>> qemu-pr-helper exits to help qemu do the high-privileged scsi related >> jobs. >LIBVIRTD is responsible to launch qemu-pr-helper and qemu, and set >selinux/DAC labels for them and their socket. >> >> # >> # >> # >> # >> # ___________ >> # ___________|libvirtd |__________ >> # | |___________| | >> # | | | >> # | | | >> # _________|________ _____|______ ___|____ >> # | qemu-pr-helper |__| vm1.sock |_____| qemu1 | >> # |__________________| |____________| |________| >> >> There may be other jobs quite like qemu-pr-helper, shall we make them as >"complex" as the qemu-pr-helper scheme? >> Will it be OK to just let qemu send an EVENT to libvirtd, and let libvirtd >> do the >SCSI/other jobs? Will it be OK if we remove qemu-pr-helper and similar >processes? >> What's the disadvantage if we let libvirtd do there high privileged jobs >> instead >qemu-pr-helper-like processes? > >No what you describe is not desired. Any process which is vital for the >runtime of the VM needs to stay as simple and minimal as possible and >separate from libvirtd. > >Libvirtd is a complex big application dealing with multiple things at >once and also the architecture allows for libvirtd to be stopped and >upgraded. > >This does not play well with the fact that processes as the PR helper >are always required. > >Merging them into libvirtd would make the VM stop until libvirtd is >running again. Additionally if any of the operations require persistent >kernel state as e.g. file descriptors, this would be impossible as >stopping libvirtd process would close the FDs which may be then >impossible to reopen properly e.g. due to state.
Thanks! Besides these reasons above, will it weaken security if we let libvirtd do these jobs? For example, Such sayings, like "libvirtd would become the focus from attacking forces", make sense? -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list
