways: Regulation—you mandate it—or
liability—you make them pay for harms they cause others. Regulation and 
liability each have strengths and weaknesses, but a liability regime is 
ultimately superior.

One of the main problems with regulation—especially in a dynamic field like 
technology—is that it requires a small number of people to figure out how 
things are going to work for an unknown and indefinite future. Those kinds of 
smarts simply don't exist. So regulators often punt:
When the Financial Services Modernization Act tasked the Federal Trade 
Commission with figuring out how to secure financial information, it didn't. 
Instead, the "Safeguards Rule" simply requires financial
institutions to have a security plan. If something goes wrong, the FTC will go 
back in and either find the plan lacking or find that it was violated, much 
like the body-bagging the SEC does.

Another weakness of regulation is that it tends to be too broad. In an area 
where risks exist, regulators will ban entire swaths of behavior rather than 
selecting among the good and bad. In 1998, for example, Congress passed the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, and the FTC set up an 
impossible-to-navigate regime for parental approval of the websites their 
children could use. Today, no child has been harmed by a site that complies 
with COPPA because there really aren't any. The market for serving children
entertaining and educational content is a shadow of what it could be.

Regulators and regulatory agencies are also subject to "capture." In his recent 
caution against network neutrality regulation, Tim Lee shows how industries 
have historically co-opted the agencies intended to control
them and turned those agencies toward insulating incumbents from competition.

And regulation often displaces individual justice. The Fair Credit Reporting 
Act preempted state law causes of action against credit bureaus that, thus, 
cannot be held liable for defamation when their reports wrongfully cause 
someone to be denied credit. "Privacy" regulations under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act gave enforcement powers to an 
obscure office in the Department of Health and Human Services. While a 
compliance kabuki dance goes on overhead, people who have suffered privacy 
violations are diverted to seeking redress by the grace of a federal agency.

Tort liability is based on the idea that someone who does harm, or allows harm 
to occur, should be responsible to the injured party. When a person drives a 
car, builds a building, runs a hotel, or installs a light switch, he or she 
owes it to anyone who might be injured to keep them safe. A rule of this type 
could apply to owners and operators of networks and databases.

A liability regime is better at discovering and solving problems than 
regulation. Owners faced with paying for harms they cause will use the latest 
knowledge and their intimacy with their businesses to protect the public. Like 
regulation, a liability regime won't catch a new threat the first
time it appears, but as soon as a threat is known, all actors must improve 
their practices to meet it. Unlike regulations, which can take decades to 
update, liability updates automatically.

Liability also leaves more room for innovation. Anything that causes harm is 
forbidden, but anything that does not cause harm is allowed. Entrepreneurs who 
are free to experiment will discover consumer-beneficial products and services 
that improve health, welfare, life, and longevity.

Liability rules aren�t always crystal clear, of course, but when cases of harm 
are alleged in tort law, the parties meet in a courtroom before a judge, and 
the judge neutrally adjudicates what harm was done and who is responsible. When 
an agency enforces its own regulation, it's not neutral:
Agencies work to "send messages," to protect their powers and budgets, and to 
foster future careers for their staffs.

Especially in the high-tech world, it's hard to prove causation. The forensic 
skill to determine who was responsible for an information age harm is still too 
rare. But regulation is equally subject to evasion. And liability acts not 
through lawsuits won, but by creating a protective incentive
structure.

One risk unique to liability is that advocates will push to do more with it 
than compensate actual harms. Some would treat the creation of risk as a 
"harm," arguing, for example, that companies should pay someone or do something 
about potential identity fraud just because a data breach
created the risk of it. They often should, but blanket regulations like that 
actually promote too much information security, lowering consumer welfare as 
people are protected against things that don't actually harm them.

As complex and changing as cyber security is, the federal government has no 
capability to institute a protective program for the entire country. While it 
secures its own networks, the federal government should encourage the adoption 
of state common law duties that require network operators, data
owners, and computer users to secure their own infrastructure and assets. (They 
in turn will divide up responsibility efficiently by contract.) This is the 
best route to discovering and patching security flaws in all the implements of 
our information economy and society.

The White House's 60-day cyber security review should explicitly deny federal 
responsibility for securing private communications infrastructure. This is the 
best way forward—and an essential route if we are to keep the government from 
monitoring and controlling Americans' private
communications.


 Jim Harper ([email protected]) is the director of information policy studies at 
the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. (www.cato.org/tech). To subscribe or see 
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TechKnowledge articles,
visit  www.cato.org/tech/tk-index.html.

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