is this the death of the dollar? (interesting)
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 By Edmund Conway
Published: 7:32PM BST 20 Jun 2009

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/e...he-dollar.html<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/5586543/Is-this-the-death-of-the-dollar.html>


After two smugglers were stopped last week with what at first appeared to be
$134bn in US state bonds, the tension and paranoia surrounding the fate of
the dollar hit a new high.

Border guards in Chiasso see plenty of smugglers and plenty of
false-bottomed suitcases, but no one in the town, which straddles the
Italian-Swiss frontier, had ever seen anything like this. Trussed up in
front of the police in the train station were two Japanese men, and beside
them a suitcase with a booty unlike any other. Concealed at the bottom of
the bag were some rather incredible sheets of paper. The documents were
apparently dollar-denominated US government bonds with a face value of a
staggering $134bn (£81bn).

How on earth did these two men, who at first refused to identify themselves,
come to be there, trying to ride the train into Switzerland carrying bonds
worth more than the gross domestic product of Singapore? If the bonds were
genuine, the pair would have been America's fourth-biggest creditor, ahead
of the UK and just behind Russia. No sooner had the story leaked out from
the Italian lakes region last week than it sparked a panoply of conspiracy
tales. But one resounded more than any other: that the men were agents of
the Japanese finance ministry, in the country for the G8 meeting, making a
surreptitious journey into Switzerland to sell off one small chunk of the
massive mountain of US bonds stacked up in the Japanese Treasury vaults.

In the event, late last week American officials confirmed that the notes
were forgeries. The men, it appeared, were nothing more than ambitious
scamsters. But many remain unconvinced. And whether fake or otherwise, the
story underlines one important point about the world economy at the moment:
that the tension and paranoia surrounding the fate of the US dollar has hit
a new high. It went to the heart of the big question: will the central
bankers in Japan, China and elsewhere continue to support the greenback even
in the wake of the worst financial crisis in modern history, or will they
abandon it as America's economic hegemony dissipates?

Dollar obituaries are nothing new. The currency has been presumed dead more
times than Shane Macgowan. But like the lead singer of The Pogues, the
greenback has somehow withstood repeated knocks and scrapes over the years
and lived on, battered, bruised and a couple of teeth the lighter, to fight
another day. In the 1970s and 1980s there were plenty predicting its demise,
although at that point the main challenger was the Japanese yen. And in the
years preceding this crisis, economists and investors including Peter Schiff
and George Soros were lining up to declare the dollar's demise as the
world's reserve currency. In the late 1990s, the creation of the euro gave
dollar sceptics another stick to beat the currency with, and no doubt the
European currency has claimed some of the prominence in its first decade.

Now, following the collapse of the global financial system, those warnings
have become louder still, and ever more difficult to dismiss – because this
time around there are threatening noises coming from those who actually have
the power to do something about it. First came a paper from Zhou Xiaochuan,
the governor of the People's Bank of China (PBoC), a couple of months ago,
positing the idea of introducing the special drawing right (SDR) – a kind of
internal currency at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – as an
international reserve currency. These calls were then repeated, with more
force, by the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, who last week declared
that the world needed new reserve currencies in addition to the dollar.

And this time around, the dollar is most certainly suffering. Since 2002 its
trade-weighted strength – calculated against a basket of other currencies –
has fallen by more than a quarter, from 112 to 81 points. In the same
period, the proportion of dollars held by reserve managers in leading
central banks has also taken a dive. According to figures from the IMF,
confirmed holdings of dollars in government vaults, from Beijing and Tokyo
to London and Paris, fell from 71pc of reserves to 64.5pc between 2002 and
2008.

However, detecting what is really happening in the world of foreign exchange
reserves is notoriously closer to an art than a science. For instance,
figures from April seemed to suggest a fall in China's holdings of US
Treasuries – something 'dollapocalypticists' pounced on at the time. But
according to Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations, the country
was merely rejigging its Treasury portfolio rather than liquidating parts of
it. In such an opaque world it is little wonder the conspiracy theories over
those two Japanese smugglers show little sign of dissipating.

