Sorry for misunderstood the code ,test and submit the patch mistakenly, will submit a new one.
2012/6/8 Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> > On Tue, Jun 05, 2012 at 02:21:10PM +0800, Royce Lv wrote: > > Libvirt-socket-rw and libvirt-socket-ro are not used only for libvirt or > > root user, > > but also for unprivileged application such as vdsm, > > Restrain the rundir only read/search for libvirt prevent comunication > > with unprivileged client,change rundir the permission equals to the > sockets > > permission. > > See bug: > > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=828073 > > > > Signed-off-by: lvroyce <[email protected]> > > --- > > daemon/libvirtd.c | 2 +- > > 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.c b/daemon/libvirtd.c > > index c74cd43..6095072 100644 > > --- a/daemon/libvirtd.c > > +++ b/daemon/libvirtd.c > > @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ daemonUnixSocketPaths(struct daemonConfig *config, > > if (!(rundir = virGetUserRuntimeDirectory())) > > goto error; > > > > - old_umask = umask(077); > > + old_umask = umask(022); > > if (virFileMakePath(rundir) < 0) { > > umask(old_umask); > > goto error; > > The bug you quote above talks about being unable to connect > to /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock for the privileged libvirtd. > > The change you are proposing here only touches unprivileged > libvirtd when it creates $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt. > > Furthermore the change you are proposing is a security flaw, > since the $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt directory is *only* intended > to be accessed by the current unprivileged user. Using a umask > of 022 lets it be accessible to any user. > > So NACK to this > > Daniel > -- > |: http://berrange.com -o- http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/:| > |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org:| > |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/:| > |: http://entangle-photo.org -o- http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc:| >
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