As specified in BOLT 3, in the commitment transactions the to_local output is time-locked with OP_CSV while the to_remote is a simple P2WPKH. The to_local output must be time-locked in order to allow the other party to come online and sweep funds from a published revoked commitment. In the case of an honest unilateral close, however, this wastes the time-value of capital locked in the channel for the publisher but not the other party.
This seems to create perverse incentives where a party that goes offline and forces a unilateral close is not penalized and only the party that broadcasts is. I see this as a problem in both normal operation and attack scenarios. Consider cases where the peer is misbehaving and the node needs to broadcast to chain. Concretely, consider a case where the other party does not send an update_fail_htlc after it expires. A rational node might decide to just become unresponsive instead of broadcasting the commitment in the hopes that the other party publishes instead. Or if the value of the HTLC is sufficient, it would want to claim the time-locked output ASAP in which case the misbehaving peer is not punished and gets access to its funds immediately. I find it easier to analyze the game theory of these situations if the to_remote output is also time-locked by the to_remote_delay. Making the consequence of an on-chain settlement symmetric changes the game from chicken  to a tragedy of the commons . I'm curious how other people think about this. -jimpo  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game)  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons
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