Nonetheless, for US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who has inherited his
predecessors' role as dollar wallah-in-chief, the currency's travails have
made it all the more difficult for him to repeat the mantra that he
"believes in a strong dollar" while keeping a straight face. Indeed, when he
tried to insist at a university lecture in Beijing earlier this month that
"Chinese financial assets are very safe," it drew floods of laughter from
the audience.

He wasn't playing for laughs, but the irony of the situation is plain to
see. If there were a textbook list of actions one could take to weaken a
currency, the US (alongside most other developed nations) would be following
it to the letter. It has cut interest rates to a whisker above zero; it has
engaged in quantitative easing, pumping cash directly into the economy; it
has committed to spending trillions of dollars on a fiscal stimulus package
designed to pull the country out of recession; it has pledged tacitly to
support its stricken banks so that no major institution is allowed to
collapse. In any normal circumstances, actions like these would hammer a
currency.

According to Stephen Jen of BlueGold Capital Management: "People are having
second thoughts not simply because they don't like the dollar, but they are
having second thoughts about whether US assets are obviously the strongest
assets to own."

Like everything else, the currency's fate depends on how well the US
authorities manage the crisis. The US is balanced on a knife-edge between
possible Japan-style deflation as the weight of all its debts bear down on
it and potential inflation as the force of all its powerful stimulus
measures take root. No one knows for sure which way it will fall, but
neither would be particularly good for the currency, and by extension for
those who hold much in the way of dollar assets.

And China and all other major central banks which have trillions of dollars
in their vaults, face something of a dilemma. Any fall in the greenback will
cause the value of their investments to slide. Even if they wanted to exit,
there seems no easy way of doing so without provoking some serious
self-harm. Indeed, according to Olivier Accominotti, a PhD economist at
Paris's Sciences Po university, the situation is not unlike that faced by
France in the 1920s, as it sought to reduce its massive sterling reserves.
The Bank of France found itself in a "sterling trap" in which it "could not
continue selling pounds without precipitating a sterling collapse and a huge
exchange loss for itself".

Neil Mellor, of Bank of New York Mellon, said: "We've got a situation where
Geithner is smiling and has no choice but to stress the credibility and
stability of the US financial and economic system, while the creditors [such
as the Chinese] smile back and say they believe him, while at the same time
giving hand signals to their reserve managers to get rid of these things."

Rather like the brinksmanship on display throughout the Cold War, it is a
dilemma which applies itself to game theory. Both sides know that the dollar
is set to weaken, but both could be set to suffer if they both allowed it to
collapse at the same time. "If you are the Chinese it is in your interest to
play the game – you've got a lot of dollars at stake – but in the long run
you surely want to reduce your holdings and diversify them at the margins,"
says Mellor.

Still, with every passing week, the conjunction of different warning signals
for the US currency seems to evolve and intensify. Recently, the alarm bell
ringing most loudly has been the increase in yields on US Treasuries – a
sign, some fear, of acute nervousness among institutional investors about
the sheer scale of the cash the Obama administration is planning to borrow
in coming years. The Federal Reserve's meeting next week is likely to be
watched attentively by everyone with a stake in the game, as the central
bank indicates whether it is planning to plough more dollars of
newly-created cash into the economy.

But while the debate fixates on the greenback, the issues at heart here go
far deeper. The dollar's fate is intertwined with that of the global
economy. America is on the brink of losing its economic superpower status,
which it will have to share with China at least, if not others, in the
coming years. Holding such a position confers important responsibilities,
none of which is more symbolic than providing the world's reserve currency –
the currency against which all major commodities are denominated, and the de
facto international unit of exchange in trade and finance.

It was a position enjoyed by UK sterling during the first waves of
globalisation in the Victorian era and the final decades of the British
Empire. Eventually, around the time of the Second World War, the dollar
inherited the mantle. At first this was something enshrined in the Bretton
Woods agreement of 1944, which fixed world currencies to the dollar, but
although that system broke down in the 1960s and 1970s, it has remained the
de facto currency of choice.

