Good morning Johan,

> C must also make sure the detour route stays within the fee limit of course.

This is indeed quite correct.  Contrariwise, if the detour route charges a fee 
that is even just 0.001 satoshi lower than the fee that C would charge, then it 
would still be rational to make this attempt: there is a nonzero change to earn 
0.001 satoshi, whereas the alternative (fail the route) earns C 0 fees.

Another issue, is that the by inserting the switch-ephemeral-keys hop packet, a 
hop packet at the end may be pushed off, and C cannot know this.  However, the 
same argument applies: the alternative is earning 0 fees.

Christian Decker pointed out that the D->C->A cycle could be rebalanced so that 
the C<->D link could pass the payment through.  However, this has the slight 
disadvantage.  If the route actually terminates to a payee further off at F, 
and it fails between F and E, then C has already paid for the rebalancing.  
Using this technique, C neither earns nor loses money.

This also increases the anonymity set, of rendez-vous routing.  A rendez-vous 
supporting node may be used, not for rendez-vous, but instead, this link-level 
payment rerouting.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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