On Fri, 30 Dec 2016 06:48:12 +0000 Leah Rowe <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi all, Hi,
> Minifree has launched a new freedom-friendly computer. Two, in fact. > [...] > > Desktop/workstation version: > https://minifree.org/product/libreboot-d16/ > > Server version: > https://minifree.org/product/libreboot-d16-server/ This is really nice. Having more choice makes it easier to find computers that suits the users (while still respecting their freedom). > This is a high-end AMD server platform, being sold in server and > extended ATX (desktop/workstation) form factor. It comes with Debian > and Libreboot preinstalled. For a server use case, how does debian compares to Trisquel. What compromises do organisations like the FSF do when using Trisquel as a server operating system? As far as I know, PureOS[1] is based on debian but is not yet certified. If and When it is certified, could it be used instead of debian, and what would the downsides of using it be compared to debian? > This has positive implications for security in terms of audability, > and therefore privacy in general (no backdoors!). It's also free > software friendly, so there are zero binary blobs and zero proprietary > software running on it in the OS or BIOS. You have all of the four > freedoms over each part of the boot process, which means that you the > user are in full control. Not only, from the website[2]: > FlexVer > This is a new upcoming add-on/extension for the D16, ETA some time in > 2017. According to the minifree website it also contains "FlexVer". It is also used on the Talos Secure Workstation[2], and if I understand correctly the documentation[1][3][4] it is really a breaktrough, because so far we had either: - Proprietary software, that runs at boot, that we cannot trust, and that was meant to ensure the integrity of the boot software, like with the TPM application inside the management engine. Here trusting the management engine is not possible. - Free sofware that we could choose to trust, but without any strong way of verifying its integrity. In my opinion it's far better than the proprietary software approach, but if people get used to have boot integrity, we should try to have it too, not to hamper the migration to free software. In many cases it is also a desirable thing to have if the user can control it (that means that the user can disable it and/or modify its functionality). As free software is flexible, several ways already existed, each with their advantages and downsides: - Not doing any integrity checks. Security was still possible by preventing attackers from using the machine (for instance with a password in grub) and forcing the attacker to physically open the machine to temper with it (which could be mitigated by using "seals" made with glider glue or nail polish with random patterns that are supposed not to be easily reproducible) . - Using the TPM to do integrity checking. Since by default nothing was forcing the TPM to be initialized setting part of the boot flash read-only can help, but as far as I know the flashrom patches to do it are not merged yet. - Using the chromebooks security model which is a combinaison of several approaches at once, including the two mentioned above. References: ----------- [1]https://puri.sm/pureos/ [2]https://minifree.org/product/libreboot-d16/ [3]https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/documentation/flexver_intro.pdf [4]https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-secure-workstation/updates/talos-fpga-functions-and-responsibilities-part-1 [5]https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-secure-workstation/updates/talos-fpga-functions-and-responsibilities-part-2 Denis.