In a globalised world, with trade being carried out between hundreds of
different nations by thousands of different companies, having an
international standard makes sense: it enables traders to exchange goods
more quickly and efficiently than they would have done otherwise. It may be
invisible to us, but the vast majority of foreign exchange transactions –
particularly those between smaller nations – involve the dollar. Exchange
your sterling for Thai baht and you're actually swapping pounds for dollars
for baht, whatever the exchange booth says. Even the much-vaunted exchange
arrangements by the Brazilian and Chinese are designed not to disrupt these
foundations, but merely to smooth things over for importers and exporters.

But a by-product of the dollar's dominance has been the skewing of the
world's monetary system. By dint of having this blessed position, the US has
been able to finance ever-larger current account and fiscal deficits, with
both the government and the public borrowing from overseas, at cheap rates
of interest. It has been able to sell US Treasuries at interest rates that
other countries can only dream of because of this position as reserve
currency. It has had a captive consumer – both because its government bonds
are something of a safe haven and because those wishing to peg their
currencies against the dollar and enhance their trade flows have little
choice but to buy US Treasuries.

And this mutated international monetary system that has evolved since the
1960s is largely responsible for the crisis into which the world has tipped.
Because it was able to borrow off other countries at such low rates without
enduring the market punishment – in other words higher interest rates –
America was able to build up massive current account deficits which poured a
record amount of debt throughout its economy, which manifested itself in the
financial crisis.

Indeed, as Mervyn King said in a speech earlier this year: "At the heart of
the crisis was the problem identified but not solved at Bretton Woods – the
need to impose symmetric obligations on countries that run persistent
current account surpluses and not just on countries that run deficits. From
that failure stemmed a chain of events, no one of which alone appeared to
threaten stability, but which taken together led to the worst financial
crisis any of us can recall."

When the PBoC's Zhou referred to the SDRs he was not merely questioning the
dollar's pre-eminence. He was indicating something far more radical – that
China supports plans for a new Bretton Woods-style agreement to manage the
flows of cash around the world. At that seminal conference in 1944, John
Maynard Keynes's original idea, which was watered down by Harry Dexter White
of the US Treasury, was for an international reserve currency, Bancor, fixed
against a basket of 30 currencies, and that countries would be penalised if
their current accounts swung too far into surplus or deficit. It is an idea
which is now being dusted off from history books by officials in finance
ministries around the world, including in China.

Such a radical shake-up would cause earthquakes in the currency markets, a
prospect which perhaps makes it unlikely. So in the absence of such a deal,
how is the dollar's role likely to evolve in the coming years? The short
answer is that no one should expect it to lose its reserve currency status
any time soon. It took around half a century for Britain to cede this
position to the US, even after being overtaken in true economic might.

One possibility is that the SDR may be used increasingly as a means of
denominating assets in accounts, but this is something which would take
place gradually, over a course of some years. But even if that is a bridge
towards a multi-polar world, in which other currencies vie with the dollar
for influence, it will take some time – perhaps 30 years or more, according
to Stephen Jen. "People should look at history," he said, referring to
sterling's pre-eminence in the first part of the 20th century. "There's a
real incumbency advantage."

Jim O'Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, sees the next few years as
something of a "vacuum period".

"The BRIC countries [Brazil, Russia, India and China] are becoming so much
more important, while the G7, including the US declines, which raises issues
about the degree of dominance of the dollar. The problem is that the
currencies of the BRICS are the ones that matter, but they won't let you
export or use their currencies.

"Until we see another five years' of evidence over whether China is a more
consumer-driven economy, becoming bigger and bigger, and whether the euro
can have a successful second decade, the dollar looks set to remain
dominant."

China has made some hints about loosening its hold over the yuan in recent
months, but these are only early manoeuvres. A second step would be to allow
the yuan to become a part of the SDR – whose own value is determined by
those of a basket of currencies including the dollar, pound and euro. As Jen
adds, there are certain prerequisites any contender to the crown of world
reserve currency needs in its pocket.

"We have to ask this question: is Russia going to provide asset market that
will be as liquid, reliable property rights, the rule of law, currency
convertibility and so on? Will we see the same from the likes of China?
Their task is very daunting."

Referring to the forged Treasury bonds picked up on the Japanese smugglers
on the Swiss border, he adds: "There is a message here: we haven't heard
much about anyone counterfeiting roubles. That is probably telling you
something."




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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